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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
•  Burundi has known a decade of civil war and a history marked by episodes of intense violence 
since its independence in 1962. The ethnic bi-polar nature of the social and political landscape has 
structured the violence. Five moments can be identified: 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, 1993 and more than 
a decade of civil war that followed. The nature of the Burundian conflict results in the fact that dealing 
with the past is complex and difficult. Burundi did not choose a strategy of amnesty during the peace 
negotiations. As a result of a UN Security Council resolution in June 2005 the government of Burundi 
and the United Nations are undertaking discussions to install a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and  a  Special  Tribunal.  Although  not  officially provided, there  are  discussions  to use  a  traditional 
conflict  resolution  mechanism,  the  Bashingantahe  counsels.  These  counsels  are  a  customary 
institution comparable to the Gacaca in neighbouring Rwanda. The Bashingantahe are a committee of 
wise men in small communities (on the hills) representing a set of values commonly referred to as the 
Ubushingantahe. 
 
•  This report presents the findings of six months of fieldwork in six rural communities in different 
regions in Burundi. The research activities had the objective to explore the expectation of “transitional 
justice” from below. The findings reveal how the nature of (an) “official” transitional space should be 
shaped in the perception of ordinary people. The objective was also to gain insight into how the “space 
of  transition”  is  currently  (being)  shaped  and  experienced  at  the  officially  proclaimed  end  of  the 
political transition period. Are ‘transitional justice’ activities already taking place in an informal and 
unofficial  manner through  popular  practices? If so, can  they  inform  the  ‘official’  transitional  justice 
policy?  The  findings  of  the  research  activities  contribute  to  the  debate  on  transitional  justice  by 
bringing in the voices of ordinary Burundians – actors that have often been absent in their own history, 
at least when it comes to participation in the decision-making process that directly affects their lives. It 
is primordial that donor interventions and/or support to the transitional justice policy and mechanisms 
are based upon an informed insight into the local practices and perceptions of the ordinary population. 
 
•  Six months of fieldwork were undertaken in rural Burundian communities (hills) in 2008 in order 
to explore the expectations of transitional justice. The following principles were used in the design of 
the study: (1) establishing variance in the sites for in-depth study (multi-sited); (2) understanding the 
breadth  and  the  depth  of  processes;  (3)  combining  quantitative  &  qualitative  research  strategies 
(mixed method). Six local communities (hills) were selected situated in the different regions of Burundi 
for  in-depth  study.  In  total  625  respondents  were  consulted  through  focus  group  discussions, 
individual interviews, a survey and/or life history interviews.  
 
•  Burundians have experienced over a decade of violence since 1993, the start of the civil war. 
Considering the ethnic identities of respondents the findings indicate that both Hutu and Tutsi were 
severely affected by traumatic experiences. Some differences can be discerned revealing something 
about the particularity of the nature of the violence each group endured. Tutsi respondents report 
more destruction of property compared to Hutu while Hutu voice that they experienced more pillaging 
of belongings. Revealing is the fact that respondents belonging to the Tutsi ethnic group encountered 
more violent deaths of family members compared to Hutu. Hutu on the other hand were more affected 
by  the  loss  of  family  members  due  to  disease.  Especially  the  people  currently  still  living  in 
displacement camps were severely affected by the violence and war.  
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•  In March 1972 a Hutu uprising started in the southern region, especially in the area around 
Rumonge.  Attacks  targeted  the  government  and  its  military  forces.  Thousands  of  Tutsi  were 
massacred, mostly in the south but also in Bujumbura. In response all Hutu intellectuals and their 
families throughout the country were targeted in an orchestrated campaign of so-called “purification”. 
The “events” of 1993 play a similar role in the memory of Tutsi. The response to “events” of 1972 was 
a policy of amnesia. Although the fact that the experience of 1972 was sometimes a preventive factor 
in the unfolding of the violence in 1993, that violent episode in Burundi’s history functioned in the 
majority of the cases as a catalyst. The events of 1988 in the communes of Ntega and Maranga and 
later in 1993 on many hills throughout the country took place since ordinary people remembered the 
events of 1972. In an indirect way the findings of the field research suggest that not dealing with the 
violent events of the past – as with the events of 1972 – results in the fact that the past can and will 
function as the seed of new violent conflict in the future. 
 
•  Life for ordinary Burundians has slowly turned to a form of normality again since the main rebel 
group (CNDD-FDD) and the government signed a cease-fire agreement in 2003. Although overt and 
intense hostilities faded since 2003, it does not mean that the peasantry is free of violence. There are 
many small arms circulating in the civilian population and banditry is rife. In general, people are of the 
opinion that the judicial institutions are unable to tackle these crimes. Apart from a fragile security 
situation people often refer to abject poverty and the lack of service delivery by state institutions as 
elements that characterize life after war.  The consequences of the war are often referred to as land 
problems  arising  from  a  multitude  of  population  movements  in  the  course  of  history.  Facing  the 
upheaval of the past often comes down to dealing with these complex land issues. 
 
•  Although the feeling of security is weak and the economic situation is bad, the peasants we 
spoke to are also of the opinion that the recent political changes in Burundi are resorting effects. Many 
of  the  respondents  refer  to  the  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  of  2005  as  democratic. 
Although  many  are aware of  the fact that the  government is not performing, they are also of the 
opinion that a new  horizon  has  been  established in  the  political  sphere.  The  fact that people  are 
convinced  that  the  political  situation  can  be  influenced  through  the  ballot  box  is  a  very  important 
change in the history of Burundi. There has been a time that only taking up arms was perceived as the 
avenue  to  facilitate  change.  The  sentiment  that  influence  can  be  exercised  is  reinforced  by  the 
perceptions on the restructuring of the security forces. 
 
•  The only localities where opinions on the new government and the political and social situation 
at the local level are different, is in the displacement camps. Inhabitants of these camps are almost 
exclusively of Tutsi identity. They are reluctant to return home because they don’t have anything to 
return to but also because they are afraid. They fear their erstwhile neighbours, some of whom might 
have played a role in the past. They also look at the new political situation suspiciously. The people 
who used to live in the displacement camps but have returned in the meantime are often satisfied with 
their return. They appreciate the fact that they are living among their former neighbours and in close 
proximity to their fields. But they are aware of the fragility of the situation. The traumatic experiences 
of the past are scars that do not heal easily. 
 
•  The  findings  of  the  research  suggest  that  related  to  the  transitional  justice  process  a 
fundamental decision needs to be made between ‘digging up the past’ or ‘burying the past’. This is the 
most  important  decision  to  be  taken  and  the  most  important  discussion  to  be  held.  Ordinary  
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Burundians were not consulted when the main features of a transitional justice process were laid out. 
They were not consulted with respect to the fundamental question whether they wanted a transitional 
justice process, although the “national consultations” that started in July 2009 must give them the 
opportunity to voice some opinions on the mechanisms identified to deal with the past. But ordinary 
people  are  not  enough  informed  to  voice  a  well-considered  opinion  on  the  technicalities  of  the 
mechanisms already envisioned to be used. 
 
•  A recurring expression was “Nta kuzura akaboze” when expressing a preference not to bring to 
light – in some way - the ‘events’ of the past. The expression can be translated as: “one does not have 
to dig up what has been buried/is rotten”. It means that it is better to leave behind what happened in 
the past and what has been left untouched for a long period. Bringing ‘bad experiences’ into the open 
would have negative consequences. An expression that was often used as well but expresses the 
opposite  strategy  is  “ibuye  ryaserutse  ntiryica  isuka”  meaning  that  “the  stone  uncovered  will  not 
damage your hoe in the future”. This expression is used when the idea is propagated that the ‘events’ 
of the past, their origins and consequences need to be treated openly and with care. The majority of 
the people consulted prefer the option to leave the past behind by “not digging up what has been 
buried”. An insight corroborated by the findings of other large-scale scientific research projects. 
 
•  A question probed into the expectations of the respondents with the specific reference to the 
mechanisms such as the Truth, Pardon and Reconciliation Commission, the Special Tribunal and the 
Bashingantahe counsels together.1 This response should thus be interpreted by taking into account 
that  respondents  formulate  their  opinions  within  the  framework  of  these  three  mechanisms.  The 
findings  suggest  that  our  respondents  prioritize  other  objectives  than  the  ones  laid  down  in  the 
framework  of  the  Arusha  Peace  Accords.  Truth  and  accountability  are  not  as  often  cited  as 
reconciliation, communal ritual activities or pardon. “Communal-ritual activity” refers to the ideas of 
“coming together to talk (about what happened)”; “to honor the victims” and “to integrate people in 
society”.  
 
•  Respondents portray a general awareness that virtually everybody has been victimized by the 
violence of the past and many have a responsibility in the violent events. The war, massacres and 
‘events’ in general have not left anyone untouched. Not only individuals but the ethnic groups as such, 
Hutu or Tutsi, need to take their part of the responsibility. The longue durée of the responsibility needs 
to be taken into account. Ordinary people are very much aware that identifying the responsibility is a 
complex exercise that needs to go back to distant events. Nevertheless, the primary responsibility for 
all these episodes lies with the political leaders, the administrative authorities and military officers who 
repeatedly resorted to violence as a strategy to rule, as an avenue to obtain access to power or to stay 
in power. The general opinion is that establishing responsibility needs to start with these people and 
not with the ordinary peasants. Although ordinary Burundians are of the opinion that every Burundian 
has to take a part of the responsibility of what happened in Burundi in the different cycles of violence, 
they make a clear distinction between levels of responsibility. 
 
•  The killing of Ndadaye stands out when considering Burundi’s long history of violent episodes. 
The killing of the democratically elected president is for many an event those responsible for need to 
                                                              
1 We refer to a “Truth, Pardon and Reconciliation Commission” and not a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” 
since the Government of Burundi is using the former expression in its communication on the transitional justice 
mechanism. We provide more explanation below.  
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be held accountable. Either because of the symbolic nature of the act (killing democracy and the will of 
the majority) or because it plunged Burundi into a decade of civil war and thus suffering and loss for 
ordinary people, both Hutu and Tutsi. People sometimes make a distinction between “the war between 
the  peasants”  and  “the  war  between  the  armies”.  While  some  periods  where  characterized  by 
confrontation between neighbours at the local level, the general population of Hutu, Tutsi and also 
Twa were as civilian population often caught between two sides of armed groups. 
 
•  Fundamental differences can exist as to whether punishment would be a necessary strategy. 
Some respondents see punishment as a prerequisite to prevent a return the violence and to end a 
culture of impunity. Others are of the opinion that punishing perpetrators of crimes committed in the 
past will result in a return to violence. The majority of the people we talked to prefer pardon over a 
process of accountability on the one hand or a blanket amnesty on the other hand. It is important to be 
aware of the fact that ‘pardon’ does not mean ‘amnesty’. The choices people make for the option of 
pardon are thus not a choice for total oblivion. Ordinary Burundians taking the option for pardon prefer 
an act of pardon with a confession. It signals the need or desire to initiate a sort of dialogue or in its 
most basic manifestation: an encounter. The truth-telling dimension of the element of confession is 
more social and restorative in nature than forensic or narrative.  
 
•  People are very much aware of the fact that a process of dealing with the past and achieving 
the transitional justice objectives will be very difficult due to a range of major obstacles. Especially 
contextual elements to the transitional justice process are often cited as potential obstacles: the social, 
economic, cultural and institutional environment in which our respondents (need to) live and operate. 
Especially the phenomenon of widespread corruption is often cited; entrenched interests, injustices 
and inequalities are (perceived) as severe hindrances to achieve the transitional justice goals. Weak 
institutions are part of this general environment but the justice sector is often cited separately. Not only 
the socio-cultural environment and weak institutions but also issues related to power, politicians and 
the  current  regime  are  considered  to  hinder  the  reaching  of  the  transitional  justice  objectives.  A 
significant part of the respondents is of the opinion that the executive influences the judicial sector. 
 
•  Especially  Tutsi  respondents  consider  politics,  the  government  and  nature  of  power  as  an 
obstacle  with regard  to  accountability (justice).  Fear  of  the  consequences  and  the  overall  political 
situation are considered a potential problem when the truth about the past needs to be established. 
Also here Tutsi respondents give more often voice to the fact that they perceive the nature of the 
political  environment  as  an  obstacle.  A  similar  tendency  is  visible  with  regard  to  the  objective  of 
compensation. A number of the respondents are of the opinion that there are no major obstacles to 
facilitate reconciliation, although a significant part of them refer to the social environment in general as 
not favourable to the reconciliation process. It means that people experience a lack in the initiatives 
that facilitate the co-habitation process. The social tissue at the local level is severely affected by the 
massacres and war. Distrust characterizes life in the communities we visited. 
 
•  The people that participated in the research are not sure whether people can deal with the issue 
of a violent past by themselves. The features of the mechanism(s) that need(s) to deal with the past 
are  unclear.  In  any  case  an  initiation  and  example  of  high-level  authorities  is  necessary.  The 
expression  “umwera  uvuye  ibuku  uca  ukwira  hose”-  “light  comes  from  above”  is  revealing  in  that 
regard. As much as there is awareness of the fact that violence was mainly a political problem initiated 
from above and imposed upon ordinary people, there is also the awareness that the initiative to deal  
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with the past needs to be facilitated as well. Often a distinction is made between the local and the 
national level. Ordinary people emphasize that there are no major problems at the local level. The 
events in the past are the result of what happened at the national level. Prevention of a recurrence of 
the past is thus primarily a political issue for them, while the local level needs assistance in the domain 
of economy, everyday justice, good governance and social cohesion. 
 
•  The study probed into the expectations towards each of the mechanisms that might be used to 
deal with the past. Although there is a general tendency not to “dig up what has been buried”, people 
are  often  in  favour  of  a  Truth,  Pardon  and  Reconciliation  Commission  if  it  will  facilitate  their  co-
habitation. They refer to the fact that reconciliation and living together needs to come from themselves 
but that a mechanism and initiative facilitating this process and mediating between the different social 
and ethnic groups is wanted and even needed. They even expect a mechanism to be decentralized to 
the most remote areas of rural Burundi in order to open a space of dialogue between inhabitants. They 
are reluctant to see an antagonistic and divisive dynamic inserted in their midst. Something they voice 
even more with respect to the discussion on the Special Tribunal. A significant number of people are 
not in favour of a tribunal since it will create tensions, a new round of war or simply because it will not 
be an adequate compensation for the losses. People are aware of the fact that a localized judicial 
procedure will create tensions and fear in their midst. Conflicts and sentiments arising from these 
judicial proceedings will hamper the difficult process of living together again. Other respondents are 
aware of the fact that a process of establishing accountability is necessary but especially with regard 
to the political, administrative and military leaders most responsible for the violence in the past. 
 
•  The Bashingantahe counsels were referred to in the Arusha peace agreement but it remains to 
be seen whether the institution will officially be part of a transitional justice policy since there is no 
mention in the “official” transitional justice strategy. But there is globally an increasing attention for the 
potential use of localized, informal and tradition-based approaches in dealing with the past. In Burundi, 
the Ubushingantahe as a set of culturally specific values and the men and women embodying these 
values – the Bashingantahe - are well-known to the local population and an important factor to be 
taken  into  account  when  exploring  popular  expectations  on  dealing  with  the  past  and  the  social 
dynamics already developing at the local level in the aftermath of violence. However, there are many 
problems, polemics and a process of politicization surrounding the institution and its members. 
 
•  Based on the findings of our study, the Bashingantahe are in general considered to be a source 
of peace and social cohesion at the local level. To come to an understanding of the functioning of the 
Bashingantahe  counsels  and  the  popular  perceptions  on  the  institution  we  asked  whether  people 
would prefer to contact the Bashingantahe counsel or the hill counsel in case of problems or conflict. 
Hutu  respondents  prefer  the  hill  counsel  over  the  Bashingantahe  counsels.  Half  of  the  Tutsi 
respondents prefer the Bashingantahe, while the other half would contact the hill counsel in case of 
conflict and problems. Striking are the responses of demobilized rebels. This is the group that mostly 
challenges the legitimacy of the Bashingantahe in their answers. One has to keep in mind that the 
current leadership in Burundi mainly originates from the rebel forces. The difficult relationship between 
the leadership of the former rebel groups and the Bashingantahe at the national level is thus also 
reflected at the local level. But  it does not seem to be a preoccupation of  the other segments of 
society. 
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•  Two tendencies can be distinguished in the perceptions on the Bashingantahe and the role they 
played during the “crisis”. There is an awareness that some tried and were able to prevent violence or 
temper the intensity of the violence. On the other hand people are also conscious that some of them 
were implicated in the violence. As a consequence, the potential use of the members of the institution 
is mixed as well. To a certain extent people refer to the fact that they are an ideal source of unity and 
peace  at  the  local  level,  a  factor  that  can  facilitate  social  cohesion  and  reconciliation  in  their 
communities.  On  the other  hand respondents sometimes  refer  to the  fact  that  they cannot  “judge 
themselves” since they have been implicated somehow, as victims but sometimes as perpetrators as 
well.  The true Bashingantahe are still considered to represent the values of the country. They might 
take  up  the  role  of  counsellers  and  “sensitizers”,  bringing  people  from  different  social  and  ethnic 
groups together. Undertaking judicial proceedings to identify guilt and responsibility in regard of the 
large-scale crimes is considered to be beyond their abilities and competence. People tend to make a 
tacit distinction between the set of values commonly referred to as Ubushingantahe and the people 
who have to become the representatives of these values over the years, the Bashingantahe. 
 
•  It is important to take into account that ordinary Burundians seem to stress other objectives than 
the typical transitional justice objectives (accountability, truth, reparation, reconciliation) when they are 
asked to reflect on the need to prevent a recurrence of the violence of the past and the increase of 
social cohesion.  It  is  in fact  governance and  development  that  should  be  an  issue  and  only  then 
transitional  justice  (as  qualified  above).  What  is  clear  is  the  relative  importance  attached  to  the 
organization of local level encounters, general meetings without specific focus on transitional justice 
issues,  although  the  latter  issue  is  also  referred  to  in  the  context  of  encounters.  The  return  of 
displaced and refugees to the community is also often cited. In sum, the strengthening of the social 
tissue, the aspect of being together, placing everything in its place as it used to be before everything 
fell  apart,  a  revitalization  of  daily  life  and  interactions  are  tacitly  stressed.  Dialogue,  speech, 
reconciliation, pardon, festivities, ceremonies, reunions, regroupings are notions that often return. 
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Be aware of the “violence” that still exists in society 
 
Although overt hostilities between armed groups have come to an end, it does not mean 
that there is no more violence in Burundi. Both physical and structural violence is still widespread. 
There  are  many  small-arms  circulating  in  the  civilian  population.  Banditry  is  rife.  The  security 
apparatus as well as the judicial institutions are considered to be weak. The performance of the state 
in  terms  of  service  delivery  is  limited.  Corruption  is  widespread  and  poverty  is  abject.  These  are 
obstacles  to  a  transitional  justice  process.  Ordinary  Burundians  are  very  much  aware  of  these 
obstacles. The nature of the overall social, political and institutional environment should be such that a 
genuine  participation  in  a  transitional  justice  process  is  possible.  It  is  therefore  important  to  pay 
sufficient attention to policies and initiatives that will guarantee the continued transformation of society 
and the structures of the state.  
 
Building strong institutions and safeguarding the promise of democracy is crucial 
 
Especially  the  building  of  strong  institutions  and  the  safeguarding  of  the  promise  of 
democracy is crucial. As said, many of the respondents refer to the presidential and parliamentary and 
local elections of 2005 as democratic. Although many are aware of the fact that the government is not 
performing,  they  are  also  of  the  opinion  that  a  new  horizon  has  been  established  in  the  political 
sphere. Also here people are aware of the fragility of the situation but they are, nevertheless, hopeful 
for an inclusive future for all. Some people, both Hutu and Tutsi, voice their grievances. Asked what 
they would do to change the situation, both groups responded that they would vote for other leaders in 
the next elections. The fact that people are convinced that the political situation can be influenced 
through the ballot box is a very important novelty in the history of Burundi. A continued support to this 
fragile  democratisation  process  is  not  only  necessary  to  create  the  necessary  environment  for  a 
genuine transitional justice process, it can be considered as a transitional justice objective in itself. 
Building strong and democratic institutions is a reparation of past wrong. It is equally a guarantee that 
the violence of the past will not be the seed of renewed conflict.  
 
Facilitate the resolution of land conflict, the restructuring of the judiciary and the return of 
displaced and refugees 
 
Ordinary Burundians often consider transitional justice to be something that goes beyond 
the objectives of accountability, truth, reparation and reconciliation. The consequences of the war and 
the long history of violence are often referred to in economic terms and especially as land problems. 
The Burundian conflict was characterized by massive movements of people. Facing the upheaval of 
the past often comes down to dealing with these complex land issues. In addition, when asked to 
reflect on accountability for past crimes ordinary Burundians often refer to the fact that justice should 
be more prospective than retrospective. Punishing crimes that were committed in the past is often 
considered  to  be  unproductive.  Instead,  it  is  desired  to  build  a  strong  judiciary  that  tackles 
contemporary  crimes  and  that  can  function  as  a  deterrent  for  potential  large-scale  human  rights 
abuses. The return of refugees and displaced persons to their hills of origins would also fall outside of 
the scope of a transitional justice process narrowly defined. However, the first step in a process of  
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living together again is often the actual physical living together again. The Burundians we spoke to 
often emphasize the communal-ritual dimensions of a reintegration process as a necessary action to 
deal with a violent past. As long as people do not physically live together it is difficult to also socially 
live together. But also in this domain there are many obstacles. Displaced persons still living in camps 
are afraid to return to their hills of origins. Refugees that have lived in neighbouring countries for years 
or even decades have not only lost the connection with their region of origin, they have often also lost 
their land and belongings. Initiatives that support the reintegration of these people in their communities 
are not only a prerequisite to participate an upcoming transitional justice process, they are part of such 
a process when broadly defined. 
 
Balance the voices from below and the international obligations 
 
The provisions laid down in the Arusha agreement as well as international norms imply 
that Burundi has the obligation to implement a policy that effectively deals with the past. Amnesty for 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide is no option. On the other hand, the findings of this 
study show that the ordinary population of Burundi dominantly prefers the option of “not digging up 
what has been buried” when faced with the fundamental question of dealing with the violence of the 
past or not. Although the latter issue is complex since it does not necessarily imply a strategy of total 
oblivion and amnesty, there is an evident tension between on the one hand the international norms 
and  obligations  and  on  the  other  hand  popular  expectations.  Careful  weighing  pros  and  cons  is 
necessary in order to do justice to both dimensions. Crafting an approach that takes into account both 
perspectives is paramount. 
 
Create sufficient decentralized, socio-cultural insights and expertise  
 
Over  the  past  years,  there  has  been  an  increasing  attention  for  the  use  of  so-called 
traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms in the aftermath of violent conflict. “Traditional” refers 
to indigenous, home-grown dispute settlement mechanisms that operate at the local community level. 
Dealing  with  a  violent  past  -  transitional  justice  -  used  to  be  primarily  a  matter  of  (international) 
tribunals and/or truth commissions. These institutions, however, were modeled on a Western idea of 
doing justice – retributive – or hinged on Western assumptions about the effects of establishing the 
truth  –  spiritual  or  Christian  redemption.  In  addition,  they  often  mainly  operated  in  capital  cities, 
sometimes even abroad. They therefore functioned at physically and psychologically large distances 
for the ordinary population, of whom a significant part had been directly affected by the violence in the 
past. This recent attention for the use of traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms, whether or 
not in parallel with a more distant institution, not only entails a turn towards more culturally appropriate 
and home-grown solutions, it often also implies the decentralization of the judicial procedure and/or 
the  reconciliation  process  to  the  most  remote  local  level:  small  face-to-face  communities.  But 
decentralized applications of justice and reconciliation mechanisms are not as informed as they should 
be. The attention to the socio-cultural dimensions of a transitional justice process necessitates specific 
expertise. The transitional justice field is characterized by “legalism”.  Law and lawyers dominate the 
field. It is necessary to capitalize on other backgrounds and expertise. 
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Capitalize on what already exists in and originates from local communities 
 
The global transitional justice paradigm is informed by sophisticated and well thought-out 
theories and ideas. Generally accepted objectives and mechanisms are transposed to different post-
conflict situations and countries all over the world. But Burundian peasants have their own wisdom 
and insights, their own established practices to deal with these issues. The fieldwork findings have 
established an insight in these opinions, preferences and practices, the worldview of the peasantry. 
The actual implementation of a transitional justice policy will have to take these findings into account. 
The findings related to the popular understandings of “living together again” indicate that the sharing of 
food and drinks, ceremonies of conviviality and the exchange of gifts are important signs of positive 
social relations. Coming together during meetings or in associations are practices often referred to 
when reflecting on activities that will facilitate peaceful co-habitation and social cohesion. Mutual help 
in general and in case of distress or general collaboration between people was also often cited by 
respondents  in  the  group  discussions.  Greeting  each  other  on  pathways  or  neighbourly  visits  are 
considered to be signs of good social cohesion as well.  
 
These signs might seem evident or banal from the perspective of an outsider but what 
one labels as “reconciliation”, “truth”, “accountability” or “compensation” has already taken root in the 
ambiguities of local life. Dealing with the violence of the past and preventing a recurrence in the future 
is  enmeshed  in  the  web  of  tightly  knit  face-to-face  communities,  difficult  to  understand  from  the 
perspective  of  an  outsider  who  is  used  to  different  preconceived  categories  of  what  is  taken  for 
granted. These elements can be supported through a range of activities that go beyond the typical 
transitional justice interventions: the creation of associations, the support of socio-cultural activities 
and groups in the countryside, theatre, radio soap opera’s etc.  
 
In  addition,  it  is  paramount  that  the  transitional  justice  mechanisms  adopted  do  not 
introduce logics that run counter to the popular expectations and the existing practices. Dealing with 
the past from the perspective of an ordinary Burundian peasant, the large majority of the population, 
seems  to  mean  the  facilitation  of  “a  change  of  the  heart”  when  considering  the  interpersonal 
perspective. At the societal level it means a revitalization of the values of Burundian culture and at the 
macro-political level it means an inclusion and integration of all segments of society with powerholders 
operating in the service of the many instead of the few. Taking an inside perspective, it somehow 
means the revitalization of the set of values referred to by the notion Ubushingantahe, understood 
here  in  the  sense  of  the  perennial,  almost  universal  values  embedded  in  Burundian  society,  not 
necessarily the people that claim to be the representatives of these values. 
 
The Ubushingantahe is not necessarily the Bashingantahe 
 
There  is  a  general  confusion  in  the  literature  on  Burundi  between  the  notions 
Ubusingantahe and Bashingantahe. A clear distinction needs to made between the Ubushingantahe 
values and the Bashingantahe counsels. Ubushingantahe refers to a range of values: righteousness, 
sociableness, sagacity, compassion, self-control, responsibility, honour, discretion, hospitality, equity, 
truthfulness, justice, social cohesion, coherence and balance in speech, faithfulness, transparence, 
tolerance, etcetera. The Bashingantahe (plural) are the men (and since recently also women) that 
embody these virtues and promote these values. The institution as such is universal and perennial, 
but not necessarily unchanging, but the members representing the institution are temporal.   
Living Together Again   IOB Working Paper / 2009.06 - 13 
The Expectation of Transitional Justice in Burundi 
   
 
The  Bashingantahe  occupied  fundamental  nodes  in  the  socio-political  order  of  pre-
colonial Burundi. They played an important role in the conflict resolution at the local level while they 
aimed at guaranteeing peace, order and harmony. Due to colonial and post-colonial interventions and 
as  a  consequence  of  natural  changes  that  characterized  the  functioning  of  the  Bashingantahe 
counsels  over  time  more  emphasis  has  been  put  on  the  judicial  features.  The  most  common 
objectives of the Bashingantahe counsels on the local hills in the Burundi countryside are currently 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The one party-state system that characterized Burundi since 
independence did not completely annihilate the Bashingantahe counsels but took over its functioning 
completely and allocated their members from within the centres of power. In doing so, it drained the 
counsels and the practices of its members from their spirit: the Ubushingantahe. It is questionable 
whether the initial values (the Ubushingantahe) underlying the institution could continue to flourish in 
the  structures  of a one party-state,  dictatorial  in  nature and  with a  specific  ideological  and  ethnic 
profile.  Since  1997  several  international  donors  and  aid  agencies  contributed  to  the  so-called 
“rehabilitation” of the institution. This rehabilitation and especially the investiture of the Bashingantahe 
at the national level was not able to counter the continued spectre of politicization of the institution. 
Especially the fact that dignitaries of the old regimes were admitted to the national counsel gave rise 
to  doubts  on  whether  these  persons  embodied  the  values  of  the  institution.  The  incorporation  of 
people that might have played a role in the upheaval of the past did not facilitate the task the institution 
is supposed to play: guarantee unity, promote peace and harmony. The situation at the local level is 
different. Most people are of the opinion that the Bashingantahe are indeed a source of peace and 
harmony. They are legitimate bodies for many segments of society. 
 
One has to take into account both this particular course of the Bashingantahe counsels 
over time as well the nature of the general expectations of the ordinary Burundians. A rehabilitation of 
a set of values is wanted; values that can generally speaking be labelled as Ubushingantahe. Any 
Burundian will have to reintegrate these values in their daily practices, it is not a task solely for the 
Bashingantahe  counsels.  Such  an  operation  cannot  be  decreed  through  legal  texts,  rehabilitation 
operations  focusing  on  detached  nation  level  counsels,  distant  mechanisms  or  policies  imposing 
changes  top-down  through  social  engineering.  It  can  only  be  facilitated  by  adopting  a  carefully 
designed approach with complementary mechanisms. 
 
Complementary approaches are more important than an overall compromise 
 
With a more strict focus on the transitional justice options for Burundi, the findings of this 
study  suggests  that  the  stipulation  of  the  transitional  justice  objectives  and  the  design  of  the 
mechanisms not only need to be informed by the expectations of ordinary Burundians, they also need 
to be impregnated by the wisdom of the peasantry in order to produce the desired outcomes. This is 
no plea for impunity or amnesty. The findings suggest that politics and politicians are considered to 
bear the primary responsibility for the violence experienced in the past. Measures might be taken to 
hold  the  latter  accountable  but  good  governance  issues  and  socio-economic  development  are 
considered to be more important than holding (low-level) perpetrators accountable or establishing the 
truth about what happened. Ordinary Burundians emphasize the need to adopt a non-discursive and 
non-prosecutorial approach that will “open a space to come together again” as their strategy of dealing 
with  the  past.  A  specifically  designed  commission  –  genre  truth  and  reconciliation  commission  – 
complemented by an institution establishing some sort of accountability at some point in time – genre  
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special tribunal - might be part of such a process, if taking place in conjunction with sufficient attention 
for non-judicial and grassroots initiatives. The introduction of one mechanism that needs to achieve 
several  objectives  at  all  levels  of  society  will  be  highly  unproductive.  A  compromise  of  different 
approaches and objectives can facilitate a transitional justice process with regard to one objective or 
one group, but it might at the same time disturb or even hinder the transitional justice process on the 
level of other objectives or from the perspective of other groups in society. One overarching initiative 
will be less productive than a combination of several processes initiated at different moments in time, 
with  different  objectives  and  targeting  different  groups  of  the  population.  Carefully  designed 
approaches introducing complementary logics are needed.   
 
Timing, tempo and sequencing are important 
 
A rushed approach will not yield productive results. A careful reading of the social and 
political forces at play is important. These forces might change over time.   
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Every society that experienced a violent conflict or repression needs to deal with the past, 
somehow. Accountability was the objective that dominated in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
The  Nürnberg  trials  are  an  example.  Truth  commissions  followed,  in  South-Africa  but  previously 
already in several Latin-American countries. Recently, more attention goes to so-called “traditional” 
justice  and  reconciliation  mechanisms.2  Exemplary  for  this  global  tendency  are  the  negotiations 
between the government of Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army. A proposal was formulated to 
use the Mato Oput ritual in the aftermath of the conflict. But collective amnesty, a collective oblivion, 
has often also been a strategy to deal with a violent past. 
 
The United Nations published a report entitled “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies” in 2004. The report states that dealing with the past needs to 
be  part  of  policy  in  post-conflict  situations.  The  objectives  are  multiple:  holding  perpetrators 
accountable,  establishing  the  truth,  compensating  victims  for  the  harm  inflicted  upon  them  and 
establishing reconciliation. The mechanisms to be used are diverse:  tribunals, truth commissions, 
reparation funds but also commemoration monuments, customary rituals and traditions or the use of 
artistic practices such as theatre plays. All are part of the armamentarium to deal with the past. 
 
Burundi is experiencing a period of fragile peace where this question on how to deal with 
the past is asked. Burundi has known a decade of civil war and a history marked by episodes of 
intense violence since its independence in 1962. Five moments can be identified: 1965, 1972, 1988, 




(1) The conflict is primarily political. Ethnic, regional and clan differences and sentiments 
were mobilized for political purposes. 
 
(2) Large-scale crimes were committed in the context of an authoritarian regime and a 
failing attempt to democratize. 
 
(3) The cycli of violence encompass large time periods and every flare of violence was 
considered to be a reprisal for a previous moment of large-scale violence. 
 
(4)  The  number  of  victims  in  the  ordinary  population  (irrespective  of  ethnic  or  other 
identity) is very high. But also the level of participation by the ordinary citizens in the execution of 
these crimes is very high in comparison with other conflicts. 
 
The  nature  of  the  Burundian  conflict  results  in  the  fact  that  dealing  with  the  past  is 
complex and difficult. It can be the source of renewed political upheaval and conflict. But obstacles 
                                                              
2 Huyse, L. & Salter, M., (2008) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African 
Experiences, Stockholm, International Idea. 
3 Vandeginste, S. (2009), “Transitional Justice for Burundi: A Long and Winding Road” in Ambos, K., Large, J. & 
Wierda, M. (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice. Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and 
Development, Springer Publishing, . P. 397  
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can also be identified when looking at it from a social perspective: ordinary citizens, often neighbours 
in small face-to-face living communities, are often either perpetrator or victim and sometimes both. 
Nevertheless, they need to live together again.  
 
Burundi did not choose a strategy of amnesty during the peace negotiations. As a result 
of a UN Security Council resolution in June 2005 the government of Burundi and the United Nations 
are undertaking discussions to install a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Tribunal. 
Both institutions would have a mixed composition with both national and international members. Three 
objectives were put forward: (1) an investigation of crimes and the prosecution and punishment of 
those  responsible;  (2)  mediation  and  reconciliation;  (3)  the  clarification  of  Burundian  history.  A 
balanced mix of truth, reconciliation and accountability is sought. 
 
Moreover,  although  not  officially  provided,  there  are  discussions  to  use  a  traditional 
conflict  resolution  mechanism,  the  Bashingantahe  counsels.  These  counsels  are  a  customary 
institution comparable to the Gacaca in neighbouring Rwanda. The Bashingantahe are a committee of 
wise men in small communities (on the hills) representing a set of values commonly referred to as the 
Ubushingantahe. Apart from the discussion on the ‘official’ mechanisms and the potential use of the 
Bashingantahe, there are also a range of non-state and informal initiatives undertaken and supported 
to  facilitate  the  ‘transitional  justice’  process  in  Burundi.  Such  as  for  example  radio  broadcasts  or 
theatre performances etc. 
 
Burundi’s transitional justice framework detailed in the peace agreements was not the 
result of a local demand. Several other factors played a role. Firstly, it were political calculations made 
by the parties involved that shaped the provisions. Secondly, international non-governmental bodies 
and  lobby  groups  with  the  objective  of  tackling  impunity  and  facilitating  (transitional)  justice  are 
generally instructive and efficient in shaping the specifics of a global paradigm of how dealing with the 
past should preferably look like. Thirdly, the experience and ‘jurisprudence’ coming from other post-
conflict and post-authoritarian situations come to inform other cases and thus the Burundi case as 
well.  
 
The discussions  on  the  next  steps in the  ‘official’  transitional  justice  strategy  and  the 
many informal and non-state initiatives are ongoing in Burundi. All of the actors and institutions that 
take part or will take part in the support, implementation and execution of the transitional justice policy 
will have to take three dimensions into account: 
 
(1) The political context:  political actors will  try to influence the policy to  opt for. In a 
similar way: the chosen policy will influence political actors. 
 
(2)  Popular  expectations:  despite  the fact  that  the  framework  of Burundi’s  transitional 
justice architecture is already defined in the peace agreements and subsequenct decisions by the 
United Nations there is still the outcome of a “national consultation” to be awaited. The “population” is 
being  consulted  on  “transitional  justice”  issues  since  July  2009.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  unclear 
whether the consultation deals with merely the technical details of something already decided on and 
in the hands of more powerful actors. And whether the issue of how to deal with the past will be 
explored in-depth with the findings taken seriously. 
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(3)  The  socio-cultural  environment:  more  than  90%  of  the  Burundian  population  are 
peasants and live in rural areas. Neighbours and fellow villagers have become enemies in the course 
of the conflict due to political, ethnic, regional and other differences. They are starting to live together 
again since the end of the violence and the increasing return of refugees to their hills of origin. On their 
own initiative but also out of necessity they develop strategies to live together again and deal with the 
past. They use elements from the shared social and cultural repertoire to do so. Moreover, apart from 
their actual practices, they have a personal opinion on how to deal (or not deal) with the past. 
 
This report presents the findings of a research project that focused on the expectation of 
(transitional)  justice  by  the  ordinary  peasant  population  in  the  context  of  their  socio-cultural  living 
environment. How would ordinary Burundians want to deal with the past? What is necessary to live 
together again? How to prevent that the violence will characterize the future as much as it did the 
past? The research activities had the objective to explore the expectations of ‘transitional justice’ from 
below. The findings reveal how the nature of (an) “official” transitional space(s) should be shaped in 
the perception of ordinary people. Although a Truth, Pardon and Reconciliation Commission and a 
Special Tribunal are envisioned to deal with the violent past in Burundi, the actual implementation of 
this official ‘transitional justice’ policy is still debated (postponed) in Burundi. It is therefore important to 
gain  insight  into  how  the  ‘space  of  transition’  is  currently  (being)  shaped  and  experienced  at  the 
officially proclaimed end of the ‘political transition’ period. Moreover, are ‘transitional justice’ activities 
already taking place in an informal and unofficial manner through popular practices? 
 
These findings contribute to the debate on transitional justice by bringing in the voices of 
ordinary Burundians – actors that have often been absent in their own history, at least when it comes 
to participation in the decision-making process that directly affects their lives. While bringing in the 
voices of these ordinary people, we pay attention to the socio-cultural context and localized dimension 
in  which  an  (upcoming)  transitional  justice  process  will  be  situated.  It  is  primordial  that  donor 
interventions  and/or  support to  the transitional  justice  policy  and mechanisms  are  based  upon an 
informed insight into the local practices and perceptions of the ordinary population. This insight is 
important in order to anticipate the impact and consequences of the strategy adopted to deal with the 
past.  The  research  activities  undertaken  had  the  objective  to  map  how  external,  state-induced 
interventions might facilitate or hinder the informal way of dealing with the past. 
 
We  first  give  an  overview  of  the  main  features  and  characteristics  of  the  notion 
“transitional  justice”.  We  identify  the  objectives  that  are  dominantly  guiding  transitional  justice 
processes.  A  following  section  gives  a  brief  overview  of  the  (violent)  history  of  Burundi  and 
summarizes the  features  of  transitional justice  mechanisms  and  objectives  adopted  in the  Arusha 
accords and the subsequent negotiations.  
 
Subsequently, we also give an overview of the fieldwork approach and the methodology 
used during this study. Six months of fieldwork in six rural communities (hills) in different regions in 
Burundi were undertaken between January and June 2008. A brief follow-up research was undertaken 
in February 2009. A mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative data and research 
techniques was adopted. 
 
The remainder of the report presents the findings of the fieldwork activities. We first give 
an overview of the traumatic experiences respondents endured during the years of “crisis” and we  
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subsequently establish an insight into the nature of life in the aftermath of violence. Both elements 
function as a general framework to understand the horizon against which ordinary Burundians develop 
their thoughts on dealing with the past. A following section details the main themes in the overall 
expectations  of  (transitional)  justice  in  Burundi:  forgetting  or  digging  up  the  past,  responsibility, 
obstacles that might impede a transitional justice process, perceptions on the mechanisms envisioned 
and, finally, an insight into what it means to live together again in the aftermath of large-scale violence 
and  avenues  that  might  facilitate  this  process.  Recommendations  based  on  these  insights  are 
summarized in the introductory section of the report. 
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2. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: KEY CONCEPTS
4 
 
Countries  that  have  experienced  a  history  of  violent  conflict  or  an  authoritarian  past 
marked by violence, repression and/or exclusion need to deal with these legacies. It is often in the 
context of a “political transition” that a process of “transitional justice” is initiated. We define a political 
transition  as  the  change  from  one  regime  into  another.  Regime  change  takes  places  when 
fundamental attributes of a regime are changing. These attributes can be ideological, behavioural and 
institutional. We define transitional justice as: “[…] the process through which States and societies 
deal with a legacy of large-scale human rights abuses in the context of a change of political regime”
5 
As Stef Vandeginste explains, this definition is precise but suffiently flexible to take into account the 
range of issues and realities associated with the notion ‘transitional justice’.
6 Transitional justice is 
characterized by on the hand the drive to reach certain objectives and on the other hand a range of 
mechanisms that need to  facilitate these objectives. We will have a closer look at the dominating 
objectives: accountability, truth, reparation and reconciliation. These notions structured the fieldwork 
activities undertaken in Burundi. In our discussion of the 
history  of  Burundi,  we  zoom  in  on  the  mechanisms 
envisioned for use in Burundi. 
 
Parmentier uses a dynamic presentation of 
the four objectives of accountability, truth, reparation and 
reconciliation  in  what  he  calls  the  TARR-model.  The 
model  reveals  that  these  notions  are  considered  to  be 
interrelated  and  interdepedent.  There  is  empirical 
uncertainty and normative and theoretical discussion on 
the  importance  of  these  different  transitional  justice 
objectives. The preferred sequencing of the objectives or 
the direction of causality between the different objectives 
is unclear.  We consider all objectives to be important in processes of dealing with the past. Some 
notions might ‘naturally’ be more important after a certain type of violent past while some political 
situations and decisions will prioritize some objectives over others. 
 
  Accountability 
The notion “accountability” refers to processes throught which the criminal responsibility 
of individuals or other entities such as states is being established. Often the establishment of this 
responsibility goes together with sanctioning. Although accountability is often associated with criminal 
justice proceedings, the notion does not necessarily have to involve prosecution in a legal system. 
Accountability is also often associated with court proceedings and tribunals. But it can also involve a 
different way of identifiying, establishing and sanctioning responsibility; this can be the case through 
for example vetting operations.  
                                                              
4 This section relies on Vandeginste, S. (2009), “Law as A Source and Instrument of Transitional Justice in 
Burundi”, Phd. Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Antwerp, pp. 7-42.  
5 Ibid., p. 22 
6 Ibid, p. 23. 
Transitional justice is 
the process through 
which States and 
societies deal with a 
legacy of large-scale 
human rights abuses in 
the context of a change 
of political regime  
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  Truth 
  “Truth”  is  a  complex  notion.  In  the  report  of  the  South-African  Truth  and  Reconciliation 
Commission four dimensions of the ‘truth’ are identified.
7 The ‘forensic truth’ entails answers to the 
basic questions of who, where, when, how and against whom and possibly the context, causes and 
patterns of violations. Other dimensions of the truth – narrative, social and restorative – go beyond this 
factual delineation of ‘actions’. ‘Narrative’ or ‘personal’ truth is related to the subjective experiences of 
people. Truth refers then to perceptions, stories, myths and experiences. The objective is to record the 
lived  reality  by  incorporating  the  ‘meaning’  attached  to  these  facts  by  victim  and  perpetrator, 
bystanders and witnesses. The ‘social truth’ is a third dimension and refers to the interaction taking 
place  through  discussion  and  debate.  And  when  factual  knowledge  is  accompanied  by 
acknowledgment of these events and thus restoring the dignity of victims and survivors one can speak 
of healing or ‘restorative truth’. Facts and meaning are connected and situated in human relationships. 
 
        Reparation 
  What is referred to with the term “reparation” can often also be captured when using similar 
notions such as restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, compensation, redress, etc. The existence of 
this  multitude  in  terms  already  reveals  that  reparation  is  a  complex  issue  as  well.  The  notion 
encompasses a range of measures and actions. In  its most precise manifestation it would be the 
return to the situation that existed before the damaging act took place. Since this return to a previous, 
unharmed  situation  is  per  definition  almost  impossible  the  reparation  measure  will  take  another, 
alternative form.  In it mosts narrow form reparation refers to those measures that benefit the victims in 
a direct way. This will often happen through financial compensation. On the other hand, the most 
broad understanding of the notion entails the guarantee of non-repetition of the harm inflicted. In that 
sense institutional and structural reforms are also part of a reparation process since they will function 
as a preventive measure. In between this wide and narrow definition lie other measures and actions 
                                                              
7 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South-Africa, Report, Vol. 1, London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 
1998, pp. 110-117. See also: A. Boraine, A Country Unmasked. Inside South-Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 288-291. 
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that  can be  associated  with  reparation  ranging  from commemoration  monuments and  exhumation 
activities over a revision of teaching manuals, support for the medical and psychological care of the 
victims. 
 
  Reconciliation 
While  the  other  transitional  justice  objectives  are  hard  to  define,  it  seems  almost 
impossible  to  come  up  with  a  widely  accepted  and  well  defined  understanding  of  the  term 
reconciliation. We will consider reconciliation to be on the one hand a process which “prevents, once 
and for all, the use of the past as the seed of renewed 
conflict”
8  and on the other hand a real or imagined end-
point that is “the coming together of things that once were 
united but have been torn asunder.”
9 Reconciliation takes 
place at different levels. At the micro-level reconciliation 
refers  to  the  repairing  and  restoring  of  relationships 
between victims and perpetrators. The psychological and 
religious dimension of healing are dominating at this level. 
The restoration of the relationship between larger entities 
of  a  society  is  at  stake  when  the  intermediate  level  of 
reconciliation  is  in  focus;  these  larger  entities  can  be 
religious, ethnic or regional groups or people with different 
ideological backgrounds or other identities. Social trust is 
at stake at this level. At the macro-level, reconciliation is a 
matter of power sharing arrangements and institutional reforms. In a minimalistic perspective this has 
only the objective to arrive at a non-violent co-existence.  A thicker interpretation of reconciliation at 
the macro-level entails the shared vision on the past and the future. 
                                                              
8 Huyse, L., (2003) ‘The Process of Reconciliation’, in: Bloomfield, D. Barns, T. & Huyse L. (eds.) Reconciliation 
after Violent Conflict. A Handbook., Stockholm: International IDEA.   
9 Sarkin, J. & Daly, E. (2004) “Too many questions, too few answers: reconciliation in tranistional societies”, 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 665. 
Reconciliation is on 
the one hand the process 
that prevents the past to 
be the seed of renewed 
conflict, on the other 
hand it is the process of 
things coming together 
that have been torn 
apart.  
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3.   BURUNDI 
 
Burundi was a kingdom before its independence in 1962. The king (mwami) governed 
things  profane  and  was  the  link  with  the  supernatural.  Although  the  king  was  of  Tutsi  origin,  he 
transcended natural and social divisions as a superhuman being, such as for example the Hutu-Tutsi 
dinstinction. Nevertheless, ethnic distinctions and their demographic weight have always dominated 
the course of Burundian history. To be precise: the political use of the bi-polar nature of the identity 
groups  Hutu  and  Tutsi.  Hutu  are  the  majority  of  the  population  with  approximately  85%  of  the 
population. The other inhabitants are Tutsi, except for approximately 1% of Twa.  Different from its 
neighbour Rwanda, Burundi also has a tiny “princely class” labelled Ganwa; they were the nobility 
surrounding the king. 
 
Burundi  was  colonized  by the  Germans  but  later passed  on  to  Belgium.  The  Belgian 
colonizer adopted a policy of indirect rule in its colonies in Central-Africa which meant that what was 
found exisiting continued to exist but it was used  -with the necessary adaptations- in the interest of 
colonial policy. For example the customary justice system of the Bashingantahe councels or the fact 
that the King’s power was exercised through a layer of middlemen of Ganwa and Tutsi identity. The 
mass of the population was Hutu. 
 
A spirit of independence made its way through Africa and touched Burundi as well. The 
country turned independent on July 1, 1962. Prince Rwagasore, the son of a King, had started the 
UPRONA party (Union pour le Progrès National) in 1958 and was murdered in 1961. The murder took 
place in the context of political competition with the PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien) and due to unrest 
within the political  and administrative  ruling  class  in general.  This  ‘political’  assassination  was  the 
forbode of the killings of a lot of political personnel and a violent future in general. The first violence 
erupted in 1965. That year also marked the start of over 30 years of authoritarian and military reign. A 
small Tutsi clique coming from one clan in the southern Bururi province ruled Burundi as if it were a 
family affair. They created profits for themselves, benefits for the privileged connected to them and, 
further, caused a mass of grievances and suffering for the majority of the population of Burundi.  
 
 We present Burundi’s history by focusing on the moments of violent upheaval in 1965, 
1972, 1988, 1991, 1993 and the decade of civil war that followed. Important to note is that these 
periods of violence often have a regional dimension: they occurred in a specific locality or they erupted 
or were more intense in some regions. Taking into account this regional diversity was important in the 
selection of sites in order to arrive at sufficient geographic and historical variance in the collection of 
data as we will explain in the next sections. 
 
3.1.   1965 
 
Political turmoil and instability followed the death of Rwagasore. These struggles became 
more ethnically coloured among others things also due to contextual elements such as the so-called 
1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda. In October 1965 a coup was staged by military and police officers of 
Hutu  origin.  The  attempt  failed  and  was  seen  as  an  action  directed  not  only  against  the  ruling 
leadership but the Tutsi dominance of this leadership. The officers that were part of the coup attempt 
were killed or removed from power. As a reaction houses of Tutsi inhabitants were set on fire in the  
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central province of Muramvya. Tutsi were attacked and killed. These actions were followed by reprisal 
massacres of Hutu civilians by the army and armed groups. A year later a military officer and at the 
time  minister  of Defence, Michel Micombero from the Tutsi-Hima clan  in the  southern province of 
Bururi, became the first president of Burundi. He abolished the monarchy and installed the one-party 
state. 
 
3.2.   1972 
 
In  March  1972  a  Hutu  uprising  started  in  the  southern  region,  especially  in  the  area 
around Rumonge. Attacks targeted the government and its military forces. Thousands of Tutsi were 
massacred, mostly in the south but also in Bujumbura. In response all Hutu intellectuals and their 
families throughout the country were targeted in an orchestrated campaign of so-called “purification”. 
This government organized and supervised campaign is labelled a ‘selective genocide’ or ‘forgotten 
genocide’ by some observers.10 The estimation of casualties ranges from 100,000 to 300,000 with 
approximately 200,000 seeking refuge abroad. 
   
3.3.   1988 
 
President Bagaza ruled Burundi between 1976 and 1987. He came to power through a 
military  coup.  He  managed  to  achieve  some  important  improvements  in  the  development  of  the 
country  through  for  example  the  construction  of  roads.  But  power  was  exercised  by  force  and 
command similarly as his predecessor had done. In addition, Bagaza also “abolished” the use of or 
reference to ethnic identities. The ethnic violence experienced in the past was never addressed but 
silenced through an imposed policy of national unity. In practice ethnic sentiments and distinctions 
were sharpened. Lemarchand remarks that it is not because one abolishes ethnic references that 
these identities cease to have meaning and force in daily life.11 In fact, the events of 1988 in the North 
of the country and all other episodes to follow have shown the ease with which ethnic identities were 
quickly mobilized for violent purposes. Even after having been “abolished” for years. In 1987, Pierre 
Buyoya, a major from Bururi deposed Bagaza and took over the presidency. Political liberalization 
followed.  In  this  context  of  increasing  albeit  limited  openings  to  voice  discontent,  ethnic  violence 
engulfed the communes of Ntega and Marangara. It was most probable the combination of a harsh 
way of governing by some Tutsi in the administration in the specific localities and politically motived 
underground activities by Hutu in conjunction with a mix of other factors that sparked the violence. The 
Tutsi inhabitants of the region were killed and their houses looted and destroyed. In response the 
army and gendarmery entered the region and killed Hutu civilians in an attempt to restore order and in 
retaliation to the acts committed. 
 
3.4.   1991 
 
In 1991 a new Hutu uprising followed during a period of continued liberalization. This time 
the centre of the action was mainly located in the provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke and Bujumbura. 
Attacks  against  military  forces,  government  positions  and  Tutsi  civilians  were  followed  by  army 
                                                              
10 Lemarchand, R. (2009), “Burundi 1972: A Forgotten Genocide”, in Lemarchand, R. (2009), The Dynamics of 
Violence in Central Africa, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 129. 
11 Lemarchand, R. (1994), Burundi. Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 10 & p. 107-118.  
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reprisals against the attackers and the civilian population in general. The origine of the uprising was 
probably the Palipehutu movement (Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu).  
 
3.5.   1993 
 
Liberalization nevertheless continued and resulted in multi-party elections in June 1993. 
The leader of Frodebu, (Front pour la Démocratique au Burundi) Melchior Ndadaye was elected as 
president. He was not only the first elected president of Burundi, he was also the first Hutu president. 
His reign only lasted a couple of months. He and  other high level politicians were killed by  Tutsi 
elements in the army on October 21, 1993. A bold ‘Frodebisation’ of the state apparatus on both the 
national and local level that was initiated after Ndadaye took power had caused panic in the circles of 
the old elite. Not only did this result in a de-tutsification of the system, also vested economic interests 
and privileges were at stake. The army was still Tutsi-dominated and in the hands of the clique from 
the South of the country. The army intervened before a reform could take place in its ranks. The news 
of  the  assassination  of  president  Ndadaye  resulted  in  the  killing  of  thousands  of  Tutsi  civilians 
throughout the country.  As was done with the 1972 events, some refer to these massacres by using 
the  term  genocide.  The  killings  were  a  combination  of  spontaneous  anger  by  ordinary  Hutu  and 
incitation  by  the  national  and  local  administrative  and  political  responsables.  However,  retaliation 
followed  by the army that was not yet touched by the Frodebu influence and thus still mono-ethnically 
Tutsi.  The  army  was  accompanied  by  bands  of  Tutsi  youth.  Apart  from  tens  of  thousands  of 
casualties, the episode resulted in thousands displaced and others seeking refuge outside Burundi. 
The killing of Ndadaye resulted in what was later considered to be a ‘creeping coup’.12 It resulted in 
the coming back to power of Buyoya in 1996. The non-democratic take-over of power was condemned 
and also sanctiond by the international community at first. In the meantime, however, the country had 
descended into a civil war. 
 
3.6.   A decade of civil war (1993-2003) 
 
From 1994 onwards rebel movements were created in response to the failed coming into 
being of democracy and the army actions undertaken in reprisal to killings by Hutu civilians. Members 
of Frodebu created the CNDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy) and its armed wing 
(Forces for the Defense of Democracy). The Palipehutu movement had the FNL (National Front of 
Liberation) and a dissident military faction FROLINA (Front for National Liberation). The state security 
forces were predominantly Tutsi and supported by many paramilitary youth groups such as the ‘Sans 
Echec’  or  the  ‘Gardiens  de  la  Paix’.  The  rebel  groups  undertook  guerilla  actions  against  the 
government  armed  forces.  They  operated  from  camps  in  Tanzania  and  Congo.  From  these 
neighbouring countries the rebels aimed to reach areas that would provide them with cover such as for 
example Kibira forest. These areas then functioned as a base to stage more attacks and to move 
around the country. The violent confrontations seriously diminished after the signing of a ceasefire 
agreement in 2003 with the largest rebel group, the CNDD-FDD operating under the leadership of the 
prospective president Pierre Nkurunziza.  
 
 
                                                              
12 Reyntjens. F. (2005) “Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?” African Affairs, Vol. 
105/418, p. 117. 
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3.7.   Arusha Accords and Transitional Justice Provisions 
 
During the years of civil war peace negotiations started in 1998. Nelson Mandela took 
over the task of Julius Nyerere from Tanzania who had been the initial mediator in the talks. The 
government  of  Burundi,  a  coalition  of  7  political  parties  in  total  dominated  by  Hutu  and  another 
coalition  of  10  political  parties  dominated  by  Tutsi  and  the  national  assembly  signed  a  peace 
agreement on 28 August 2000. But the fighting on the ground continued and was even more intense 
than before. The rebel groups were not included in the peace talks. An agreement was reached with 
the CNDD-FDD in October 2003. A similar agreement was reached with the FNL in September 2006. 
But the actual demobilization of the FNL only started late 2008 after a last round of intense fighting in 
the first half of that year. 
 
It is important to note that the Arusha Peace Agreement stipulated a “consociational” type 
of power-sharing and governance structure to be put in place. The general principle of the system is to 
distribute a proportion of the government and administrative positions over the different political parties 
and ethnic groups. A balance was observed after the 2005 elections when considering the ethnic and 
political background of the political and administrative personnel taking up positions ranging from vice-
president to the level of the communal authorities.13   
 
The  transitional  justice  dimension  of  the  Arusha  Agreement  favours  a  retributive 
approach to the conflict in Burundi. It stresses the need to end impunity. Initially, it was forseen to 
install  an  international  judicial  commission  (IJC)  on  genocide,  war  crimes  and  crimes  against 
humanity. This commission would investigate and classify the facts starting from independence until 
the date of the signature of the agreement. Those responsible would be identified. In addition, a Truth 
and  Reconciliation  Commission  (TRC)  would  be  set  up  with  the  objective  to  investigate,  bring 
arbitration and reconciliation and clarify history. The truth about the violence committed between 1962 
and 2000 would be established. Moreover, the commission would also establish responsiblities and 
thus identify perpetrators.  
 
A report summarizing the findings from an assessment mission of the UN in 2004 was 
published in March 2005. The report is generally referred to as the Kalomoh-report. The report states 
that functions and objectives of the IJC and the TRC might overlap. The recommendation was made 
to replace the IJC with a Special Chamber/Tribunal to be situated within the Burundian justice system. 
This institution would be of mixed composition with national and international judges. This Special 
Chamber/Tribunal  would  prosecute  persons  having  the  biggest  responsibility  for  the  crimes  of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Information would come from the TRC. The TRC 
would have a research unit establishing the facts and characteristics of the Burundian conflict and the 
nature  of  the  atrocities.  An  investigative  unit  would  investigate  the  crimes  and  identify  those 
responsible. The report suggested undertaking negotiations to establish both mechanisms. 
 
A negotiation between the UN and the government of Burundi was launched after the 
elections of 2005. The consultation meeting that took place in March 2006 and later in March 2007 
                                                              
13  Vandeginste, S. (2008) “Burundi: Entre le Modèle Consociatif et Sa Mise en Oeuvre”, in: Marysse, S., 
Reyntjens, F. & Vandeginste, S. L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 2007-2008, Paris, L’Harmattan, pp. 55-76. 
Reyntjens. F. (2005) “Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?” African Affairs, Vol. 
105/418.  
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resulted in a blocage. The main obstacles were the issue of amnesty, the relationship between the 
TRC and the ST and the involvement of the population. A following step was the launch of a national 
consultation  process  on  transitional  justice  in  November  2007.  A  steering  committee  consists  of 
representatives of the UN, Burundian civil society and the government. The committee is set up to 
‘consult the population’. The idea is thus to give voice to the population of Burundi. The substance of 
the consultation seems to give rise to political controversy: for example related to the fact whether the 
population should be consulted on the fact whether they agree with the proposed transitional justice 
framework for Burundi with a TRC and ST or whether the population can only give advice on more 
technical issues such as the composition of the TRC and ST. In the meantime, it is important to note 
that  the  name  of  the  mechanism  to  be  implemented  changed  from  Truth  and  Reconciliation 
Commission  to  a  Truth,  Pardon  and  Reconciliation  Commission,  at  least  when  considering  the 
communication of the Burundian government on the transitional justice policy and mechanisms. This 
change reveals a general change in the desired objective of the commission.  
 
It is important to note that the Arusha Accords also explicitly refer to the Bashingantahe, a 
so-called  tradition-based  justice  and  reconciliation  mechanism  part  of  the  culture  and  history  of 
Burundi. It is however open for discussion whether this reference also implied that the Bashingantahe 
councels were/are supposed to be a mechanism to be used in the transitional justice process. The text 
of the Arusha Accords proposes that the institution should be rehabilitated and that the councel of the 
Bashingantahe – the wise men representing the Ubushingantahe values – sits at the level of the hill 
(colline) to “administer justice in a conciliatory  spirit”. The  Bashingantahe are  considered  to be “a 
factor of social cohesion”.  
 
Although Burundi’s transitional and current constitution refers to the Bashingantahe as a 
source  of  peace  and  social  cohesion,  the  UN  Kalomoh  report  has  no  reference  to  the  institution 
anymore. Although the potential role of the Bashingantahe tradition in the transitional justice process 
is still debated in reports mainly prepared by consultants and civil society organizations14, reference 
to its use by political actors has faded over time. The rather hostile relationship between the CNDD-
FDD  party  in  power  and  the  “National  Council  of  the  Bashingantahe”  is  one  of  the  factors  that 
contribute to the polemics surrounding the potential role of the Bashingantahe counsels. The fact that 
both parties have a diverging vision on the nature and objectives of the transitional justice process 
contributes to this problematic relationship. We will deal with this issue extensively in the concluding 
section that focuses on the practice of living together again. 
 
During  our  fieldwork  activities  we  have  thus  considered  the  Ubushingantahe  as  a 
potential mechanism to be used, next to (or in connection with) the officially proposed Truth, Pardon 
and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Tribunal. For two reasons: firstly since the institution 
is referred to in the Arusha Agreement and secondly due to the fact that there is a global trend in the 
transitional  justice  paradigm  to  use  homegrown,  localized  and/or  tradition-based  justice  and 
reconciliation mechanisms in the aftermath of violent conflict.15 The United Nations report on The 
                                                              
14 See for example: Dexter, T. & Ntahombaye, P., (2005) The Role of Informal Justice Systems in Fostering the 
Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Situations. The Case of Burundi, Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 
15 Theidon, K. 2006. ‘Justice in transition: the micropolitics of reconciliation in postwar Peru’,  Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50, 3: 433-57. Waldorf, L. (2006), “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as 
Transitional Justice”, Temple Law Review, Vol. 79, N°1. Lundy, P. & McGovern, M. (2008) “Whose Justice? 
Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up”, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 35, N° 2, pp. 265-292. 
Oomen, B. (2007) “Transitional Justice and Its Legitimacy: The Case for A Local Perspective”, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 25, N°  1, pp. 141-148. Huyse, L. & Salter, M., (2008) Traditional Justice and  
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Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies states that “ [..] regard 
must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes, to 





                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences, Stockholm, International Idea. McEvoy, 
K. & McGregor, L. (eds.) (2008) Transiional Justice from Below. Grassroots Actvisim and the Struggle for 
Change, Oxford, Hart Publishing. Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, (2008) “Social Reconstruction as a Local 
Process”International Journal of Transition Justice, Vol. 2, pp. 152-172. 
16 United Nations (2004) The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report 
of the Secretary-General, United Nations Document S/2004/616, p. 12.  
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4.   FIELDWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
An environment where people experienced or participated in different forms of violence is 
not  the  context  where  you  can  make  clear-cut  observations  and  impetuously  ‘collect’  info  to 
subsequently proceed with a univocal analysis and generalization. ‘Living together again’ is a complex 
phenomenon  and  process  while  expectations  of  (transitional)  justice  are  hard  to  ‘measure’  in  a 
complex environment – the aftermath of violence, socio-political pressure and cultural particularities. 
Therefore, we integrated the following principles and research strategies in designing the ‘operational’ 
part  of  the  study:  (1)  establishing  variance  in  the  sites  for  in-depth  study  (multi-sited);  (2) 
understanding  the  breadth  and  the  depth  of  processes;  (3)  combining  quantitative  &  qualitative 
research strategies (mixed method). 
 
4.1.  The selection of communities (hills) for in-depth study 
 
Maximizing  variance  was crucial  in the  selection  of  communities  for  in-depth  study  in 
order  to  sharpen  patterns  in  different  contexts:  historical  bases  of  powers  and  differences  in  the 
experience  of  violence.  The  selection  of  communities  was  thus  based  on  available  historical 
information and further supported by the information delivered by key informants. As explained above, 
Burundi experienced different eruptions and periods of violence that often  had a regional dimension in 
either onset or intensity. We took this historical element as a defining variable in the  selection  of 
communities  for  in-depth  study.  We  purposively  selected  six  communities  for  in-depth  study.  The 
regional  and  historical  variation  as  well  as  the  differences  in  the  overall  dynamics  of  violence 
experienced at the local level ensure that we were able to capture a wide variety of experiences. With 
communities we refer to “hills”: a “hill” in the Burundian countryside corresponds on the one hand with 
an administrative demarcation and from a social perspective with the proximity of ‘everyday life’ for the 
inhabitants.  For  security  reasons  we  will  not  identify  the  names  of  the  hills  where  we  conducted 
fieldwork. We only refer to the names of the commune, an administrative level situated above the hill 
level. (See map 1). 
 
Bugendana 
Bugendana is located in the central province Gitega. The commune is situated on the 
main road (non-tarmac) between the provincial town of Gitega and the northern town of Ngozi. A very 
large camp of displaced persons is situated close to the communal offices. Nearby there is also a 
military camp that functions as the base of paracommando troops. A large number of displaced still 
live in the camp, also the Tutsi inhabitants coming from the hill we choose in our sample. That hill is 
located 3 to 5 kilometers more to the south.  None of these Tutsi returned to their hill of origin, but they 
often go there to cultivate their fields. The inhabitants of Bugendana remember the events of 1972. 
Not so much the abductions or killings of Hutu that took place in their own area but the fact that trucks 
filled with screaming people crossed their commune coming from the North. Bugendana is located on 
the main road connecting the centre of the country with the North and educated Hutu transported to be 
killed passed the area. As elsewhere in 1993 the Hutu peasants attacked their Tutsi neighbours in 
response to the killing of President Ndadaye. A couple of days later, the army entered the area ‘to 
restore order’ resulting in another round of killings on the side of the Hutu this time. Since that day, life 
never turned to normal again. The central province of Gitega was very much affected by the civil war. 
While  some  regions  of  Burundi  almost  never  experienced  combats  or  guerrilla  movements,  the  
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population  of  the  central  region  suffered  greatly  during  the  years  of  civil  war.  The  inhabitants  of 
Bugendana were split into two groups. Tutsi lived in a displacement camp close to the communal 
office and the military position. The Hutu lived dispersed over the hills in times of relative calm in their 
homes but during periods of military operations or rebel movements sometimes for months hiding in 
the  bush.  Bugendana  is,  however,  exceptional  since  it  was  the  theatre  of  a  brutal  attack  on  the 
displacement camp in 1996. During the night rebels together with local Hutu inhabitants attacked the 
camp and killed a large number of the Tutsi inhabitants. A graveyard with crosses sticking out of the 
ground is the silent witness of this massacre.  
 
Itaba 
While Bugendana was the scene of a horrific attack by rebels on the civilian population, 
the inhabitants of Itaba experienced something similar but with the roles reversed. The government 
army virtually ‘rased’ two hills in 2002 by killing all that moved. Apart from this event, the history of 
Itaba is very similar to that of Bugendana. Itaba is also located in the central province of Gitega but 
more to the South; one has to take the road into the direction of the province of Ruyigi and then a dirt 
road that runs parallel to a mountainside. This road leads to the hills part of the commune of Itaba. 
1972 was more a distant affair in Itaba with only people affected having family members in Bujumbura. 
The  killing  of  Ndadaye  in  1993  resulted  in  massive  violence  against  the  Tutsi  population.  Tutsi 
inhabitants of Itaba came to seek refuge in the provincial town of Gitega and later returned to their 
area of origin. They were installed near to the parish and a military position nearby. The years of civil 
war followed with utmost insecurity and regular rebel movements and clashes between rebels and 
government forces. In 2002 word went around that rebels were spotted on two hills in Itaba. A certain 
morning a large pack of government soldiers closed off all roads and pathways leading to the two hills 
and killed everybody that moved. Inhabitants, all of them Hutu since Tutsi were still in the camp for 




Ntega is located in the northern province of Kirundo. The commune borders Rwanda. The 
river  Akanyaru  is  the  natural  frontier  between  the  two  countries.  Inhabitants  remember  that  the 
‘intellectuals’ were targeted in 1972 - Hutu with nice houses and jobs setting them apart from others. 
They were taken away with trucks never to be seen afterwards. The commune of Ntega is the location 
where together with the neigbouring commune of Marangara ‘the events of 1988’ took place. Whereas 
the other areas of Burundi experienced no physical acts of violence in 1988, these two communes 
were the scene of a Hutu uprising targeting Tutsi civilians. The reasons of the uprising remain unclear 
and  are still  disputed.  Nevertheless,  the  combination of  harsh  Tutsi  governance  and  underground 
Palipehutu  ideological  activities  undertaken  from  neighbouring  Rwanda was  ented  on  the  struggle 
between  two  local  business  rivals,  one  Tutsi  and  the  other  one  Hutu.  This  conflict  polarized  the 
inhabitants of the commune of Ntega along ethnic lines. Violence erupted when the house of the Tutsi 
businessman was under siege. He opened fire from his house and the house was attacked in return. 
Attacks on other Tutsi families followed. In response security forces intervened and killed civilians. An 
action  that was  most  probably  not  only  aimed  at restoring order but  used  for repression  as  well. 
Almost all the Hutu inhabitants fled Burundi seeking refuge in Rwanda. A significant number of them 
were still living in refugee camps when Ndadaye was killed. The hills of Ntega were not much touched 
by violence after the killing of the president. Apart from a generalized fear and unrest, there were no 
specific acts of violence. They majority of the Hutu living in camps in Rwanda returned after the take- 
  Living Together Again   IOB Working Paper / 2009.06 - 32 
The Expectation of Transitional Justice in Burundi 
   
over of power by the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda. Also during the years 
of civil war there were no outright clashes between rebels and army. In general, security was low and 
banditry rife, but the region was largely spared from the war. 
 
Rumonge 
The commune of Rumonge is located along Lake Tanganyika in the South of the country. 
The  area  is  known  for  its  palm  trees  used  for  collecting  palm  oil.  The  hill  where  we  conducted 
fieldwork in Rumonge was at the origin of the events of 1972. Due to the fertility of the area, the 
inhabitants  were  rather  prosperous.  There  was  a  large  number  of  Hutu  among  the  inhabitants. 
Although the origins of the events of 1972 are still covered in mystery, the central administration in 
Bujumbura was challenged at some point through attacks on government posts and security positions. 
The response was harsh and spread all over the country. High numbers of Hutu inhabitants fled the 
country, mainly to neighbouring Tanzania. In the following years others came to the region to occupy 
the fields, the fertile soils and lucrative business of the ones that had left. The government decided to 
plant  palm  trees  and  divided  the  parcels  for  this  purpose.  Several  rounds  of  distribution  and  re-
distribution also among the newcomers to the region followed. As a result, the identification of the 
owners of the plots of land has become extremely difficult especially with high numbers of refugees 
returning from camps in Tanzania where they had been living for over 20 years. There are no more 
displaced coming from the hill where we did research. Tutsi never lived in a camp for displaced as 
they were and are abundant in the central regions of Burundi. At the time after the killing of Ndadaye 
and  during  the  civil  war  they  gathered  in  a  local  commercial  centre  where  there  was  also  a 
government  position.  No  massive  violence  followed  the  killing  of  Ndadaye  in  1993.    The  rebels 
sometimes attacked homes during the civil war. Often the rebels operating in the area were coming 
from the region and knew the inhabitants. The FROLINA rebel movement was popular in the area. 
 
Bisoro 
Bisoro is situated in the province Mwaro, south of Gitega and to the North of Bururi. The 
commune of Bisoro used to be part of the province of Muramvya before the new province of Mwaro 
was created. Bisoro is characterized by rolling green hills where livestock and cows are grazing. It is 
an area close to the region in Bururi where the clan that ruled Burundi for decades originated from. 
Many  inhabitants of  Bisoro are  Tutsi.  A  significant  number of  households  have  a  connection  with 
officers or soldiers of the Burundian army as it existed until the restructuring started in 2003. On the 
hill  where  we  did  research  there  are  almost  as  many  Tutsi  inhabitants  as  Hutu.  Bisoro  did  not 
experience any violence in 1993 and was never touched by the rebellion and civil war. Only once 
rebels passed the area without any further disturbance to the inhabitants. But what happened in 1965 
and 1972 was intense. Large numbers of Hutu inhabitants, mainly educated or wealthy men, were 
chased and rounded up. They were guarded and tortured at the communal offices and most of them 
were  killed.  The  administrative  authorities  were  in  charge  of  that  operation  but  ordinary  Tutsi 
inhabitants were accomplices to the authorities and security forces. Remarkably is the high number of 
Bashingantahe invested in the Bisoro area. The fact that there were so many Bashingantaha played a 
crucial role in the prevention of violence in 1993, according to the inhabitants. 
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Kabarore 
Kabarore is a commune in the vicinity of the Kibira forest in the northern province of 
Kayanza. The hills where we conducted research touch the Rwandan border. On the east, the tropical 
forest  Kibira  is  within  a  couple  of  hundred  metres.  Although  the  inhabitants  of  the  hill  where  we 
conducted research in Kabarore never experienced an outburst of outright violence neither in 1972 nor 
in 1993, they were severly touched by the civil war. Not so much due to the combat activities but due 
to the presence of rebels in the Kibira forest. Rebels came to the hill to pillage livestock and other 
belongings of the inhabitants. Even in 2008 there was almost no livestock to be spotted in Kabarore, 
be it cows, goats, sheep or chickens. For years the inhabitants lived with the fear of rebels coming to 
pillage their belongings. They often slept outside of their homes in order to avoid being killed when 
assailants would enter the house. Men would be forced to accompany the rebels into the forest to 
carry the pillaged goods. On the other hand the national army used the local inhabitants as a sort of 
living shield when they entered the forest on patrol. The civilians had to run ahead of the soldiers and 
would thus first be spotted and attacked when the patrol came across rebels. 
 
 
Table 1 Overview demographics of the selected localilities (hills) - households 
  Bugendana  Itaba   Ntega   Rumonge   Mwaro   Kayanza    
  Bugendana  Itaba   Ntega   Rumonge   Bisoro  Kabarore   
Never Displaced Hutu  539  722  1598  628  432  458  4377 
Repatriates  30  44  19  74  0  4  171 
Demobilized Rebels  1  4  10  24  0  1  40 
Liberated Prisoner (“Political”)  6  9  5  6  0  0  26 
Never Displaced Tutsi  0  0  0  33  131  6  170 
Demobilized Soldiers (Army)  0  0  0  4  10  0  14 
Displaced  49  37  3  0  0  0  89 
Former Displaced  4  21  4  0  0  0  29 
Total Households  629  837  1639  769  573  469  4916 
 
 
4.2.   Research Instruments 
 
To assess the underlying research question, it was necessary not only to diversify the 
overall nature of the observations made but also to use a mixed-methods approach. The use of large-
scale surveys avoids idiosyncrasies by reducing the complexity of reality. On the other hand in-depth 
ethnographic research generates information very rich in detail and gives insights into the reason why 
and  how  events  happen  and  processes  take  place.  Ethnographic  approaches  are  able  to  identify 
underlying patterns and themes that will not surface by using questionnaires; they are well-suited to 
understand  issues  of  process.  Both  quantitative  and  qualitative  research  strategies  were  used  to 
collect data. By using mixed methods and through the triangulation of data, we could layer the data 
over one another to identify overlaps and inconsistencies. Indistinct elements could be filtered out in 
such a way as to gradually discover grounded patterns and returning themes in the social reality faced 
and  lived  by  the  inhabitants  of  communities  at  the  local  level.    The  main  research  
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instruments/techniques and their specific objectives are discussed in more detail. We subsequently 
give  an overview of the general principles and the  overall nature of the research activities during 
fieldwork. The procedures applied in the selection of respondents follows. 
 
Key Informant Interviews 
In every locality (hill) we contacted a number of “key informants”. The key informants 
were people able to provide a lot of information on history, socio-political organization and economic 
life.  The  key  informants  were  dominantly  older  men,  (former)  administrative  authorities  or 
bashingantahe. They were also solicited to identify households living on the hill according to their 
different social, economic and ethnic identity markers. 
 
Archival Research 
Wherever  possible  we  consulted  local  archival  records  to  get  information  on  the 
demographic, socio-economic and political organization of hillside life in the past. It were often the key 
informants and especially the former local authorities who were able to dig up documents dating back 
to years past. 
 
Focus group discussions 
In every locality several focus group discussions were organized. The groups consisted 
of people chosen through so-called “snowball-sampling”; a procedure explained below. The discussion 
mainly dealt with general topics of historical or economic importance. People belonging to either Hutu 
or Tutsi identity groups were sometimes placed together in one group. But in general and with the 
objective  to  avoid  that  people  would  be  unwilling  to  speak  freely  Hutu  and  Tutsi  respondents 
participated in different groups. Men and women were sometimes separated since it would be more 
difficult for women to speak in the presence of men. The topics of discussion ranged from an in-depth 
discussion on the history of the locality with specific attention to the events in 1993 and the years of 
civil war. When discussing the events in the past a timeline was used as a visual to facilitate the 
respondents to recall the sequence of events. With other groups discussion were held on transitional 
justice issues: opinions on the objectives and mechanisms. The topic of democracy, governance and 
regime (change) was introduced as well. The nature of life after violence and the prospects for the 
future  were  discussed.  The  average  group  consisted  of  5  to  10  participants.  All  focus  group 
discussions were led by the author assisted by two local collaborators. One translated the discussion 
simultaneously. Another one wrote down the discussion verbatim in Kirundi. The written statements 
were later translated into French. 
 
(Participant) Observation 
We resided for several weeks in each of the research locations. Apart from the many 
group  discussions  and  interviews  this  allowed  to  get  an  understanding  of  life  in  the  particular 
community by being there. Non-verbal communication and observation gives additional information 
that allows to contextualize the data collected through other techniques. For example: the observation 
of interactions between the inhabitants of a camp of displaced (Tutsi) and (Hutu) visitors coming from 
the hills of origin. Or vice versa: the way inhabitants of camps of displaced are interacting with the 
(Hutu)  residents  of  their  hills  of  origin.  Although  several  months  and  an  active  participation  in 
community  life would  be  necessary  to  be  able to  speak  of a genuine  participant  observation,  the 
limited time spent on the hills gave the necessary information to enrich the data collected. 
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Life History Interviews & Subjective Rankings 
Burundi’s history of violence goes back to the 1960s. A political transition was initiated in 
the beginning of the 90s but was only consolidated after the 2005 elections. We, therefore, needed the 
ability to capture dynamics over a longer period, not only an understanding of the current situation. 
Moreover, we needed to come to an understanding of the perceived comparison of the subsequent 
regimes without asking respondents explicit questions to do so. In general it was necessary to capture 
dynamics of change. Direct questions of this kind by foreign researchers can trigger politically correct 
answers by respondents. The violence experienced in the past and the precarious security situation in 
Burundi has as a result that distrust is pervasive. We approached the topic sideways by collecting life 
histories and subjective rankings. In so doing respondents were not aware that they were not only 
telling their own story but equally the story of (a political) transition and regime change. An analysis of 
these  numerous  life-story  narratives  enables  us  to  understand  what  it  means  to  live  through  a 
transition, a period of violence and from one regime into another. But apart from this qualitative or 
ethnographic research strategy we added a quantitative element to the exercise. During each life-story 
interview we used a visual to facilitate the respondents in the assessment of different periods in the life 
span. We asked this for the different themes identified above: the socio-economic situation, the feeling 
of  security  and  the  level  of confidence  in others  and the  feeling  of political representation. In  the 
lifestory interviews a value between -5 and +5 was given (by the respondent) through pointing on the 
appropriate  step  on  the  ladder  for  every  year  in  the  adult  life  period.  It  allows  us  to  assess  the 
perceived changes over time according to the identity of the respondent. The findings of the life story 
interviews and the subjective rankings will be discussed in a separate publication.
17 But they have 
informed the analysis we present here. We explain below how respondents were selected. 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
The respondents selected for the life story interviews were also questioned by using a 
survey  instrument.  The  survey  questionnaire  contained  sections  that  gathered  information  on 
demographics,  wartime  experiences,  opinions  on  the  objectives  and  mechanisms  of  transitional 
justice,  obstacles  and  important  factors  to  the  transitional  justice  processes  and  a  section  on 
perceived life changes over time. 
 
Individual Interviews 
Sometimes individuals would be contacted for an individual interview. If a respondent in 
the group discussions or the life-story interviews turned out to have an added value for the research 
project, we contacted the person individually to do a follow-up interview on a specific topic. 
 
 
                                                              
17 See for example: Ingelaere, B. (2007). Living the transition: a bottom-up perspective on Rwanda’s political 
transition. Antwerp: Institute of Development Policy and Management, discussion paper 2007: 6. Ingelaere, B. 
(2008). ‘The gacaca courts in Rwanda’, in L. Huyse & M. Salter, eds. Traditional Justice and Reconciliation 
Mechanisms After Violent Conflict: learning from African experiences. Stockholm: International Idea, 25-60. 
Ingelaere, B. (2009), “Does the Truth Pass across the Fire without Burning? Locating the Short Circuit in 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 47, N°  4. Ingelaere, B. (2010). ‘Peasants, 
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4.3.   Fieldwork Principles 
 
All of the research tools were ‘tested’ on the one hand during a similar research project in 
Rwanda (a similar research environment) and on the other hand during a pilot phase in one of the 
selected hills. The survey questionnaires were first tested based on important themes and questions 
conceived  beforehand  and  findings  from  initial  focus  group  discussions.  They  were  then  further 
restructured based on the experience during the pilot. All of the interviews, focus group discussions 
and observations were conducted or made by the author.  The survey questionnaires and the life story 
interviews were administered by a team of 9 Burundian collaborators from mixed ethnic and regional 
origin. The enumerators were selected based on their previous experience with participation in survey 
research,  their  capacity  to  reside  in  rural  communities  and  skills  in  interaction  with  the  peasant 
population. The enumerators were not inhabitants of the communities. They received a training of five 
days on the contents of the questionnaires and overall fieldwork principles (selection of respondents – 
introduction – behaviour towards respondents – etc.). The survey was fielded in each community with 
all enumerators present and the author as supervisor. 
 
With each interview (both from the author and the field assistants) a general introduction 
on the origin and aim of the study was given. It was explained that the study was conducted by a 
‘university student from Belgium’ and dealt with ‘post-conflict reconstruction’.  Anonymity and voluntary 
participation was stressed. All individual interviews and questionnaires were administered in the house 
of the respondent. Focus group discussions were held in ‘quiet’ and ‘private’ places, mostly school 
buildings, other ‘public’ buildings and sometimes in private housings. In a few cases group discussions 
were  conducted  in  open  air  but  always  in  a  remote  location  free  from  onlookers  or  possible 
disturbance.  We  never  accepted  the  offer  by  local  authorities  to  hold  an  interview  session  in  a 
government – related building in order not to create the impression of a government connection. We 
refused any presence of someone related to the government during the interviews.  
 
The interviews and observations made by the author were translated in the field by a field 
assistant in order to follow the narrative and recorded in Kirundi by another field-assistant/translator. 
They were later translated into French. The knowledge of Kirundi by the author is limited, but he is 
acquainted with basic words and expressions in Kirundi, especially related to the research theme; this 
allowed for a general supervision on the translation. Expressions in Kirundi with a specific meaning 
were discussed afterwards and compared with the translated statements. All interviews were later 
typed  out  by  another  assistant,  who  also  annotated  the  interviews  when  faced  with  particularities 
related  to  the  translation  of  statements  from  Kirundi.  We  did  not  use  recording  devices  since 
respondents are not familiarized with them and they arouse suspicion and possibly a reservation in 
response. Due to the security situation we were unable to reside in the studied communities but we 
resided nearby, this in order to increase trust with the inhabitants. We spent several weeks in each 
community, with daily visits from morning until evening. 
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4.4.   The Selection of Respondents 
 
The type of  the  data  collection instrument defined  how informants were selected. We 
applied different selection principles. For a range of data collection instruments – FGDs, Individual 
Interviews, Key Informant Interviews – respondents were selected based on the principal of ‘snowball 
sampling’.  Snowball  sampling  is  a  non-probability  sampling  scheme  through which  one begins by 
(purposively) sampling one person and then -through this person- obtains a list of persons who have 
the same characteristics as the initial persons selected and so on. For example: for the FGDs we 
initially selected one person who belonged to the specific group we wanted to interview – for example 
released prisoners - , this person would then provide a list of names of other released prisoners to be 
invited for a group discussion. Table 2 gives an overview of the identities of participants in the focus 
group discussions. 
 
Table 2 Participants Focus Group Discussions 
  Bugendana  Itaba   Ntega   Rumonge   Bisoro  Kabarore   
HUTU  13  11  18  7  6  6  61 
TUTSI  8  12  8  9  5  0  42 
MIXED GROUP  15  32  32  31  32  22  164 
Total   36  55  58  47  43  28  267 
   
   
 
Burundi is an ethnically bi-polar society with Hutu and Tutsi as the main ethnic groups. 
Since the violence has always been structured along these ethnic lines we wanted to establish an 
insight into the differences in opinions and experiences of these ethnic groups. We did not focus on 
people with Twa or Ganwa identities since they are a tiny minority that did not play a major role in the 
unfolding of the violence. It is, however, sensitive to identify people based on their ethnic identities in 
the aftermath of an ethnic conflict. Especially when this is done through lists etc. Therefore, we used 
“sub-ethnic” identity markers to identify people.  
 
“New” social groups with new forms of markers have emerged due to the violence. The 
conflict generated a tremendous amount of movements in the populations. We identified people based 
on the type of movement they had experienced. Eight labels can be discerned to identify inhabitants of 
the Burundian hills. Each of these groups can -in general- be considered as sub-ethnic identities. Tutsi 
inhabitants  are  divided into  “displaced”  who are currently  still living  in  displacement  camps in  the 
vicinity of their hills of origin; “former displaced” used to live in these camps but have returned to their 
homes in the meantime. Demobilized soldiers of the national army are generally also of Tutsi identity. 
On a hill, there are also Tutsi inhabitants who were never displaced and thus never returned, we 
labelled them “never moved Tutsi”. Hutu in a Burundian local setting currently include people that 
never left their homes for a long period: the “never  moved Hutu”. “Repatriates” are Hutu who left 
Burundi in 1972 or 1993 and after; they lived in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. They started 
to  be  repatriated  after  the  signing  of  the  Arusha  Accords  and  the  cease-fire  agreement  with  the 
CNDD-FDD. “Demobilized rebels” on a Burundian hill are dominantly younger men that joined the 
rebellion during the years of civil war. They have been demobilized and have returned to their hills of 
origin since 2003. “Liberated (political) prisoners” are Hutu arrested by the previous regime on the 
accusation of participation in the events that killed (Tutsi) civilians in 1993 and during the years of war. 
After the CNDD-FDD came to power they were labelled “political” prisoners and a large amount of 
them were released. Table 3 gives an overview of the number of respondents in each group.  
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Table 3 Identity Respondents Survey  Life History Interviews  & Subjective Rankings 





Itaba   Ntega   Rumonge   Bisoro  Kabaro
re 
 
Never Moved Hutu  26  20  32  19  20  39  156 
Repatriates  15  13  13  14  0  3  58 
Demobilized Rebels  1  4  8  9  0  1  23 
Liberated Prisoner 
(“Political”) 
5  9  5  6  0  0  25 
Never Moved  Tutsi  0  0  0  11  19  3  33 
Demobilized Soldiers 
(Army) 
0  0  0  3  6  0  9 
Displaced  17  12  10  0  0  0  39 
Former Displaced  3  10  2  0  0  0  15 
Total   67  68  70  62  45  46  358 
 
TOTAL HUTU  47  46  60  51  21  43  268 
TOTAL TUTSI  20  22  10  11  24  3  90 
  
 
Lists were compiled with the names of all the household heads on the selected hills and 
several groups of key informants were asked to identify every household according to one of these 
eight  groups.  Through  a  stratified  random  sampling  scheme  households  within  each  group  were 
subsequently selected and the heads of the household were interviewed giving between 45 and 70 
respondents  in  each  locality.
18  Selected  persons  were  all  over  30  (with  a  few  exceptions  for 
demobilized  rebels)  since  respondents  needed  to  have  lived  through  the  transition  and  regime 
changes and be aware of the period since 1990 and 1993.  
 
When quoting someone in the text we will indicate the basic demographic identity of the 
respondent and the type of data collection instrument through which the information was obtained. 
Through this information it will, therefore, also be clear how the respondent was selected. We will also 
indicate whether an observation was made by the author or a field assistant.  
 
                                                              
18 Some communities did not have one or more of the categories.  
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5.    VIOLENCE 
 
Burundians have experienced over a decade of violence since 1993. The “longue durée” 
of the history of Burundi is characterized by episodes of violence. Almost everyone has been touched 
by  the  violence.  Figure  1  presents  the  traumatic  experiences  of  the  respondents  in  our  sample. 
Property was destroyed for 41% of the respondents, 65% of them experienced the loss of household 
utensils, livestock or other belongings. Seventy-six percent of respondents were displaced at some 
point  in  time.  Forty-one  percent  fall  sick  due  to  the  violence  and  war  situation,  36%  lost  family 
members due to sickness in the period of upheaval. Of all respondents 25% lost family members in a 
violent manner: in massacres, during combat between the rebels and the army or due to some other 
kind  of  violent  action.  Nine  percent  was  physically  injured  while  3%  was  sexually  violated.  Eight 
percent of respondents were at some point incarcerated. 
 
 
Figure 1. Traumatic Experiences (Weighted Results) 
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Considering the ethnic identities of respondents the findings indicate that both Hutu and 
Tutsi were severely affected by traumatic experiences. Some differences can be discerned revealing 
something about the particularity of the nature of the violence each group endured. Tutsi respondents 
report  more  destruction  of  property  (54%)  compared  to  Hutu  (41%)  while  Hutu  voice  that  they 
experienced  more  pillaging  of  belongings  (77%).  The  latter  is  reported  by  59%  of  the  Tutsi 
respondents. Revealing is the fact that respondents of Tutsi origin encountered more violent deaths of 
family members (34%) compared to Hutu (24%). Hutu on the other hand were more affected by the 
loss of family members due to disease (38%). Thirteen percent of Tutsi encountered death by disease. 
Hutu were more incarcerated, at least in their own reporting; eight percent of respondents were put in 
custody for some period of time compared to 2% of Tutsi respondents. 
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Figure  2  presents  the  findings  according  to  sub-ethnic  groups.  Especially  the  people 
currently still living in displacement camps were severely affected by the violence and war. All of them 
(100%) report property destruction, the pillaging of belongings and, evidently, displacement. Similar 
experience  can  be  found  with  the  people  that  used  to  live  in  displacement  camps  but  that  have 
returned  to  their  hills.  Both  groups  are  almost  exclusively  composed  of  people  of  Tutsi  identity. 
Insightful is the fact that the ones that left the displacement camp behind report less violent deaths in 
their families. Over seventy percent of the ones still living in the camps have experienced death of 
family members. Without any doubt do these traumatic experiences make a return to the hill of origin a 
difficult  undertaking.  It  is  one  of  the  factors  that  contribute  to  their  reluctance  to  return  home. 
Demobilized army soldiers and Tutsi that never left their hill were less touched by property destruction 
and the pillaging of belongings. It is probably one of the reasons why the latter did not leave in the first 
place.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  they  kept  on  living  on  their  hills  indicate  that  they  were 
somehow protected by family or friendship ties with other inhabitants on the hill. Mostly Hutu that were 
able to prevent them from being harmed or having to flee.  
 
Political  prisoners  report  most  physical  injuries.  In  doing  so  they  refer  to  the  harsh 
circumstances in the prisons where they were often mistreated and tortured by security personnel. 
Demobilized army soldiers also report more physical injuries compared to the other groups; one can 
assume they mainly refer to combat injuries. 
 
While the previous charts show that different social and ethnic groups had similar but 
nevertheless particular traumatic experiences, the following figure complicates the issue even more 
when considering the geographical location of the respondents. The findings are broken down along 
community lines in figure 3.  
 
The traumatic experiences according to locality correspond with the brief description of 
the events that occurred in each of these locations we presented in the introductory section. Especially 
the hills we visited in Bugendana and Itaba were severly affected by the violence. Not only because 
they are situated in the central province Gitega, the scene of intense and continued clashes between 
the government forces and the army but also because the residents of both of the hills experienced 
large-scale  massacres.  The  hill  in  the  commune  of  Bugendana  was  attacked  by  rebels  while  the 
inhabitants of Itaba were massacred by the national army. A description of the events that unfolded on 
each of hills following the killing of Ndadaye can be found in annex (see annex 2 where we juxtapose 
the narratives of Hutu and Tutsi respondents). 
 
Less than 8% of the population living on the hill we visited in Kayanza refers to family 
members killed due to the violence. As explained, the locality did not experience any events in 1993 
nor were there any major confrontations during the years of civil war. Nevertheless, the hill is situated 
in  close  proximity  to  the  Kibira  forest.  Rebels  and  army  soldiers  regularly  came  to  pillage  the 
belongings of the inhabitants. Box 1 presents the discussions recorded with the inhabitants during 
focus group discussions. 
 
In line with the descriptions of the events presented earlier, the effect of the violence on 
the  inhabitants  residing  on  the  hill  visited  in  Mwaro  shows  that  they  were  much  less  touched  by 
traumatizing events. It also shows, however, that people mainly take into account more recent events  
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and experiences. The hill was severly affected by the events of 1965 and 1972. The dead reported 
date back to that era.  
 
Nevertheless, what happened in 1972 always surfaced during focus groups discussions 
and individual interviews in each of the locations.  What happened in 1972 and the way it was dealt 
with (or better not dealt with) was the “moment fondateur” for everything that followed not only at the 
national level but also at the local level in each of the communities we visited. However, the violence 
experienced in 1972 turned out differently in each of the localities: it could be a catalyst of violence to 
come or, on the contrary, a factor preventing the instigation of violence at a later stage. Box 2 and 3 
present some of the discussions recorded.  
 
 




Box  2  presents  excerpts  from  discussions  with  peasants  in  the  hill  located  in  the 
commune of Rumonge in the South. Another excerpt is based on discussions with inhabitants of the 
hill in the province of Mwaro. As we have explained, both areas were severely affected by the violence 
engulfing the country in 1972. Rumonge was the region in the South that was the scene of an uprising 
by Hutu. The reaction of the authorities and the army not only crushed the intentions of the inhabitants  
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of the area but also the inhabitants themselves. The security forces later targeted every “educated” 
and “wealthy” Hutu throughout the country also on the hill in Mwaro. When reflecting on the reasons 
why there was less violence in 1993, both groups refer to the fact that the experience of 1972 had 
taught them a lesson. Nobody wanted to return to such actions since all of them had experienced the 
losses. 
 
Although the fact that the experience of 1972 was sometimes a preventive factor in the 
unfolding of the violence in 1993, that violent episode in Burundi’s history functioned in the majority of 
the cases, however, as a catalyst of what happened in 1988 in Ntega and Maranga and later in 1993 
on many hills throughout the country. Box 3 summarizes some of the discussions. Not only did some 
of  the  authorities  at  the  time  call  for  action  referring  to  the  events  of  1972,    many  people  still 
remembered what had happened to themselves. “Mythico-histories” had been created to deal with 
those experiences by the  ordinary people as Liisa Malkii has documented based on her research 
among Hutu refugees in Tanzania.
19 There was never any “transitional justice” policy that had to deal 
with  those  events.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  forbidden  to  talk  and  refer  to  the  events.  Moreover, 
president Bagaza had in the meantime “abolished” ethnic identities during his reign that started in 
1976. Ethnic distinctions and ethnic grievances went underground but did not cease to have meaning 
below the surface of daily life. The fact that respondents refer to these long gone events show the 
force with which these experiences persisted not only as facts but also as myths passed on from 
generation to generation. 
 
A last striking element in this discussion on the experience of violence is the fact that 
Hutu and Tutsi respondents recount the events that happened on their hills differently, although these 
hills are a shared living environment and although they have experienced the same events. We have 
juxtaposed  the  Hutu  and  Tutsi  narratives  that  chronologically  -almost  day  by  day-  recount  the 
unfolding of the upheaval in their midst following the killing of Ndadaye in annex. Each of the groups 
emphasizes different dimensions of the violence and different aspects in the nature of responsibility. 
Hutu often refer to the Hutu from other hills coming to attack Tutsi in their community. While Tutsi say 
that it were in fact their own Hutu neighbours that played a major role in the unfolding of the violence. 
Tutsi on the other hand tempt to emphasize the fact that Hutu attacked the army forces that came to 
their  rescue  and  that,  therefore,  they  were  targeted  by  these  forces  as  a  sort  of  self-defense. 
According  to  them  there  were  not  many  killings  of  Hutu  by  the  army.  The  Hutu  on  the  contrary 
emphasize  that  they  were  violently  and  deliberately  targeted  by  the  army  forces.  The  army  was 
supported and guided by their Tutsi neighbours in their version of the facts. These observations show 
that each of the groups has its own version of the facts, its own truth about the past. It is an issue to 
take into account when reflecting on the issue of transitional justice. 
                                                              
19 Malkii, L. H., (1995) Purity and Exile. Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania, Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press. 
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Box 1. Life during War – Near the Rebels’ Forest 
 
Q. Comment était la situation [durant la guerre] ? 2. Les rebelles qui étaient dans la KIBIRA 
venaient pendant la nuit, ils tuaient les gens, brûlaient les maisons et pillaient tout (bétail, 
aliments, habits,…). 4. Les gens passaient les nuits dehors. 1. On entendait les enfants crier dans 
la forêt.  
 
Q. Quand est-ce que cela  a commencé ? 3. Les pillages ont commencé en 1993, mais c’est 
devenu grave en 1998. 3. Ils visaient les riches, ceux qui avaient des vaches, de l’argent, ou bien 
à  manger.  5.  Même  certains  pauvres  étaient  attaqués.  Pour  les  pauvres,  on  leur  faisait 
transporter les bagages. 4. Un jour, ils sont entrés dans la maison d’un indigent et ils se sont 
écriés « nous nous sommes trompés ».  
 
Q. Quelle a été la réaction de la population? 4. Le soir, chacun essayait d’aller se cacher. 1. 
« TWARI TWABAYE NK’INZUKI ZIDAFITE UMUTWARE = nous étions comme des abeilles sans 
reine » 5. Pendant la journée,  la vie se déroulait quasi normalement, mais à partir de 17h00, 
tout changeait.  
 
Q.  Quelle était la réaction  du  pouvoir?  (Rire.) Tous :  Les  autorités  locales,  elles  aussi se 
cachaient comme nous tous, elles étaient plus recherchées que nous. 5. Les militaires venaient 
au secours mais souvent, ils trouvaient les rebelles parties. 
 
 Q. N’y a-t-il pas eu la guerre ici ? 3. Oui, il y en a eu. 4. Ils se sont battus sur la colline de […]  
jusqu’à […]. 2. C’était au mois de juillet en 1998. 4. La guerre est finie en novembre 2005.  
 
Q. Quel est  l’impact de cette guerre ? 4. Les gens sont morts (sur la colline on compte 9 
personnes tuées).  Les  maisons  ont  été pillées,  aucune famille  n’a été  épargnée.  3. Il  y a la 
pauvreté, le bétail a été emporté et la production a diminué suite au manque du fumier. 3. Ce 
sont surtout les hommes qui ont été affectés, ils étaient recherchés par les rebelles parce qu’ils 
faisaient des rondes, les militaires eux aussi forçaient les hommes d’aller devant pour chercher 
les rebelles dans la forêt ou pour aller montrer où sont passés les rebelles.  1. Les gens qui 
avaient beaucoup de biens eux aussi ont été les plus touchés car on leur rendait de fréquentes 
visites.  
 
Q. Y a-t-il eu des gens qui ont profité de cette situation ? 3. Oui, il y en a qui se prenaient 
pour des rebelles afin de pouvoir piller.  
 
Q. Quelle a été la durée de cet impact? 1. L’impact dure encore maintenant, mais ce n’est plus 
remarquable,  les  gens  commencent  à  se  remettre.  4.  Ceux  qui  se  remettent  sont  ceux  qui 
cultivent  du  thé.  5.  Ceux  qui  se  confondaient aux  rebelles  sont  ceux  qui  sont  devenus  des 
bandits  qui  nous  empêchent  de  dormir  à  ce  moment-  ci.  FGD,  Kayanza  Province,  Commune 
Kabarore, 12 May 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 65; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 30; (3) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 27; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 42; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
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Box 2. 1972 as prevention of future violence 
 
Q. Est ce que quelque chose  s’est aussi  passé en 1993? 3. Personne n’a été tuée en 1993. 
Mais les gens de l’ethnie Tutsi ne pouvaient rien acheter dans les boutiques. Q. Qu’est ce qui 
s’est passé quand le Président a été tué? 4. On a commencé à terroriser les Tutsi. Il y en a qui 
sont partis pour se réfugier, il y en a qui ne  sont pas encore revenus.3. On lançait des pierres sur 
les maisons. 4. Et on récoltait par force dans leurs champs. 
 
 Q. Pourquoi  personne n’a été  tuée à ce moment ? 3. Ici aussi, on a failli s’entretuer, mais 
comme  en  1972  la  guerre  a  sérieusement  touché  la  région,  il  y  a  certains  Hutu  qui  se 
demandaient ce qui allait suivre quand on attaquait les Tutsi. Il y avait des militaires ici et les 
Hutu ont dit on va attendre pour voir ce qui se passe dans d’autres régions parce que l’autre fois 
en 1972 on avait perdu. 5. En 1993, les militaires sont venus pour assurer la sécurité. FGD, Bururi 
Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, 39; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
72;  (3)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  52;  (4)  teacher,  male,  Tutsi,  40;  (5)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  44;  (6) 
peasant, female, Tutsi, 67; (7) peasant, female, Tutsi, 40. 
 
Q. Qu’est- ce qui se passait ici ? 6. Les Hutu ont eu peur. Ils ont commencé à former des 
groupes. Les Tutsi se sont dit que peut-être les Hutu allaient se venger de ce qu’ils avaient fait 
dans le passé.  Les Hutu passaient la nuit dans la vallée, les Tutsi passaient la nuit dans une autre 
vallée. Chaque groupe avait peur de l’autre. 3. Les Hutu se sont regroupés pour éviter que ce qui 
s’est passé en 1972 ne revienne. On est venu me demander pourquoi les Hutu étaient en alerte, 
j’ai répondu que c’était pour éviter 1972. 5. Les gens de BUGAMBA sont venus pour attaquer 
notre région. Ils avaient intentionnellement abandonné un taureau ici, le jour suivant, ils sont 
venus réclamer cet animal, c’était pour chercher un motif de déclencher la guerre. […]  
 
Q. Pourquoi selon vous, il n’y a pas eude violence ici? 3. Nous partageons tout, nous nous 
sommes dit qu’il n’y avait pas de raisons de s’entretuer. On peut être qualifié de Hutu alors qu’on 
est Tutsi et vice versa.6. Pendant les vacances, les élèves Tutsi se rassemblent sur les collines, et 
nous avons dit à     leurs parents de les empêcher et ils ont fait ainsi.  
 
Q. Il n’y a pas eu de victimes ici en 1993 ? Tous : Non, sauf ceux qui sont morts dans d’autres 
régions. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 15 April 2008; (1) peasant, male,  Hutu, 51; (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 73; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 67; 
(5) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 63; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 43. 
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Box 3. 1972 as foundation of future violence 
 
Q. Comment s’est arrivé [en 1993]? 5. Après que les Hutu et les Tutsi aient entendu que 
NDADAYE a été tué, il y a eu un appel à la Radio RWANDA, lequel a été lancé par Jean MINANI, il 
appelait les Hutu à se défendre, pour ne pas subir le sort de 1972. 1. Après avoir entendu cela, 
j’ai vu   en face de moi une foule de gens, ces gens me disaient que celui que nous avons élu 
venait d’être tué. J’ai dit à ces gens de patienter parce que le Président n’était pas pour les gens 
de [..] seulement. Ils ne m’ont pas écouté, c’était le 22/10/1993. Ils ont commencé à brûler les 
maisons. 5. Ce jour là, le 22/10/1993, les Tutsi ages,  les hommes surtout ont été conduits à 
RUHANZA où ils ont été tués. Il y avait le bureau de la zone [...]. Ils ont été tués à l’arme blanche 
et jetés dans les  toilettes de l’école primaire. 1. Les femmes et les enfants ont été cachés par les 
voisins. Après, on a dit qu’aucun Tutsi ne devait survivre. Les Hutu ont fait la chasse de ces Tutsi 
et les ont tués. 1. Les Hutu de chez nous sur la Sous-Colline de […] ont tué les femmes et les 
enfants le 23/10/1993 et après ils ont  commencé à attaquer d’autres Sous-Collines. 4. Ici, on 
peut y trouver quelques Tutsi, mais dans les autres Sous-Collines, c’est un peu difficile. 2. Tout le 
mois d’octobre, c’est la machette qui parlait. 5. Il n’y avait personne pour commander ces gens  
de tuer les autres. 2. C’était le chagrin qui les conduisait. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune 
Itaba, 12 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 40; (3) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 67; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 30.  
 
Q. Comment était la vie ici durant les années 1980 ? 4. Dans les années 80, la situation était 
mauvaise. Depuis les années 1970, les HUTU étaient persécutés, pas de droit pour parler pour 
les Hutu, les autorités se succédaient mais aucun Hutu parmi les hautes autorités. Dans ces 
années  on  a  eu  beaucoup  de  morts  surtout  des  Hutus  parce  que  les  Tutsi  dirigeaient.5. 
Actuellement il y a la justice et tout le monde peut s’exprimer librement. En 1988, les Tutsi ont 
été très malins ils ont dit aux Hutu de s’installer  quelque part pour assurer la sécurité et on 
prenait quelques uns pour les tuer. FGD, Kirundo Province, Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; 
(1) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (4) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 80; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
 
5. Il y a eu la guerre entre les Hutu et les Tutsi. Après la mort du Président NDADAYE, les Hutu 
ont commencé à tuer les Tutsi, ils faisaient ça en faisant référence à ce qui s’était passé en 1972. 
Les Hutu se disaient que si on commençait par tuer le Président, pour nous le petit peuple, nous 
allions périr en masse.  
 
Q. Pourquoi les Hutu ont tué des civiles Tutsi ? 5. Il y a eu des discours et de la sensibilisation 
disant que les Hutu devaient tuer les Tutsi en premier. On pensait que les Tutsi avec l’aide de 
l’armée  qui  était  presque  mono  ethnique  allaient  tuer  les  Hutu.  Même  si  lesHhutu  ont 
commencé à tuer et àt piller les biens des Tutsi, les Tutsi eux aussi ont tué les Hutu et ont pillé 
leurs biens, c’est dans ce contexte que la maison de mon collègue a été détruite. FGD, Gitega 
Province,  Commune  Bugendana,  28  February  2009;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  34;  (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, Tutsi, former displaced, 68; (4) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 60; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 46. 
  
  Living Together Again   IOB Working Paper / 2009.06 - 48 
The Expectation of Transitional Justice in Burundi 
   
6.   LIFE IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE 
  
Life for ordinary Burundians has slowly turned to a form of normality again since the main 
rebel group CNDD-FDD and the government signed a peacefire agreement in 2003. But the situation 
of war continued to a certain extent due to fact that the Palipehutu-FNL did not join the government 
and continued its rebel activities. Also in 2008 when this research was conducted the Palipehutu-FNL 
launched a new and last campaign of attacks on positions of government security forces, especially in 
the area around the capital of Bujumbura. When reflecting on this period of violence and the renewed 
period of relative calm, participants in the groups discussion often refer to the political class as the 
main source of disturbance of calm and peace but thus also as the primary factor to garantuee peace 
and security (see box 4 and 5).
20 
 
Although  overt  and  intense  hostilies  faded  since  2003,  it  does  not  mean  that  the 
peasantry is free of violence.
21 There are many small arms circulating in the civilian population and 
banditry is rife. In the hills in the Northern regions Kayanza and Ntega where we conducted fieldwork, 
some inhabitants sletp outside at night; they were afraid that bandits would enter their homes at night 
to pillage their belongings. To avoid being killed or physically injured by these groups of armed men 
generally  in  the  possession  of machine  guns  and  other war  equipment,  people  slept in  the  fields 
surrounding their houses. In general, people are of the opinion that the judicial institutions are unable 
to tackle these crimes. They sometimes refer to the fact that when bandits are arrested, they are 
immediately set free, sometimes due to corrupt police forces. 
 
Apart from a fragile security situation people often refer to abject poverty and the lack of 
service delivery by state institutions as elements that characterize life after war. Livestock has been 
pillaged, the plots of land were not well maintained during the years of war. They complain about the 
lack of aid in the agricultural domain. Burundi is not only in transition from war to some kind of peace 
but equally in transition from humanitarian and urgency aid to more structural development aid. In 
some  areas the  population has  been  supported  for  years  by relief  agencies  distributing  food. We 
observed a meeting in the North where people rejected the idea of the introduction of a development 
related project that would provide the basic needs to farmers so that they could start self-sustainable 
agricultural activities. The peasants, however, preferred a continuation of the food distribution since 
they considered it to be more useful to them. 
 
The consequences of the war and the long history of violence are often referred to in 
economic  terms  and  especially  as  land  problems.  The  Burundian  conflict  was  characterized  by 
massive movements of people. People already left Burundi in 1972 and have been living in Tanzania 
for decades. Others have been living in displacement camps for many years or were roaming their 
region of origin while fleeing the movements on the battle field. All of these people (and the next 
generations born “on the move”) are returning to their hills of origin. In the meantime, land property 
has been reshuffled, either due to land grabbing in the context of insecurity, through illegal sales or 
through government reform. Facing the upheaval of the past often comes down to dealing with these 
complex land issues.   
                                                              
20 On Burundians politics in the popular imagination see: Turner, Simon (2007), “The Precarious Position of 
Politics in Popular Imagination: The Burundian Case”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 1, N°  1, pp. 93-106. 
21 See the work of Peter Uvin on the life after violence: Uvin, P. (2009) Life after Violence. A People’s Story of 
Burundi, London & New York, Zed Books. Peter Uvin: “Human Security in Burundi:The View from Below (by 
Youth)”African Security Review, Vol. 16, N°2, pp. 39-52.  
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Box 5. Life after Violence  
 
Q. Comment vous voyez la situation ici? 3. Au côté social, les relations sont bonnes. Au point 
de vue économique, il  y  a  la pauvreté.  A  cause de cette  pauvreté,  les gens  volent  dans  les 
champs. 1. Il y a aussi des attaques, des gens armés de fusils ou de machettes. Ce sont des gens  
qui viennent pendant la nuit. Ils sont souvent masqués. Difficile de quoi il s’agit. On peut aussi 
tuer quelqu’un à cause de son ethnie, mais on déguise en disant que ce sont des crimes. 2. 
Quand  il  y  a  des  aides  ça  arrive  au  niveau  local.  Ce  n’est  pas  tout  le  monde  qui  peut  en 
bénéficier. Quand les aides arrivent, ces paysans  venus des autres régions ne peuvent rien 
recevoir.  Ce  sont  des  gens  venus  des  autres  Communes.  FGD,  Bururi  Province,  Commune 
Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, 39; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, 72; (3) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, 52; (4) teacher, male, Tutsi, 40; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, 44; (6) peasant, female, Tutsi, 67; 
(7) peasant, female, Tutsi, 40. 
 
Q. Comment  se déroule la vie ici sur la Colline actuellement? 1. Cette Colline de […], je ne 
dis pas cela parce que je vis ici, c’est une belle Colline, il n’y a pas de divisions, on ne peut pas 
identifier qui est Hutu, qui est Tutsi. Ici, nous partageons tout, lors des cérémonies, on invite 
tout le monde. Pour ce qui est de la guerre, nous entendons cela ailleurs. 5. Si vous arrivez ici, 
vous trouverez des gens ensemble. Nous partageons le bien et le  mal. La sécurité est assurée 
pour tout le monde. Même les dirigeants de la Commune savent que nous sommes exemplaires. 
4. En vérité ici, il y a la sécurité, nous sommes unis, vous l’avez constaté vous-mêmes, les Hutu 
et  les  Tutsi  investis  partagent  la  vérité.  Les  enfants,  les  adultes  partagent  tout  comme  le 
faisaient nos ancêtres. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 16 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 65; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 76; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
Umushingantahe,  65;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  Umushingantahe,  77;  (5)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
Umushingantahe, 80.   
 
Q.  Comment  voyez-vous  la  vie  sur  la  Colline?  3.  La  vie  ici  n’est  pas  bonne.  La  ration 
alimentaire n’est pas suffisante surtout après que nous ayons été pillé pendant la guerre. Q. 
Avez-vous l’impression  d’avoir  la  paix ?  4.  Je  pense  qu’il  devrait  y  avoir  une  entente  au 
niveau supérieur. Actuellement, il n’y a pas la  paix, on a peur d’être attaqué.1. Il n’y a pas la paix 
car les Burundais meurent encore. Il faut qu’il y ait une entente entre les Hutu et les Tutsi. Le 
mouvement qui se bat actuellement a commencé la guerre en 1972 parce que les Hutu étaient 
persécutés. Il y a des accords qu’il faut appliquer pour arrêter la guerre. Q. Que veux-tu dire 
par là ? 1. Le gouvernement doit accorder au FNL ce qu’il veut pour la paix.  FGD,  Kayanza 
Province, Commune Kabarore, 6 May 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 50; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 42; 
(3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 37; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 56; (6) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 55.  
 
Q. Comment vous voyez la situation ici? 4. Ici dans le site de […], la situation est mauvaise. Il 
y a la pauvreté et la faim. La maladie, surtout la malaria et nous sommes dans un petit endroit. 
Pas de toilettes, manque d’hygiène. En général : la situation est mauvaise. 4. C’est la guerre de 
1993 qui les a fait venir ici. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, 
male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  44;  (2)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  displaced,  50;  (3)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 50; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 39; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 28; (6) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 37; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
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Box 4. Life after Violence (continued) 
 
Q. Comment fonctionne la vie ici? 1. Actuellement la situation est mauvaise. 2. Avant, nous 
avions une bonne situation, mais avec la crise, tout a été perdu. Nous vivons grâce à Dieu, si nous 
trouvons le sommeil, ça va, si les grands dorment bien, s’il ya le calme là-bas, chez les Chefs, nous 
aussi nous dormons, on peut même dormir sans manger. 1. C’est le Dieu qui nous garde, mais si 
les grands dorment, nous aussi, nous dormons. 2. Avant, nous avions du bétail pour fertiliser nos 
champs, maintenant, notre bétail a été décimé, nous sommes comme des orphelins. Toutefois, la 
vie des paysans dépend de celle des Chefs, si les Chefs sont en paix, nous en bénéficions. 1. Nous 
vivons  des  herbes  comme  des  vaches,  ce  qui  ne  se  faisait  pas  avant.  FGD,  Gitega  Province, 
Commune Itaba, 12 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 85; (2) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, former displaced, 74; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 37; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
former displaced, 60; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 37.  
 
Q. Comment voyez-vous   la vie ici dans la communauté ? 1. La situation est mauvaise.  On 
dépend des conditions climatiques. Quand on est pauvre, sans quelque chose qui peut t’aider,  ce 
n’est pas bien ici.  
Q. Et sur le plan social, comment est la vie entre les gens ? 3. Vraiment actuellement  il y a le 
calme quand on a vécu dans le passé. C’était grave surtout à cause des gens qui étaient au pouvoir 
qui  ne  prenaient  pas  tout  le  monde  au  pied  d’égalité.  On  dirait  qu’il  y  avait  « UMWANA 
N’IKINONO » = « Il y avait un enfant aimé et celui qui est pris comme le pied de la vache ». FGD, 
Kirundo Province, Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (2) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 80; (6) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
 
Q.  Comment    voyez-vous    la  vie  sur  la  Colline ?  2.  Actuellement,  pendant  la  période 
démocratique la vie va bien. Sauf quelques bandits qui attaquent. 3. La guerre est entrain de finir. 
Le problème qui reste, c’est la pauvreté. Si on pouvait nous  aider à créer des associations, ça 
pourrait nous aider. 4. La situation est calme. Mais, il y a le problème des bandits et les champs 
deviennent très petits. FGD, Kirundo Province, Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 45; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 40; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 62; (5) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 42 
 
Q. Comment  la vie fonctionne –t-elle  ici? 6. En général, la vie n’est pas bonne. Il y a la pauvreté 
dans  la  population,  il  y  a  une  culture  qui  peut  améliorer  la  vie  ici.  Mais  quand  on  voit  la 
population qui est ici, on peut penser que  cela peut aider la population ici. Mais les plantations 
appartiennent aux dirigeants à BUJUMBURA. Quand on a détruit les plantations d’autrefois ici, 
beaucoup de gens d’ici étaient à l’étranger. Ils n’ont pas reçu de nouvelles parcelles. Ceux qui sont 
revenus de l’exil ont trouvé leur propriété occupée par d’autres gens, installés par l’Etat. Les uns 
avaient pris fuite à cause des massacres organisés par l’Etat. Ceux revenus de l’exil attendent que 
le Gouvernement fait quelque chose. 7. Les paysans d’ici sont vraiment pauvres. Les gens ne 
peuvent pas avoir accès au palmier. Les gens prennent les restes des palmiers pour les vendre. 
Pour…., des parcelles, on doit louer. C’est dans les palmiers, mais ça ne  rapporte  pas bien. Avant 
le  départ  en  exil,  les  palmiers  appartenaient  aux  habitants,  on  était  riche.  Les  propriétaires 
viennent  seulement  pour  récolter.  L’économie  n’est  pas  bonne.  Ce  sont  seulement  des  gens 
d’autres régions qui profitent. FGD, Bururi Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 86; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 70; 
(5) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (6)  member hill councel, male, Hutu, 62; (7) peasant, female, Hutu, 54; 
(8) trader & Umushingantahe, male, 57; (9) mechanic &  hill administrator, male, Hutu, 40. 
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Although the feeling of security is weak and the economic situation is bad, the peasants we spoke to 
are also of the opinion that the recent political changes in Burundi are resorting effects. Many of the 
respondents  refer  to the  presidential and parlementary  elections  of  2005  as  democratic.  Although 
many are aware of the fact that the government is not performing, they are also of the opinion that a 
new horizon has been established in the political sphere. Also here people are aware of the fragility of 
the situation but they are, nevertheless, hopeful for an inclusive future for all. Some people, both Hutu 
and Tutsi, voice their grievances. Asked what they would do to change the situation, both groups 
responded  that  they  would  vote  for  other  leaders  in  the  next  elections.  The  fact  that  people  are 
convinced  that  the  political  situation  can  be  influenced  through  the  ballot  box  is  a  very  important 
change in the history of Burundi. There has been a time that only taking up arms was perceived as the 
avenue to facilitate change. 
 
The sentiment of influence is reinforced by their perceptions on the restructuring of the 
security forces. In the past Burundi’s security forces were Tutsi-dominated. Hutu peasants now refer to 
the fact that they will not flee to neighbouring countries anymore in case a new “crisis” develops. They 
would flee to army barracks and police stations as their Tutsi neighbours did in the past. The latter 
were sure to be secure at these places since the security forces belonged to their ethnic group. Hutu 
now refer to the fact that they can do the same since “their sons and brothers” are now also part of the 
army and policy. It also signals the fact that people of Hutu identity are less afraid of human rights 
abuses committed by the government forces. 
 
Remarkable when considering the narratives presented in the following text boxes is the 
fact that people often have a positive experience of the social cohesion in their communities. Social 
ties have been torn apart due to war, crisis and massacres but social life is gradually taking a new 
shape again. People have to live together, they have no other option. It is often in the daily interactions 
that people explore the motives of their neighbours, the intention of others. Neighbours and others that 
might have belonged to social and/or ethnic groups that were supposed to be the “enemies” in the 
past. Slow but sure these interactions turn to a form of normality again but distrust is still lurking under 
the surface of daily life. 
 
The only localities where opinions on the new government and the political and social 
situation at the local level are different, is in the displacement camps (see box 6). Inhabitants of these 
camps are almost exclusively of Tutsi identity. They have been severely affected by the violence that 
engulfed  the  country  in  the  wake  of  the  death  of  Ndadaye  in  1993.  As  the  previous  section  on 
traumatic experiences has shown, they not only lost house and goods, but also family members in the 
so-called “crisis”. They are reluctant to return home because they don’t have anything to return to but 
also because they are afraid. They fear their erstwhile neighbours, some of whom might have played a 
role in the past. They also look at the new political situation suspiciously. Some people refer to the fact 
that politicians sometimes incite these displaced to keep on living in their camps and the reason why 
they are reluctant to leave: they live in an environment exclusively constituted of social and ethnic 
peers, which does not facilitate the social interactions with others. 
 
The  people  who  used  to  live  in  the  displacement  camps  but  have  returned  in  the 
meantime are often satisfied with their return. They appreciate the fact that they are living among their 
former  neighbours  and  in  close proximity to  their fields.  But  they  are  aware  of  the  fragility of  the 
situation. The traumatic experiences of the past are scars that do not heal easily. One older Tutsi man  
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who had returned to his former home with his family after having lived for years in a displacement 
camp referred to the “strategy of the antilopes”. The antilopes take to the plains to graze but the wild 
animals are still in the vicinity and on the look out; they might attack at any moment. He felt similar in 
the social environment he had regained.  
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Box 6. The Displaced: Returning or Not? 
Q. Comment  la vie fonctionne –t-elle ici dans le site ? 1. Normalement, la vie n’est pas bonne, nos 
champs se trouvent loin et nous avons des difficultés pour les cultiver. Les toitures de nos maisons 
sont vieilles, seuls sont à l’abri ceux qui ont pu trouvé des tuiles. 5. Nous sommes dans une mauvaise 
situation, les biens que nous avons reçus sont finis, nous ne savons pas quoi faire. Quand les enfants 
vont à l’école, on se demande ce qu’on va lui faire quand ils seront de retour. Nous cultivons et on vole 
notre récolte dans les champs. TOUS : Ici dans le site, nous avons de bonnes relations entre nous. 1. 
Les gens qui sont restés sur les collines ne nous aident pas. Il y a le problème des partis politiques, 
quand on n’est pas du parti au pouvoir, les autorités locales n’aident pas. 2. Même quand un Tutsi est 
membre du parti, on n’a pas confiance en lui. 5. Moi, je suis la seule rescapée de la colline, quand je dis 
qu’on me vole, on me répond que je dois rentrer pour veiller à mes cultures. 1. Même si on construit 
des maisons pour nous, ces gens restés sur les collines vont nous persécuter. Il  y a des gens qui sont 
rentrés et qui ont été tués. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 28 February 2009; (1) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, 52; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 37; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 34; (4) 
peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 60; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 61; (6) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
displaced, 63.  
 
Q. Pourquoi les autres déplacés ne rentrent pas ? 5. Nous avons l’habitude de causer avec ces gens 
sur ce sujet. Ils disent qu’ils ont peur de rentrer parce que les autorités du haut niveau ne sont pas 
d’accord sur différents points. Ils disent aussi qu’ils ont peur des élections, autrement, les relations 
entre nous sont bonnes. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 28 February 2009; (1) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 34; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, Tutsi, former displaced, 68; (4) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 60; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 46. 
 
Q. Quand pensez-vous rentrer sur vos collines ? 3. C’est une question très délicate, nous souhaitons 
avoir un village de paix et pour toutes les ethnies, mais il est impossible de rentrer chez nous. 2. On ne 
peut pas rentrer. 5. Les gens du site viennent des endroits différents, comment rentrer pour vivre seul 
au milieu des Hutu ? Mais le village serait efficace. Quand on veut te tuer sur la colline, on t’accuse de 
sorcellerie. 3. A […], il y a un seul ménage qui est rentré, le vieux est mort et sa fille est restée seule. 
Les Hu sont venus et ont détruit et pillé la maison, ils ont même emporté les tôles, mais les auteurs de 
ce crime n’ont pas été punis jusqu’à maintenant. La fille loge chez sa petite sœur qui est mariée à un 
Hutu. Ce qui se passe à ITABA est sans pareil car on dit « ITABA HARATABAGURITSE HARABURA 
GITABARA = ITABA est déchiré et il n’y a pas eu de secours. »  2. Ça ne va pas à […].  FGD, Gitega 
Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 44; (2) peasant, female, 
Tutsi, displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 39; (5) 
peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  displaced,  28;  (6)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  37;  (7)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 40. 
 
Q. Comment  la vie fonctionne-t-elle? 2. Je crois qu’il y a d’abord la sécurité. Cette question est d’une 
part facile mais d’autre part, elle est difficile. Il y a ceux qui ne veulent pas que ça se termine par là. 
Ceux qui sont dans les sites ne veulent pas rentrer. Avant ils disaient qu’il fallait d’abord rapatrier 
ceux qui étaient à l’extérieur, ils sont maintenant rentrés, et pourquoi alors les autres ne veulent pas 
rentrer ? 1. La vraie cause qui fait que ces gens ne rentrent pas, nous, nous ne le savons pas, eux seuls 
le savent. Je crois qu’il y a des raisons politiques derrière tout ça, car quand ils disaient que ceux qui 
sont à l’extérieur devaient rentrer,ils disaient aussi qu’ils n’avaient pas de maisons, leurs maisons sont 
là, ils viennent y passer la journée et le soir, ils rentrent dans le site. 4. Nous travaillons même pour 
eux, ils prétendent ne pas avoir des maisons, nous en avons construit pour eux, mais ils ne sont pas 
rentrés. 2. Ils ont demandé qu’on leur construise des maisons, après, ils ont détruit ces maisons et ils 
sont retournés dans le site. Alors, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire? Nous acceptons qu’il puisse y avoir des 
villages  pour  nous  tous  car  même  avant,  on  était  comme  ça,  nous  étions  comme  des  frères.  Le 
problème est que les Tutsi peuvent refuser de vivre ensemble avec nous dans ces villages. FGD, Gitega 
Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) 
peasant, female, Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 59; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
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7.   THE EXPECTATIONS OF (TRANSITIONAL) JUSTICE 
 
The previous section has briefly sketched the general horizon against which the opinions 
on the possibilities and needs of a transitional justice policy take shape. Poverty, insecurity, trauma 
and corruption are rife. But there is also a general experience of changes brought about in the political 
structures  of  society.  Within  this  context  this  section  explores  these  perceptions  and  opinions  on 
transitional justice in general and the practices already taking shape that should inform a transitional 
justice policy. We firstly identify recurring themes in the narratives of the focus group discussions. The 
following sections of the report will take up each of these themes separately. Before doing so, we 
secondly address the opinions with regard to the fundamental question: digging up the past or leaving 
the  past  behind.  We  give  an  extensive  overview  of  the  discussions  on  this  topic  since  they  are 
primordial  for  other  reflections  on  transitional  justice.  In  addition  we  frame  the  expectations  of 
transitional justice in the context of the institutions envisioned to deal with the past in Burundi: the 
Truth,  Pardon  and  Reconciliation  Commission,  a  Special  Tribunal  and  the  potential  use  of  the 
Ubushingantahe institution.  
 
7.1.   Peasant narratives: a general overview 
 
Box 7. presents the narratives of discussions on the preferred strategy to deal with the 
past and the road to take to construct a peaceful future. The expectation of ‘justice’ for the problems 
and violence experienced in the past is discussed. We give an extensive overview of the discussion to 
subsequently  identify  several  recurring  elements.  These  themes  will  set  the  stage  for  further 
exploration and reflection in the remaining sections of this report.  
Box 7. The Expectation of Justice 
 
1. Ceux qui ont tué ne peuvent pas demander pardon, mais quand on les punit, ils deviennent  
conscients de ce qu’ils ont fait. 4. On ne peut pas pardonner à celui qui n’a pas demandé pardon, 
mais on peut donner de petites punitions pour les responsables. On doit punir tout le monde car 
d’après ce que j’ai remarqué, là où il y avait beaucoup de Tutsi, ils ont maltraité les Hutu, mais ce 
n’était pas organisé par un parti comme l’a fait le FRODEBU. On les maltraitait pour s’approprier 
surtout de leurs biens. 6. Quand je me rends sur ma Colline d’origine, les gens me disent que notre 
époque est dépassée. Pour finir tout, il faut un dialogue franc entre les Hutu et les Tutsi à fin de se 
pardonner. Pour nous les paysans, il est facile de faire cela, mais comme on dit : « UMWERA UVA 
IBUKURU UGAKWIRA HOSE » ce sont les hautes  autorités qui nous divisent car nous les petits, 
nous nous aimons vraiment. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 19 March 2008; (1) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, Umushingantahe, 58; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 48; (3) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, displaced, 74; (4) teacher, male, Tutsi, displaced, 54; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 35; (6) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 54.  
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Box 7. The Expectation of Justice (2) 
Q. Comment traiter les problèmes du passé? 3. Pendant la guerre, les soldats et les rebelles ont 
pillé et tué, il faut pardonner et  oublier. 1. Cela nous permettra de dormir, car nous avons tant 
souffert. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 12 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (2) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 40; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 67; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 30.  
 
Q. Comment résoudre les problèmes du passé? 4. Les responsables des crimes doivent être 
arrêtés et jugés. 1. Ceux qui ont commis des crimes en 1988 et 1993 doivent être arrêtés et jugés. 
Si quelqu’un tue les gens et reste chez lui, il peut renouveler parce qu’il peut penser que ce  qu’il a 
fait est bon. 5. Celui qui a commis des crimes doit être arrêté et traduit en justice. S’ils avouent 
leurs  crises,  ils  peuvent  être  pardonnés.  Sinon  ils  peuvent  continuer.  FGD,  Kirundo  Province, 
Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 42; (3) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 52; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 35; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 36; (6) peasant, female, Hutu, 35; 
(7) peasant, female, Hutu, 21.  
 
Q. Comment traiter les événements de 1988 pour vous ? 4-5-7 : Celui qui ne veut pas doit être 
puni. Tous : Si on demande pardon, on peut pardonner. Nous sommes prêt à pardonner. 1. Même si 
on a tué mon père et frère, il était cherché parce qu’il était à l’école, je suis prêt à  pardonner. 7. 
Même si on a tué toute la famille, je suis démobilisé sans emploi. Je suis prêt à pardonner mais si 
c’est dit aussi les gens qui ont tout perdu, qui sont sans maison. 5. C’est difficile d’aller vivre là où 
j’étais. Tous les gens qui ont tué ma famille sont encore là.   Je n’ai pas confiance, l’état doit faire un 
geste pour nommer. Pour faire venir la confiance, on doit juger ces criminels devant les tribunaux. 
Ce n’est pas la justice locale qui peut faire cela.  FGD, Kirundo Province, Commune Ntega, 28 March 
2008; (1) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 36; (2) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 84; (3) peasant, 
female, Tutsi, displaced, (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 36; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 31; 
(6) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 66; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 47; (8) peasant, female, 
Tutsi, displaced, 24. 
 
Q. Qu’est-ce qu’on doit faire avec les gens qui ont fait des crimes sur les collines ? 3. on doit 
les pardonner. Ils ne sont pas responsables de ce qu’ils ont fait. […] 1. Pendant la guerre, les Tutsi 
formaient des groupes de 10 à 30 personnes pour tuer les Hutu. Les Hutu pareillementl. Ce n’est 
pas à cause d’eux qu’ils ont fait ça mais à cause de l’ordre des autres. Q. Alors, ceux qui ont 
effectivement tué ne sont pas  responsables ? 1. Même si les gens ont pris les machettes pour 
aller tuer, ce n’est pas à cause d’eux, il y avait     des gens derrière cela.  FGD, Kirundo Province, 
Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 49; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 80; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
 
 
Q. Quoi faire pour traiter ces problèmes du passé. Le pillage et les tueries etc. ? 6. Il faut que 
les rapatriés et les …..déplacés trouvent un terrain d’entente, qu’ils vivent en harmonie. Il faut qu’il 
y  ait  un  partage  de  terre  pour  que  les  troubles  finissent.  1.  Le grand  problème,  c’est  que  les 
rapatriés trouvent leur terre occupée par d’autres personnes. 7. Pour résoudre ces problèmes, il 
faut que les gens se pardonnent. Il faut oublier les ethnies et reconnaître que tout le monde est 
humain. Il faut d’abord se réconcilier et le reste va suivre. Q.  Qu’est-ce qui  est nécessaire pour 
se réconcilier ? 8. Ce qui est nécessaire, c’est le dialogue qu’on peut avouer et qu’on demande 
pardon. Après, les gens peuvent vivre en harmonie. FGD, Bururi Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 
April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 86; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (4) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (6)  member hill councel, male, Hutu, 62; (7) 
peasant, female, Hutu, 54; (8) trader & Umushingantahe, male, 57; (9) mechanic &  hill administrator, 
male, Hutu, 40. 
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Box 7. The Expectation of Justice (3) 
 
Q. Qu’est ce que vous souhaitez ? 5. J’entends depuis longtemps qu’on parle des orphelins 
etc. Je ne sais pas quoi faire. 3. Je souhaite qu’il y ait une entente entre les hautes autorités du pays 
car    « UMWERA  UVUYE  IBUKU  UCA  UKWIRA  HOSE »La  lumière  vient  d’en  haut.  Les  simples 
paysans suivent l’exemple des hautes autorités. Ils sont souvent des outils. Les politiciens aiment 
diviser les gens selon les ethnies pour gagner la confiance de l’ethnie majoritaire. Pour arriver à la 
paix, il faut que les dirigeants laissent tomber les discours qui blessent. Pendant les élections, nous 
n’avons pas assez de représentants, on les qualifie des usurpateurs. Si le gouvernement nous a 
donné des terres, c’est une sorte de  récompense parce qu’on a perdu beaucoup de gens. Ce qui 
occupe les gens c’est la question de terre. On oublie tous les gens qui sont morts. 4. Ce n’est pas 
difficile de résoudre les problèmes au niveau le plus bas. Si les gens au haut niveau s’entendent, les 
paysans suivent. 3. Les autorités de haut niveau ne veulent pas que ce qu’ils ont fait soit connu par 
tout     le monde. Il faut qu’on connaisse ce qui s’est passé. Après avoir identifié les coupables, les 
criminels, on peut s’asseoir. S’il faut pardonner, on va pardonner, s’il faut payer, on va payer. 5. 
Qu’est ce qu’on peut faire. Les gens qui reviennent de l’exil disent qu’ils ont été en exil à cause des 
Tutsi. Comment cette haine dans les cœurs des gens peut-elle disparaître ?  
 
Q. Oui, comment ? Qu’est ce qui est nécessaire ? 3. Le gouvernement doit se préparer pour 
accueillir les gens revenus de l’extérieur. Le gouvernement a abandonné ces rapatriés. Ils ne sont 
pas assistés. Nous aussi, on ne peut pas abandonner les terres qu’on occupe maintenant parce que 
nous avons reçu  de petites  parcelles.  Le gouvernement  devait  récompenser ces  gens pour  les 
parcelles  qu’ils  ont  perdues.  FGD,  Bururi  Province,  Commune  Rumonge,  23  April  2008;  (1) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, 39; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, 72; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, 52; (4) teacher, 
male, Tutsi, 40; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, 44;  (6) peasant, female, Tutsi, 67; (7)  peasant, 
female, Tutsi, 40. 
 
Q.  Que  faire  pour  traiter  les  problèmes  du  passé  ?  1.  Je  pense  que  ça  ne  devrait  pas 
recommencer. 5. Ce qui est parti c’est fini. Je souhaite que ceux qui restent vivent en paix. Il ne faut 
pas revenir au passé. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 16 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 65; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 76; (3) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 65; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 77; (5) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 80.   
 
Q. Comment traiter les problèmes du passé ? 6. Je pense qu’il faut pardonner parce qu’on ne 
peut rien faire sur ce qui s’est passé. On dit à la radio qu’on va organiser un dialogue depuis la 
Colline jusqu’au niveau national pour nous réconcilier. 1. Je pense qu’il y a eu trop de crimes ici. Il 
n’y a aucun Burundais qui n’a pas perdu. Il faut oublier et reconstruire de nouveau. Tous : Il faut 
pardonner.  FGD, Kayanza Province, Commune Kabarore, 6 May 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 
50; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 42; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 37; (5) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 56; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 55.  
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These general discussions on ‘transitional justice’ reveal that 
 
(1) A fundamental decision needs to be made between ‘digging up the past’ or ‘burying 
the past’. 
 
(2) Fundamental differences can exist as to whether punishment would be a necessary 
strategy. Some respondents see punishment as a prerequisite to prevent a return the violence and to 
end a culture of impunity. Others are of the opinion that punishing perpetrators of crimes committed in 
the past will result in a return to violence. A detailed exploration will need to establish the breadth of 
these opinions and identify whether there are differences according to the identity of the respondents. 
As can be seen in Box 7, especially displaced persons seem to opt for punishment. Other prefer other 
objectives.  
 
(3) Pardon is a recurring and prominent theme in the narratives presented in box 7. It 
needs to be discussed, however, what pardon entails. Several different expressions are used to refer 
to pardon. We will explore them in following sections. 
 
(4) Discussants are not sure whether people can deal with the issue by themselves. The 
features of the mechanism(s) that need(s) to deal with the past are unclear. In any case an initiation 
and example of high-level authorities is necessary. The expression “umwera uvuye ibuku uca ukwira 
hose”- “light comes from above” is revealing in that regard. As much as there is awareness of the fact 
that violence was mainly a political problem initiated from above and imposed upon ordinary people, 
there is also the awareness that the initiative to deal with the past needs to be facilitated as well. 
 
(5) The notion ‘dialogue’ is often used in connection with the issue of pardon. What kind 
of dialogue is expected? What are the parameters necessary to structure this dialogue? 
 
(6) People are very much aware of the fact that a process of dealing with the past and 
achieving the transitional justice objectives will be very difficult due to a range of major obstacles. We 
will bring these obstacles into focus in a following section. 
 
(7) Important element to take into account in the exploration of this initial discussion is the 
fact that issues considered to be outside of the scope of ‘transitional justice’ objectives are often cited 
as well. Reference is made to socio-economic elements (land), overall good governance and power-
sharing issues. 
 
(8) Often a distinction is made between the local and the national level. Ordinary people 
emphasize that there are no major problems at the local level. The events in the past are the result of 
what happened at the national level. Prevention of a recurrence of the past is thus primarily a political 
issue for them, while the local level needs assistance in the domain of economy, everyday justice, 
good governance and social cohesion. 
 
(9) The notion of the heart is referred to when remembering the violence experienced.  
When discussing strategies to deal with the violence, the heart is often mentioned as well. As we will 
explain, the notion of the heart is important to understand local-level and interpersonal reconciliation. 
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(10) The need for justice is more prospective than retrospective. Strengthening the rule of 
law and rehabilitating the justice system is a priority. 
 
 
7.2.  Forgetting or remembering: the options and the choices 
 
Ordinary Burundians are aware of the fact that a fundamental decision needs to be taken: 
digging up the past or leaving it behind; this is the most important decision to be taken and the most 
important discussion to be held. Ordinary Burundians were not consulted when the main features of a 
transitional justice process were laid out. They were not consulted with respect to the fundamental 
question whether they wanted a transitional justice process, although the “national consultations” that 
started  in  July  2009  must  give  them  the  opportunity  to  voice  some  opinions  on  the  mechanisms 
identified  to  deal  with  the  past.  But  ordinary  people  are  not  enough  informed  to  voice  a  well-
considered opinion on the technicalities of the mechanisms already envisioned to be used. But they 
can give an indication as to what kind of fundamental objectives are important to them and the general 
shape this “transitional” space needs to have. In open-ended discussions on the topic our respondents 
often  used  popular  expressions  to  refer  to  possible  fundamental  strategies  to  be  used.  These 
expressions also served to evoke the consequences of certain approaches.  
 
A recurring expression was “Nta kuzura akaboze” when expressing a preference not to 
bring to light – in some way - the ‘events’ of the past. The expression can be translated as: “one does 
not have to dig up what has been buried/is rotten”. It means that it is better to leave behind what 
happened in the past and what has been left untouched for a long period. Bringing ‘bad experiences’ 
into the open would have negative consequences. An expression that was often used as well but 
expresses the opposite strategy is “ibuye ryaserutse ntiryica isuka” meaning that “the stone uncovered 
will not damage your hoe in the future”. This expression is used when the idea is propagated that the 
‘events’ of the past, their origins and consequences need to be treated openly and with care. Dealing 
with  them  would  ensure  proper  understanding  and  deterrence  and  would  thus  have  positive 
consequences. Several other expressions can be used to express one of these two approaches. They 
are enumerated in box 8. Box 9 further explores the meaning of the two expressions in the words of 
our peasant conversation partners.  
 
The choice made by a selection of 40 participants in the focus groups discussions reveals 
that the majority would take the option to leave the past behind by “not digging up what  has been 
buried”. An insight corroborated by the findings of other large-scale scientific research projects. 22 
Table 4 summarizes their choices.  
 
Box  10 subsequently, gives an overview of the discussion unfolding when people were 
asked to make a choice between the two options. Those who would like to leave the past behind seem 
to take this option primarily out of conviction. Others would prefer to dig up what is under the surface 
but seem to be aware of the obstacles and especially the negative consequences it might have.  The 
discussion around these two expressions often touches upon the different obstacles in place or that 
                                                              
22 Samii, Cyrus (2009), “Who wants to Forgive and Forget? Civilian Attitudes towards Post-Conflict Justice and 
Truth in Burundi.” Working Paper, New York: Columbia University. Uvin, P. (2009) Life after Violence. A People’s 
Story of Burundi, London & New York, Zed Books,  
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might  arise  in  the  transitional  justice  process.  We  will  further  explore  the  perceived  obstacles  in 
following sections of the report. 
 
Table 4. Choice Expressions - Selection Respondents FGDs (N=40) 
  N 
NTA KUZURA AKABOZE Forgetting / Amnesty  26 
IBUYE RYASERUTSE NTIRYICA ISUKA  
Remembering / Digging up the past 
10 
NO ANSWER  4 
TOTAL  40 
 
Box 8: Forgetting or remembering: an overview of expressions 
NTA KUZURA AKABOZE 
=one does not have to dig up that which has 
been rotten 
 
INTIBAGIRA NTIBANA  
= celui qui n’oublie pas n’a pas d’amis 
= the person that does not forget, has no 
friends 
 
IHORIHORI RIMARA IMIRYANGO 
 = la vengeance décime les familles 
= revenge decimates families 
 
INYAMA MBISI ISEBURA IYUMYE  
= la viande crue remplace la viande desséchée 
= dried out meat is replaced by uncooked 
meat   
 
AMASE Y A KERA NTAGIHOMA URUTARO  
= les anciens excrément de la vache ne servent 
plus à enduire le panier 
= the old excrements of the cow are no longer 
used to smear the basket 
 
ISUBIRAMO NI RIBI 
= refaire les choses c’est mauvais 
= redo thing is bad 
 
IVYAGIYE VYARAGIYE 
 = ce qui est parti est parti et c’est fini 
= what is done is done and is over 
IBUYE RYASERUTSE NTIRYICA ISUKA 
=the stone uncovered will not damage your 
hoe in the future” 
 
« IGITI NTIKIGUKORA MU JISHO KABIRI 
= une branche ne te touche pas dans l’œil deux 
fois » 
= a branch does not touch you in the eye twice 
 
NTAWISIGIRA KU BUHOMA 
 = On ne se maquille pas sans se laver 
= one does not make oneself up without 
washing 
 
IGITI KIGUKOZE MUJISHO KABIRI KIBA 
GISHAKA KURIMENA 
 = Si une branche d’arbre te touche dans l’œil 
deux fois, elle cherche à le briser 
= if a branch of a tree touches you in the eye 
for the second time, it is destined to ruin 
 
IKIBI GIKWIYE GUHEBWA 
=LE MAL DOIT ETRE ABANDONNE 
= evil needs to be abandoned 
 
IYAKUBURIYE NTIBA IKIKURIYE 
= le chien qui a aboyé ne mord plus 
= the dog that is barking does no longer bite  
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Box 9: Forgetting or Remembering? The Options  
 
Q.  Il  y  a  un  proverbe  burundais  qui  dit  « NTA  KUZURA  AKABOZE »  quel  serait  son 
contraire ? 7. L’expression « NTAKUZURA AKABOZE » signifie qu’il ne faut pas se préoccuper du 
passé, qu’il faut avancer pour aller vers l’avenir. 4. Le contraire serait « ISUBIRAMO NI RIBI » ce 
qui signifie qu’il ne faut pas revenir sur le passé. Tous : C’est plutôt la même chose.  
Q.  Que  veut  dire  l’expression  « IBUYE  RYASERUTSE  NTIRYICA  ISUKA ? »  1.  Ça  signifie 
qu’après avoir découvert le mauvais, il faut l’écarter. 6. Ça veut dire que s’il y avait une chose qui 
était cachée et qu’on a découvert, cette chose ne va plus nuire car tout le monde peut l’écarter. 4. 
C’est  comme  l’autre expression qui dit « IGITI NTIKIGUKORA MU JISHO KABIRI = une branche 
d’arbre ne peut pas te toucher deux fois dans l’œil », car on sait comment éviter ce mal. FGD, 
Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 29 April 2008; (1) peasant, female, Hutu, 68; (2) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 60; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, 78; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, 76; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 51; (6) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 45; (7) peasant, male, Hutu, 65; (8) peasant, female, Hutu, 41. 
 
Q. Que signifie l’expression « NTA KUZURA AKABOZE » ? 5. Ce qui est pourri est pourri, ce qui 
reste est de continuer vers l’avenir. 1. Ça dépend des moments, il arrive que le mal devienne une 
leçon pour l’avenir. On n’oublie pas le mal qui a séparé les gens. Si on se bat, on se respecte. 3. Il 
ne faut pas déterrer le passé.  
Q.  Que  signifie  l’expression  « IBUYE  RYASERUTSE  NTIRYICA  ISUKA » ?  2.  C'est-à-dire  par 
exemple dans un cas de dispute, quand les autres ont entendu le projet, ils avertissent l’intéressé 
et celui-ci se tient prêt et essaie de prendre des mesures qui s’imposent ; et ainsi on évite le 
combat. 5. Cela est vrai, quand on est déjà averti, on sait comment se comporter. FGD, Gitega 
Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 28;  
(2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 59; (5) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 56. 
 
Q.  Que  veut  dire  l’expression  « NTA  KUZURA  AKABOZE » ?  3.  Cela  veut  dire  qu’il  faut 
abandonner le passé et avancer vers la nouvelle situation.  
Q. Quel serait le contraire de cette expression? 1. Le contraire serait « il faut quitter le passé 
pour avancer vers de nouvelles choses ».  
Q. Que veut dire « IBUYE RYASERUTSE NTIRYICA ISUKA » ? 2. Cela veut dire qu’il y a quelqu’un 
qui  veut  faire  du  mal,  mais  qui  est  connu,  on  peut  alors  l’éviter  et  contrecarrer  ce  mal  qu’il 
envisage de faire. 5. Cela veut dire « IYAKUBURIYE NTIBA IKIKURIYE= le chien qui a aboyé ne 
mord plus. » 4. Celui qui connaît les visées ne peut pas nuire. Celui avec qui on est en conflit, 
quand il fait un geste, on réagit très vite. FGD, Kayanza Province, Commune Kabarore, 11 May 2008; 
(1) peasant, male, Hutu, 53; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 50; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (4) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 40; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 25; (6) peasant, female, Hutu, 30. 
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Box 9: Forgetting or Remembering? The Options (2) 
 
Q. Que signifie »NTAKUZURA AKABOZE ? »  6. Ca veut dire qu’on ne veut pas se rappeler de 
quelque chose qui n’était pas agréable. 5. « NTAKUZURA AKABOZE », c’est comme cette affaire de 
la crise de 1972, si quelqu’un veut faire payer, il est entrain de déterrer le pourri. 2. C’est comme 
cette crise de 1972, si on  commence à en parler, la confiance est gênée alors      que les gens 
commencent à s’entendre.  
Q. Quel est le contraire de cette expression? 4. « IKIBI GIKWIYE GUHEBWA=LE MAL DOIT 
ETRE ABANDONNE ». 6. L’expression semblable est « INTIBAGIRA NTIBANA ». 3. Il faut oublier 
le passé qui n’était pas agréable.  
Q. Que signifie « IBUYE RYSERUTSE NTIRYCA ISUKA ? » 6. Cela signifie que si le mal est connu 
avant d’arriver à terme, on a le temps de l’empêcher.  Si un malfaiteur est connu, on peut l’éviter.  
2. Si le mal est connu, on peut le combattre à temps.  
Q. Quel est son synonyme ? 6. « IKUBURIYE NTIKURYA ». (= le chien qui a aboyé ne mord plus.)  
Q. Quel est son contraire ? Tous : Pas de réponse. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 1 May 
2008; (1) peasant, female, Hutu, 60; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 67; (4) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 38; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 51; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 49. 
 
Q. Que signifie l’expression « NTA KUZURA AKABOZE » ? 3. Ça veut dire qu’il ne faut pas 
revenir sur le passé, ça veut dire qu’il faut avancer vers le futur.  
Q. Quel serait le contraire de cette expression? Tous : Pas de réponse.  
Q. Que signifie l’expression « IBUYE RYASERUTSE NTIRYICA ISUKA » ? 1. Ça veut dire que les 
idées qui sont mises devant le public ne font pas de mal à quelqu’un. Mais quand les idées 
cachées explosent, elles font des dégâts. 3. Une parole dite ne peut pas faire de mal, car on sait 
comment l’éviter.  FGD,  Kayanza  Province,  Commune  Kabarore,  10  May  2008;  (1)  peasant,  male, 
Hutu, 54; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 27; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, former burgomaster, 78; (4) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 38; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 40.  
 
Q.  Que  signifie  l’expression  « NTAKUZURA  AKABOZE » ?  6.  Ca  veut  dire  qu’il  ne  faut  pas 
revenir sur le mal qui a endeuillé le pays.  
Q.  Quel  est  le  contraire  de  cette  expression ?  1.  Le  contraire  est  « IBUYE  RYASERUTSE 
NTIRYICA ISUKA » qui signifie que quand on  connaît le danger, on peut l’écarter. FGD, Kayanza 
Province, Commune Kabarore, 6 May 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 50; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 42; 
(3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 37; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 56; (6) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 55.  
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Box 10: Forgetting or Remembering? The Choices 
 
Q. Que signifie l’expression « NTA KUZURA AKABOZE » ? 4. Cela est très mauvais, car c’est quelque 
chose qui est pourri, on ne peut pas le déterrer, quand on le déterre, il sent mauvais. 2. C’est se souvenir 
de mauvaises choses passées qu’il fallait oublier. Il faut oublier ce qui s’est passé. Que ce soit les Hutu 
ou les Tutsi, tout le monde a perdu, c’est pourquoi il faut abandonner. 1. Si on observe ce qui s’est passé, 
en y retournant, les bonnes relations qui commencent à naître vont disparaître, c’est pourquoi il faut 
abandonner. 3. C’est comme toucher dans une blessure. En vérité, tout le monde a perdu. Le pardon est 
possible à celui qui en fait une demande et l’Etat va indemniser ceux qui ont perdu pour faire oublier ce 
qui s’est passé.  5. Si quelqu’un rencontre quelqu’un du site et qu’il lui dit bonjour, c’est très bien. 2. 
Demander pardon, je trouve que c’est difficile, car si on va dans le site pour demander pardon, on va se 
dire que tu t’accuses de beaucoup de choses. 3. On doit organiser des réunions publiques au cours 
desquelles les gens vont se demander pardon. 4. Je ne vois pas l’intérêt de ces réunions car même si 
quelqu’un du site vient ici, nous lui donnons à manger sans problème.  
Q.  Qu’est-ce  que  l’expression  « IBUYE  RYASERUTSE  NTIRYICA  ISUKA »  veut  dire ?  2.  Si  on 
demande ce qui s’est passé, personne ne souhaiterait retourner dans le passé. 1. Une fois, si une chose 
est connue par tout le monde, on sait comment en faire face. 3. C’est la même chose que de dire « IGITI 
NTIKIGUKORA  MU JISHO KABIRI=  une  branche ne  te touche  pas  dans  l’œil  deux  fois ».4.  Car on  a 
toujours des soucis pour cet arbre. 3. En vérité « NTAWISIGIRA KU BUHOMA = On ne se maquille pas 
sans se laver », il faut tout dire et tout mettre à la portée de tous. Il faut déterrer la pierre et après, on va 
abandonner parce que tout le monde saura où se trouve cette pierre. 5. Il faut tout oublier, ce qui s’est 
passé s’est passé et c’est fini, il faut oublier pour s’aimer. 4. il faut laisser la pierre où ??elle, car même si 
on la déterre, ce qui est perdu ne reviendra pas. 1. Au lieu de réconcilier, ça peut causer d’autres 
problèmes, car il y aura des procès d’indemnisation, je pense qu’il faut avancer car tout cela peut causer 
d’autres problèmes. 2. Je peux dire quelque chose. J’ai entendu dire que « NTAWISIGIRA KU BUHOMA ». 
Je constate qu’il vient de se passer à peu près 5 ans avec le nouveau régime, au cours de toutes ces 
années, aucun Tutsi n’a eu des problèmes avec un Hutu, d’où il faut avancer et ne pas déterrer ce qui 
s’est passé. Pour le moment, on se donne des filles en mariage avec les Tutsi, et si on retourne en 
arrière, on avait créer des problèmes. 3. Il y a une différence. Il y a ceux qui ont perdu les leurs et qui 
connaissent les auteurs, on va pardonner à celui qui demande pardon, si non, c’est comme quelqu’un 
qui va chez le prêtre pour se confesser et qui se confesse en moitié. Il faut qu’on soit ensemble, qu’on se 
dise la vérité pour se pardonner enfin.4. Cela est impossible, car si on avoue la faute, la victime va 
porter plainte. 2. Si je réfléchis, c’est le même mot. C’est difficile, les crimes ont eu lieu sous plusieurs 
formes, un déplacé pouvait venir avec un militaire et tuer les gens ici. Est-ce que celui- là viendra 
demander  pardon  lui  aussi ?  Comment  le  fera-t-il ?  Est-ce  que  ce  militaire  viendra  lui  aussi  pour 
demander pardon ? S’ils commencent, ça nous donnera une leçon et nous aussi, nous allons suivre.  3. 
Un Tutsi a été pillé, les rescapés sont dans le site. Les Hutu eux aussi ont été pillés et tués. Tout le 
monde avouera ce qu’il a fait. C’est le pardon qui va tout corriger car il y a eu la vengeance, c’est 
pourquoi tout le monde va demander pardon. 5. Tout le monde a perdu. Les Tutsi ont perdu et les Hutu 
aussi. Qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire ? Il faut tout laisser et continuer vers l’avenirt parce que si on continue 
à s’accuser mutuellement, on risque d’être troublé.  2. Cela va encore nous enfoncer dans les malheurs. 
Tous  mes  biens  ont  été  brûlés,  mais  je  n’ai  pas  besoin  de  voir  l’auteur  venir  chez  moi  pour  me 
demander pardon, car s’il vient, je vais lui demander de me payer. Il y a un autre qui  va me demander 
de lui remettre ce qu’il a perdu et dont je suis le responsable, alors que je suis incapable de payer ! 
Qu’est-ce que je deviendrai ? Je n’ai pas besoin de voir l’auteur chez moi pour me demander pardon. 
FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 27 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 26; (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 33; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 69; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 55; 
(5) peasant, female, Hutu, 40. 
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Box 10: Forgetting or Remembering? The Choices (2) 
 
Q. Quelle expression peut-on utiliser pour traiter les problèmes du passé ici? 1. Je pense 
qu’il ne faut rien négliger étant donné ce qui s’est passé ici. 2. (Il hésite pour répondre). 3-4 : 
« NTA KUZURA AKABOZE », il faut avancer et laisser de côté ce qui s’est passé et de fait, la paix 
viendra.  5.  Même  si  on déterre  la  pierre, on  ne fera  pas  revenir  les nôtres,  de ce  fait  « NTA 
KUZURA AKABOZE ». 1. Je pense que ceux qui ont pris le devant doivent commencer par avouer, 
il y en a même qui ont parlé sur les radios, les Burundais doivent déterrer cette pierre eux-
mêmes. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 
28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 59; 
(5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
 
Q.  Quelle  expression  faut-il  utiliser  pour  régler  les  problèmes  du  passé  dans  la 
communauté?  1.  Selon  moi,  je  pense  qu’il  faut  clarifier  ces  problèmes  du  passé  parce 
qu’actuellement,  les  uns  accusent  les  autres.  Je  pense  alors  qu’il  faut  tout  mettre au  clair  et 
pardonner après avoir su pourquoi et à qui on pardonne. Si non, on ne peut pas pardonner à 
quelqu’un qu’on ne connaît pas. 2. Moi aussi, je pense que le mieux est de pardonner, mais après 
la vérité. On ne peut pas bien sûr demander à celui qui a tué de restituer les gens tués, mais si on 
connaît la vérité, on peut pardonner à celui qui a avoué. Je pense qu’il faut « GISERURA IBUYE » et 
après, oublier le passé et avancer vers l’avenir. 5. Selon moi, je pense qu’on ne doit pas se venger 
après la vérité, on peut « KUZURA AKABOZE » et pardonner après pour éviter la guerre. La vérité 
va venir des autorités, nous les paysans, nous succombons aux mauvaises actions des autorités. 
Nous allons pardonner. 2. « UMWERA UVUYE IBUKURU UKWIRA HOSE = la clarté qui vient du 
haut placé arrive partout », les problèmes commencent au niveau supérieur, quand il y a des 
problèmes là bas, les uns prennent le chemin de la forêt et nous succombons. 1. Toutes les crises 
depuis 1965, nous ne savons pas comment elles sont  venues, nous subissons seulement. 4. Pour 
moi,  « NTA  KUZURA  AKABOZE »  car  ça  sera  le  début  de  la  guerre.  1.  Je  pense  qu’on  peut 
« GUSERURA  IBUYE »  en  évitant  « KUZURA  AKABOZE ».  S’il  y  a  quelqu’un  qui  a  commis  des 
crimes, il doit venir pour avouer et demander pardon. 
 Q. Où organiser ce genre de rencontre ? 1. Ce problème est délicat, le criminel ne va pas aller 
devant la victime pour lui demander pardon. « IMITIMA Y’ABARUNDI NTIYOROSHE = les cœurs 
des Burundais ne sont pas tendres », il faut installer des commissions qui vont visiter les gens qui 
ont perdu les leurs pendant les différentes crises, les victimes vont dénoncer les criminels et la 
commission va mettre en confrontation les victimes et leurs bourreaux. Ici, la crise de 1972 a été 
« AGAHOMERAMUNWA = inqualifiable », mais les crimes étaient commis en pleine journée, ce 
n’était pas pendant la nuit, on connaît ceux qui ont commis des crimes. Si une telle commission 
est installée, on peut pardonner après l’aveu. 2. Les autorités doivent installer des commissions 
pour  faire  l’instruction.  On  peut  aussi  installer  des  tribunaux  devant  lesquels  les  gens  vont 
comparaître et se pardonner après la vérité. 1. Si possible, l’Etat doit installer ces tribunaux, car 
ici sur la colline, nous ne pouvons pas trancher ce genre de conflit. 3. Les BASHINGANTAHE ne 
peuvent pas régler ce genre de conflit. 1. Moi, je suis un MUSHINGANTAHE investi depuis 1984, il 
peut y avoir un MUSHINGANTAHE qui a tué ou dont les gens ont été tués, c’est impossible pour 
les deux de faire ce genre de procès équitablement. 2. C’est le gouvernement qui doit s’occuper de 
ce problème, car ce sonteux qui  organisent aussi toutes les crises. 3. Si on commence à dire que 
ce sont les BASHINGANTAHE qui vont faire ces procès, les gens vont dire qu’on veut « KUZURA 
AKABOZE » et c’est de nouveau la guerre. Tous : Il faut « GUSERURA IBUYE » mais c’est une action 
qui doit être réalisée par des gens venus des instances supérieures pas ceux de la colline.  FGD, 
Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 30 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 
64; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 46; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 51; 
(5) peasant, female, Hutu, 38; (6) peasant, female, Hutu, 56.  
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Box 10: Forgetting or Remembering? The Choices (3) 
 
Q. Quelle expression utiliser pour traiter les problèmes du passé ? 6. Moi, je préférerais « NTA 
KUZURA AKABOZE » parce que quand un acte est consommé, souvent la victime est séquestrée par 
son tortionnaire, la victime s’écrie alors envers son bourreau « Que tu ne continues pas à déterrer 
mon  pourri ».  2.  Moi  aussi,  je  préférerais  « NTA  KUZURA  AKABOZE »car  par  exemple  si  deux 
enfants d’un même père se battent et que l’un est mort et l’autre emprisonné, le parent préférerait 
ne pas perdre les deux enfants, il irait demander pardon pour le vivant. Si on déterre le pourri, ça 
serait une sorte de vengeance  perpétuelle. 3. Moi aussi, je préfère « NTA KUZURA AKABOZE » 
quand on déterre le pourri, on avance en reculant. 1. Si on commence à démasquer la pierre, on ne 
vise pas la paix, il faut aller en avant. 2. La pierre démasquée n’amène pas à la confiance, ça veut 
dire qu’on doit rester vigilant pour la pierre démasquée. 6. Ça serait la guerre. 5. Si on continue à 
parler de ce qu’on avait oublié, c’est la paix qui part.  
Q. Pour vous « NTA KUZURA AKABOZE » Tous : Oui, c’est notre conclusion.  FGD, Mwaro Province, 
Commune Bisoro, 30 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 64; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 
43; (3) peasant,  female,  Hutu,  46;  (4)  peasant,  female,  Hutu,  51;  (5)  peasant,  female,  Hutu,  38;  (6) 
peasant, female, Hutu, 56.  
 
Q.  Quelle  expression  choisissez-vous  entre  les  deux ?  2.  Moi,  je  préférerais  « NTAKUZURA 
AKABOZE ». 6. C’est vrai, il ne faut pas déterrer car « INTIBAGIRA NTIBANA = Celui qui n’oublie pas 
n’a pas d’ami ». 1. Moi, je préférerais « IBUYE RYASERUTSE NTIRYICA ISUKA » parce qu’on arrive à 
démontrer ce qui allait détruire, on le met de côté et tout le monde sait où se trouve cette origine 
du mal. 3. En vérité, si on connaît cette mauvaise pierre, on la jette loin, et aucune houe ne serait 
endommagée  par  la  pierre.  5.  Je  pense  que  « NTA  KUZURA  AKABOZE »  car  on  dit  « IVYAGIYE 
VYARAGIYE = ce qui est parti est parti et c’est fini ». 8. Moi, je pense qu’il faut démonter cette 
pierre, la mettre devant tout le monde pour qu’elle n’abîme plus de houes. 4. Je pense que « NTA 
KUZURA  AKABOZE »  car  tout  le  monde  sait  où  se  trouve  la  pierre,  il  faut  savoir  que  « IGITI 
KITAGUKORA MU JISHO KABIRI ». FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro; 30 April 2008 (1) peasant, 
male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 59; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 40; (3) peasant, female, 
Tutsi, 80; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 55; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 82; (6) peasant, female, Hutu, 58.  
 
Q. Quelle expression choisir pour traiter les problèmes du passé? 4. Pour moi, il ne faut pas 
déterrer, car si on déterre, ça va causer des dégâts, on ne va pas construire. 5. On peut considérer le 
fait de déterrer comme quand on a une plaie qui est en train de cicatriser, quand une blanche la 
blesse de nouveau, on a mal, alors, il ne faut pas déterrer car ça serait comme rouvrir la plaie en 
voie de cicatrisation. 3. Pour moi, il ne faut pas déterrer. Par exemple, quand on se rappelle les 
biens que nous avons perdus ici, on est pris de chagrin, mieux vaut alors regarder vers l’avenir. 2. 
pour moi, il ne faut pas déterrer, parce qu’on peut même être traumatisé. 3. Pendant la guerre, on 
ne savait pas où les gens de la famille passaient la nuit, pourquoi y revenir pour en parler ? A quoi 
servirait le fait de connaître ceux qui ont tué ? Mieux vaut aller en avant pour se développer. 1. 
Pour moi, il ne faut pas parler du passé, car ça peut être pire, ça blesse. Mieux vaut aller en avant en 
commençant  par  où  on  est  maintenant.  3.  Il  faut  mettre  des  lois  pour  punir  ceux  qui  vont 
recommencer, celui qui parle du passé risque de blesser les gens qui ont souffert dans ce passé 
douloureux.  1. Comment venir me dire comment mon père a été tué alors que celui qui parle est 
peut être celui qui a tué mon père ? Cela veut dire qu’il veut me blesser et que je pourrais me 
venger  de lui immédiatement. FGD, Kayanza Province, Commune Kabarore, 10 May 2008; (1) peasant, 
male,  Hutu,  54;  (2)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  27;  (3)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  former  burgomaster,  78;  (4) 
peasant, female, Hutu, 38; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 40.  
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Box 10: Forgetting or Remembering? The Choices (4) 
 
Q. Quelle expression utilisée pour traiter les problèmes du passé ? 1. Moi, je pense qu’il faut 
démasquer la pierre parce que si la pierre est démasquée, aucune houe ne sera endommagée et 
nous pourrons avancer sans avoir peur de buter encore une fois sur des pierres. 6. Moi, je pense 
que il ne faut pas déterrer le pourri parce que ce pourri est mauvais. Si un événement est 
dépassé  et  que  tous  les  concernés  ont  oublié,  il  faut  l’abandonner  car  si  l’événement  était 
mauvais, revenir sur lui peut endommager les relations entre les gens. Mais on oublie, on avance 
et les dégâts de cet événement malheureux sont abandonnés pour de bon. 2. Il faut démasquer la 
pierre  pour  que  les  houes  ne  soient  plus  endommagées.  5.  Moi,  je  pense  qu’il  ne  faut  pas 
déterrer, qu’il faut abandonner le passé et avancer vers l’avenir. 4. Moi, je pense que ça ne sert à 
rien de reparler  du  passé  douloureux. Il  ne faut pas  déterrer le  pourri. 5.  Pour moi,  il faut 
avancer et ne pas déterrer le pourri. Il faut aller vers de nouveaux événements et non revenir 
sur les anciens. 
Q.  Si  nécessaire  qu’on  démasque  la  pierre,  que  se  passera-t-il ?  5.  Si  on  décide  de 
démasquer la pierre, on va retourner dans cette méfiance, il n’y a rien de bon en démasquant la 
pierre. 6. Moi aussi, si on dit de démasquer la pierre, cette pierre va causer des dégâts car on va 
s’entredéchirer en disant que c’est à cause de celui qui démasque la pierre que la situation va 
mal. 
Q. Si on décide qu’il ne faut pas déterrer le pourri, quelles seraient les conséquences ? 1. 
La pierre démasquée n’endommage pas la houe, si on la laisse, elle va encore endommager 
d’autres houes. Mais si on démasque, on peut pardonner après avoir su où se trouvent tous ceux 
qui ont commis des crimes. 2. Si je sais que tel est mon ennemi, je peux aller lui demander 
pourquoi il me haït, il peut me dire pourquoi et nous pouvons nous réconcilier. Mais si je me tais 
alors que je sais qu’il me haït, c’est la haine qui va continuer entre nous. C’est comme quelqu’un 
qui découvre la pierre mais qui la couvre de la pierre, il faut vraiment démasquer cette pierre.  
Q. Qui peut démasquer cette pierre ? 2. Je pense que ceux qui ont commis des crimes peuvent 
demander pardon, mais je ne sais pas  qui peut leur inciter à le faire, car moi, je ne peux pas aller 
arrêter mon tortionnaire. 1. C’est vrai que le criminel ne peut pas aller devant sa victime pour 
demander pardon, mais  la victime peut aller devant la justice porter plainte, le criminel peut 
avouer, demander pardon pour ne plus recommencer. 5. Même si je ne suis pas pour qu’on 
démasque la pierre, je pense que si on connaît le criminel, on doit aller devant la justice car 
personne ne va demander pardon de soi.  
Q. Quel genre de justice ? 5. La justice du niveau supérieur car ici, on ne peut pas trancher de 
tels procès. Je suis un MUSHINGANTAHE, mais je pense que nous ne pouvons pas faire ce genre 
de procès. Les Burundais sont compliqués, on ne peut pas trancher ce genre de procès sur la 
Colline. 6. Quelqu’un qui perdrait sur la Colline ne va pas accepter de payer et même s’il paye, ça 
ne marchera pas entre les deux parties. 1. La pierre va alors continuer à endommager les houes. 
Je pense qu’il faut pardonner mais après avoir connu la vérité car personne ne peut refuser le 
pardon. FGD, Mwaro  Province,  Commune  Bisoro,  1 May  2008;  (1)  peasant,  female, Hutu,  60;  (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 67; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 38; (5) peasant, male, 
Hutu, Umushingantahe, 51; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 49. 
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7.3.   THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONS (TPRC, SC, UBUSHINGANTAHE) 
 
Figures 4 to 6 present the answers to the question what is expected from the institutions 
envisioned to deal with the past in Burundi. The question specifically focused on dealing with the past 
in  the  context  of  these  institutions.  The  inquiry  was  thus  not  open-endedly  verifying  the  general 
preferences to deal with the past as in the focus group discussions. It is important to know that the 
categories used in the graphs have been recoded to achieve a reduction of possibilities. Respondents 
had more options for some categories.23 Important to know is the fact that “communal-ritual activity” 
refers to the ideas of “coming together to talk (about what happened)”; “to honor the victims” and “to 
integrate people in society”.24  
 
Figure 4: What do you expect from the institutions (Ubushingantahe, TPR Commission, Special 
Tribunal) that might deal with the past in Burundi? (Weighted Frequency – Multiple Responses) 
                                                              
23 Accountability is derived from the options “the end past wrongs”, “judge and punish the guilty” and “seperate the 
guilty from the non-guilty”. Truth was phrased as “to make the truth emerge”. Reconcilation was  a direct and 
single option., as well as restitution. ‘Revenge’ and ‘liberating the prisoners’ fall under the category Other. Pardon 
brings together  the options ‘asking pardon’, ‘showing remorse’ and ‘to pardon’. Communal-ritual activity is a 
recoded category encompassing the options “to come together to talk (about what happened)”; “to honor the 
victims” and “to integrate people in society”. To options nothing (no expectation) and unknown institution were 
options that were immediately available to the respondents. 
24 Luc Huyse refer to ritualistic-communal procedures that characterize tradition-based approaches to justice and 
reconciliation. Huyse, L. (2008), “Introduction: Tradition-Based Approaches in Peacemaking, transitional justice 
and reconciliation policies”, in: Huyse, L. & Salter, M. (eds.), (2008) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after 
Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences, Stockholm, International Idea, pp. 14-15. 
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The findings suggest that our respondents prioritize other objectives than the ones laid 
down in the framework of the Arusha Peace Accords. Truth and accountability are not as often cited 
as  reconciliation  (21%),  communal  ritual  activities  (18%)  or  pardon  (15%).  Seventeen  percent  of 
respondents  favour  accountability,  11%  have  a  preference  for  truth  and  5%  want  restitution.  A 
significant number expects nothing (8%), something else (1%) or are unfamiliar with one or more of 
the institutions (6%). As said, one has to keep in mind that this question probes into the expectations 
of the respondents with the specific reference to the mechanisms such as the Truth, Pardon and 
Reconciliation Commission, the Special Tribunal and the Ubushingantahe together. The responses 
should thus be interpreted by taking into account that respondents formulate their opinions within the 
framework of these three mechanisms.  
 
There  are  minor  differences  between  the  opinions  of  the  social  groups  when 
disaggregating the findings according to the ethnic identity of the respondents (figure 5) or sub-ethnic 
identities (figure 6). 
 
Figure 5 What do you expect from the institutions (Ubushingantahe, TPR Commission, Special 
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Figure 6. What do you expect from the institutions (Ubushingantahe, TPR Commission, Special 




Tutsi stress the need for what we have labelled a ‘communal ritual activity’ (24%). It are 
often the displaced currently still living in camps who expect this kind of strategy facilitated by these 
institutions (Figure 5). They most probably stress the need to be integrated in society again. For years 
they have lived not only far away from their plots of land, but also from their neighbours. On the one 
hand they have the desire to return. On the other hand practical problems make them hesitant to 
effectively  return:  the  lack  of  shelter  f.i.  since  their  original  homes  were  destroyed-  but  also  the 
continuing  fear  due  to  the  experiences  from  the  past  as  the  sometimes  inciting  messages  from 
politicians. 
 
When  considering  the  sub-ethnic  identities,  it  is  interesting  to  see  that  it  are  those 
persons still displaced among the Tutsi respondents who prioritize accountability (19%). Tutsi who 
have never left their houses on the hills (11%) or the ones that have lived in camps in the past but  
Living Together Again   IOB Working Paper / 2009.06 - 69 
The Expectation of Transitional Justice in Burundi 
   
have returned (13%) are not so much expecting accountability from the mechanisms. They emphasize 
more the wish for a reconciling approach (19% and 22%) instead. Table 5. presents the findings in a 
different way by ranking the objectives according to the identity of the respondents. 
 
Important  to  note  is  that  the  answer  to  this  question  also  reveals  that  people  not 
necessarily associate a specific mechanism with a certain objective. Even a truth commission or a 
tribunal is expected by some respondents to bring reconciliation or pardon. We will return to these 




Table 5. Priority Ranking 
Ranking 
Identity 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
All Respondents  Reconciliation  Communal-
Ritual Activity 
Accountability  Pardon  Truth 
 
Hutu  Reconciliation  Communal-
Ritual Activity 
Accountability  Pardon  Truth 
Tutsi  Communal-
Ritual Activity 




Accountability  Reconciliation  Pardon  Truth 
Former Displaced  Reconciliation  Communal-
Ritual Activity 
Pardon  Accountability  Nothing 
Repatriate  Accountability  Reconciliation  Communal-
Ritual Activity 
Pardon  Nothing 
Former Prisoner 
(Political Prisoner) 
Reconciliation  Pardon  Communal-
Ritual Activity 
Accountability  Truth 
Demobilized 
Soldiers (Rebels) 
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8.   RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Box 11 brings together some of the narratives recorded during group discussions. Five 
tendencies are discernable when our respondents reflect on the onus of responsibility for the history of 
violence in their country. 
 
(1) Everybody has been victimized by the violence and many have a responsibility in the 
violent events. The war, massacres and ‘events’ in general have not left anyone untouched. Not only 
individuals but the ethnic groups as such, Hutu or Tutsi, need to take their part of the responsibility. 
 
(2) The longue durée of the responsibility needs to be taken into account. Burundi is often 
associated with the most  recent episode in its  violent history,  the 1993 events and especially the 
decade of civil war. But -as we have shown- every period of violence built upon a previous cycle. 
Ordinary people are very much aware that identifying the responsibility is a complex exercise that 
needs  to  go  back  to  distant  events.  This  is  in  the  perception  also  an  obstacle  to  initiate  such  a 
process. 
 
(3) Nevertheless, the primary responsibility for all these episodes lies with the political 
leaders, the administrative authorities and military officers who repeatedly resorted to violence as a 
strategy to rule, as an avenue to obtain access to power or to stay in power. The names of Burundian 
personalities often mentioned when discussing the issue of responsibility are Micombero, Bagaza, 
Buyoya, Bikomagu. To a lesser extent also current president Nkurunziza as the former rebel leader. 
The general opinion is that establishing responsibility needs to start with these people and not with the 
ordinary peasants. Before arriving at the local level, all other administrative levels from the military and 
rebel commanders to the people in the administration at the time need to be taken into account. 
  
(4) The killing of Ndadaye stands out when considering Burundi’s long history of violent 
episodes. The killing of the democratically elected president is for many an event those responsible for 
need to be held accountable. Either because of the symbolic nature of the act (killing democracy and 
the will of the majority) or because it plunged Burundi into a decade of civil war and thus suffering and 
loss for ordinary people both Hutu and Tutsi. 
 
(5) People sometimes make a distinction between “the war between the peasants” and 
“the war between the armies”. During several periods and moments in the history of Burundi, ordinary 
people – often neighbours – were engaged in violent acts against each other. But there were also 
periods - especially during the civil war that engulfed the country after 1993 - when it were mainly the 
national army and armed groups that were fighting each other. The general population of Hutu, Tutsi 
and also Twa were often caught between two sides. 
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Box 11. Responsibility: The Authorities, the Killing of Ndadaye and the Longue Durée  
4. Je pense que ce dialogue n’est pas nécessaire. Ce qui s’est passé a été comme un incident, c’est fini. 
Nous savons tous que la guerre a eu lieu, maintenant les gens sont ensemble, il n’y a plus de méfiance. 
Au cours de cette guerre, il n’y a eu aucun innocent, tout le monde est coupable, les Hutu ont tué et les 
Tutsi aussi l’ont fait. […] 5. Si une [telle] justice a lieu, elle doit commencer par les hautes autorités 
avant d’arriver  au bas peuple. Ce sont ces hautes autorités qui sont responsables. 1. pour nous, un 
petit paysan n’a jamais eu l’idée de tuer son voisin. Ceux qui ont tué le Président ont été à la base et 
les gens d’ici ont réagi en se rappelant ce qui s’était passé dans les années précédentes. 4. Au début de 
la crise, l’administrateur n’a rien fait pour calmer la situation, il a failli à son obligation et ça a été 
comme remuer une fourmilière. Nous sommes comme un troupeau de vache que l’administrateur n’a 
pas pu conduire.  
Q. Il faut alors juger les grands responsables ? 1. Cela serait un retour en arrière. Si on juge les 
hautes autorités, ça va descendre pour arriver chez nous. 5. Qui peut-on juger ? Les Tutsi appelaient 
les leurs à tuer les Hutu, et les Hutu eux aussi appelaient les leurs à tuer les Tutsi. Il n’y a aucun 
innocent. TOUS : Tout le monde est coupable. 5. Même si on n’a pas été impliqué physiquement dans 
les massacres, on était complaisant de ce qui se passait pour ou contre l’autre ethnie. Seul Dieu va 
nous juger. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 28 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 34; 
(2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, Tutsi, former displaced, 68; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; 
(5) peasant, male, Hutu, 46. 
 
Q. Est-ce qu’on doit punir ? 3. Oui, parmi ces hautes autorités oui. Ils doivent passer au moins deux 
mois en prison. 4. Mais les simples paysans ont été trompés. 5. Quand un rapatrié vient et il dit c’est là 
où j’habitais. C’est la guerre qui commence. FGD, Bururi Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, 39; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, 72; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, 52; (4) teacher, male, Tutsi, 
40; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, 44; (6) peasant, female, Tutsi, 67; (7) peasant, female, Tutsi, 40. 
 
Q. Pensez-vous qu’il faut connaître la vérité, ou punir les auteurs de ces crimes ?5. Pour moi, s’il 
faut connaître la vérité, il faut commencer par 1965. 1. Il faut d’abord connaître la vérité afin de 
pouvoir punir les responsables. 3. Pour punir, il faut faire attention, il faut commencer par ceux qui 
ont tué les hautes autorités. 5. Si on ne fait pas cela, il faut une loi amnistiant tout le monde. 
Q. Que faire selon toi ? 5. Depuis 1965 à 1993, si on veut connaître la vérité, il faut commencer par le 
sommet,  ils  connaissent  les  responsables  et  vous  les  connaissez  aussi.  1.  L’impunité  que  nous 
constatons actuellement vient de là de puis lors, on ne punit pas les coupables. FGD, Mwaro Province, 
Commune Bisoro, 15 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 51; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (3) peasant, 
male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 73; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 67; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 
63; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 43. 
 
Q. Que faire pour les auteurs de cette guerre ?5. Les principaux acteurs de cette guerre : BAGAZA, 
BUYOYA  et BIKOMAGU  JEAN  doivent avouer  ce qu’ils ont  fait  et  demander  pardon  aux citoyens. 
BUYOYA doit répondre à beaucoup de questions car même à l’époque MICOMBERO, il était là, en 
1972.  FGD,  Gitega  Province,  Commune  Bugendana,  30  March  2008;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  56;  (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 41; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 65; (4) trader, male, Hutu, 36; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 
37. 
 
4. Pour moi, les Hutu ont tué, les Tutsi ont tué, comment va t-on s’accuser ? 3. Pour moi, il faut 
chercher ceux qui ont tué le Président NDADAYE et laisser en paix le petit peuple. 1. Depuis 1972, 
beaucoup de Hutu ont été tués, en 1993, les Tutsi eux aussi ont été tués, mais les Hutu ont perdu 
l’élite qui avait de l’importance, tandis que pour les Tutsi, c’est le petit peuple qui était visé. Il faut 
chercher celui qui a tué NDADAYE. 
Q. Qui l’a tué selon vous? 4. Ce sont les Tutsi qui étaient forts dans l’armée.  
Q. Que faire de ces gens ? 4. Il faut les punir exemplairement mais il ne faut pas les tuer.  FGD, 
Kayanza Province, Commune Kabarore, 6 May 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 50; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 
42; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 37; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 56; (6) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 55.  
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8.1.  Pardon with or without confession 
 
Figure 7 to 9 detail the responses to the question how those considered responsible for 
the events of 1993 and their aftermath should be dealt with? We limited ourselves to the events of 
1993 and their aftermath to reduce the complexity of the issue. By stressing the events of 1993 and 
their aftermath (the civil war) we, nevertheless, refer to a range of issues that are linked to both major 
political players from all sides as well as Hutu and Tutsi actors. 
 
Figure 7: How to deal with those responsible for / participants in the 1993 events and their 
aftermath? (Weighted Frequencies) 
 
 
Box 11.Responsibility: The Authorities, the Killing of Ndadaye and the Longue Durée   
 
7. Tous ceux qui ont commis des crimes doivent être punis sans aucune exception. 3. On peut tuer 
différemment, on peut tuer par les paroles et par les actes. Il faut d’abord juger les promoteurs car 
même si on punit les voisins ça ne servira à rien, il faut commencer par le plus haut niveau. On ne 
peut pas arriver à la colline sans juger l’administrateur par exemple. 1. Il faut commencer au plus 
haut niveau et même le Président. 2. Quand on emprisonnait les gens de la colline, il y a ceux qui 
disaient qu’ils avaient reçu un ordre, et qu’on leur avait promis des terres des Tutsi car on disait que 
les Tutsi avaient de grandes superficies, on leur disait qu’ils allaient se partager les terres et les 
places dans l’administration. 3. Que ce tribunal vienne, mais pas pour le bas peuple, mais pour tout le 
monde.  FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 44; 
(2) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
displaced, 39; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 28; (6) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 37; (7) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
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The majority of the people we talked to prefer pardon over a process of accountability on 
the one hand or a blanket amnesty on the other hand. When breaking down the responses according 
to the ethnicity of the respondents we notice that over 14% more Tutsi respondents are of the opinion 
that those responsible for the 1993 events and their aftermath should be held accountable.  
 
Figure 8: How to deal with those responsible for / participants in the 1993 events and their 
aftermath? (Weighted Frequencies) 
 
 
When breaking down these results according to ‘sub-ethnic’ identities it becomes clear 
that in the group of Tutsi respondents, mostly displaced, favour an accountability process (50.9%). 
Another  extreme  position  can  be  found  with  the  group  of  so-called  ‘released  prisoners’  with  only 
19,4% favouring some sort of accountability procedure. This group is, of course, the only group that 
has already experienced criminal prosecution or at least incarceration in the wake of the 1993 events. 
Moreover, although a significant part of them was put into custody due to false accusations or in the 
confusion of the times, a similar significant part of this group has a responsibility for what happened in 
1993. This is probably an additional reason why they are not in favour of an accountability procedure.  
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Figure 9: How to deal with those responsible for / participants in the 1993 events and their 
aftermath? (Weighted Frequencies) 
 
 
Important to note is the fact that also almost as many demobilized rebels (34,3%) as 
former  displaced (35,6%)  signal  a  preference  to  see those  responsible  for  the 1993  carnage and 
everything that followed brought to justice.  Repatriates (27,1%) and Hutu who never left their hill 
(22,8%) do not favour accountability more than either pardon or amnesty. Thirty-three percent of the 
repatriates wants pardon as a strategy to deal with what happened in 1993 and after and 38,1% of 
them wants a blanket amnesty. High scores for pardon are seen in the group of never moved Hutu 
(45,6%) and never moved Tutsi (43,7%) . These groups have never left their hills of origin for a longer 
period during the violent events. They most probably prefer pardon because they were not so much 
affected by this violence. These experiences influence their opinions without any doubt. Demobilized 
soldiers from the national armed forces during the 1993 crisis and the years of civil war also favour a 
strategy of pardon with 56,6% of the respondents in this group.   
 
It is important to be aware of the fact that ‘pardon’ does not mean ‘amnesty’. The choices 
people make for the option of pardon are thus not a choice for total oblivion. One can make the 
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(1) Ikigongwe c’ikivunga = amnesty 
(2) Ikigongwe / imbabazi = pardon 
(2a) Ikigongwe kuwemeye amakosa = pardon with confession (dialogue) 
(2b) Ikigongwe kumurekurira = pardon without confession (dialogue) 
 
People are very much aware of the fact that option 1 is something given or imposed by 
an outside and abstract entity such as the state while 2 is still an interpersonal act between human 
beings. Options 2a and 2b are subsequently further qualifications and make things more personal. As 
figures 10 to 12 further make clear: ordinary Burundians taking the option for pardon prefer an act of 
pardon with a confession. Out of the group of 44,7% taking the option of pardon,  31,4% wants pardon 
to be accompanied  by an act of  confessing. No large  differences  in this option when considering 
ethnic  or  other  identities  (figure  12).  The  notion  confession  may  mean  confessing  to  the  crimes 
committed as a sort of establishing the ‘forensic truth’: who, where, when, with whom, etc. But we will 
later  turn  to  the  narratives  to  give  more  body  to  these  statistics.  The  analysis  will  show  that  the 
preference for an act of pardon with some sort of confessional activity signals the need or desire to 
initiate a sort of dialogue or in its most basic manifestation: an encounter. The truth-telling dimension 
of the element of confession is more social and restorative in nature than forensic or narrative. 
 
 
Figure 10 How to deal with those responsible for / participants in the 1993 events and their 
aftermath? (Weighted Frequencies) 
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Figure 11: How to deal with those responsible for / participants in the 1993 events and their 
aftermath? (Weighted Frequencies) 
 
 
Figure 12: How to deal with those responsible for / participants in the 1993 events and their 
aftermath? (Weighted Frequencies) 
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8.2.  Authorities & Armed Groups vs. Ordinary People 
 
Although ordinary Burundians are of the opinion that every Burundian has to take a part 
of the responsibility of what happened in Burundi in the different cycles of violence, they make a clear 
distinction between levels of responsibility. Figure 13 and 14 give an overview of the opinions of our 
respondents when asked whether there is a difference between ordinary people and people who held 
a position in the administration  or were members of armed groups (both national army  and rebel 
movements) during the events of 1993 and the years of civil war that followed. As mentioned before, 
we focus on the year 1993 to reduce the complexity of Burundi’s history, but we clearly incorporate a 
reference to the years of civil war as well.  
 
The result of the question on the difference in responsibility of the different actors is clear. 
Almost 80% of the respondents is, indeed, of the opinion that there is a difference between ordinary 
people  and  those  who  were  in  the  position  of  authority  or  in  the  possession  of  the  gun.  This 
convinction rises even to the level of 81,4% when isolating the armed groups from the people in the 
administration.  
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More important is what follows in figure 14. Taking into account the difference between 
the actors and the nature of their responsibility, we separate the respondents that think there is no 
difference  between  armed  groups,  people  in  the  administration  and  ordinary  people.  These 
respondents opt for amnesty (50,2%). As said, it is however a minority of the respondents that does 
not want to differentiate the actors. The majority of approximately 80% does so. Important to note is 
that in this group 41,3% would favour an accountability process for the people in the administration at 
the times of upheaval and the treatment with pardon (58,4%) or amnesty (12,0%) for the ordinary 
people. A similar tendency is visible when asked what should be done with the members of the armed 
groups (rebellion, militia, youth groups, national army) compared to the ordinary people. The options 
for the armed groups are spread over accountability (31,2%), pardon (33,5%) and amnesty (32,7%), 
while ordinary people should enter a process of pardoning (50,7%) or amnesty (19,1%). A minority 
also wants ordinary people that played a role in the 1993 ‘events’ and/or the aftermath to be held 
accountable for their actions. 
   
Figure 14 What are according to you the most favourable actions against those responsible / 
participants in the 1993 events and their aftermath? (Weighted Frequency) 
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9.    OBSTACLES - ACCOUNTABILITY, TRUTH, REPARATION,    RECONCILIATION 
 
In  the  preceding  sections  we  explored  the  opinions  on  transitional  justice  issues  in 
general and the element of responsibility. These opinions are influenced by the experiences of the 
past and the perceptions of the current socio-political order. We, therefore, asked our respondents to 
explain in  their  own words  the  obstacles  that  might exist to  reach  each  of  the  transitional  justice 
objectives. We first present some exemplary narratives that will subsequently be explored more in-
depth. 
 
Box 12. Obstacles When Dealing With the Past: Accountability 
 
La politique du pays n'est pas bonne. Si le gouvernement avait la volonté de faire la justice, les 
organes pour faire la justice sont là, il n'y aurait pas d'autres obstacles   
 
Comme la question de 1993 est sensible, les juges burundais peuvent être partiaux, peut-être 
que des juges étrangers pourraient traiter ces cas           
 
Le retour à la vengeance et la guerre pour les familles des victimes et des responsables des 
crimes     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
La corruption : les juges et l'administration sont corrompus par ceux qui ont de l'argent                   
 
La justice actuelle n'est pas pour tous, certains des magistrats sont aussi impliqués                 
 
Les autorités ne veulent pas dénoncer ceux qui ont tué le président Ndadaye  
 
La lutte pour le pouvoir qui empêche aux gens d'avoir une même vision pour le pays       
 
Le manque de volonté des autorités actuelles car les dirigeants seraient accusés ouvertement 
car il y en a des coupables   
 
Tant qu'il n'y a pas de volonté des autorités, les citoyens eux seuls ne pourront pas le faire                               
 
La peur de dénoncer : on risque d'être menacé si l'administration ne s'y prend pas bien                                      
 
Il y a un grand problème de justice. C'est la corruption qui ronge le pays  
 
L'injustice qui a caractérisé les pouvoirs passés et qui continue même aujourd'hui fait qu'il y ait 
des dominants sur les autres                           
 
On risque d'emprisonner tout le monde car il y a eu trop de perte   
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Box 13. Obstacles When Dealing With the Past: Truth 
On joue au cache-cache entre les politiciens, on ne peut pas connaître la vérité    
 
Ce sont les autorités qui font traîner le processus, de peur d'être accusées elles-mêmes                          
 
Les autorités sont parmi les coupables et la justice n'est pas indépendante, ce qui freine l'arrivée 
à la vérité                                     
 
Nous, le bas peuple, nous ne pouvons pas oser accuser nos dirigeants criminels                                
 
La peur de dénoncer car on peut subir des représailles: il faut être téméraire pour dénoncer les 
grands crimes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
            
La population a peur d'être poursuivie pour leur témoignage                                                  
 
Je n'ai pas besoin d'accuser ceux qui m'ont pillé et qui ont commis des crimes, de peur de ne pas 
en sortir; ça risquerait de nous enfoncer encore une fois dans une crise comme celle d'octobre. 
C'est mauvais de déterrer ce qui est pourri (Si vyiza kuzura akaboze)  
 
Absence de cadre d'expression pour arriver à cette vérité 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Les gens ont peur de dire la vérité                            
 
Box 14. Obstacles When Dealing With the Past: Reparation 
On ne peut pas avoir à restituer : il y a beaucoup de biens endommagés          
 
La  justice  est  corrompue,  si  vous  portez  plainte  à  la  justice,  celui  qui  a  les  moyens  sera  le 
gagnant                           
 
Les biens pillés ont été consommé et il n'y a plus moyens de restituer, même l'Etat n'aurait pas 
de moyens suffisants pour restituer tout                                
 
La plupart de nos biens ont été emportés par les ex-combattants, comment pourrais-je connaître 
ceux qui ont emporté les chèvres et mes sacs de haricots ?                                              
 
Le gouvernement actuel ne travaille pas pour tous les Burundais, les autorités travaillent pour 
leurs intérêts                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Inutile de faire la restitution, car il faut oublier, toute personne a perdu des biens         
 
Le retour de la guerre : il y a eu trop de dommages et les responsables risquent de fuir le pays                                                                                                            
                           
Il est pratiquement impossible de restituer les pertes tant bien matérielles qu'humaines   
 
La pauvreté : les coupables sont morts ou pauvres        
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After  having  presented  some  exemplary  statements  recorded  through  the  qualitative 
research techniques, we turn to the quantified opinions on potential obstacles. The idea is to gain a 
better insight in the breadth of these opinions. The findings presented in figures 15 to 25 and tables 6 
to 9 are based on codes attributed to open-ended questions that were part of the survey instrument. 
The  respondents  were free to  give two obstacles  they  saw  important to  achieve each  one of  the 
transitional  justice  objectives:  accountability,  truth,  reparation  and  reconciliation.  All  options  were 
recorded. The coding tree was derived from these options in an inductive way and consisted of 109 
options. These options were later summarized under 11 main categories. You can find the coding tree 
in annex. 
 
Figure 15 gives an overview of the perceived obstacles when taking the answers for all 
objectives together. Especially contextual elements to the transitional justice process are often cited 
as  potential  obstacles:  the  social,  economic,  cultural  and  institutional  environment  in  which  our 
respondents (need to) live and operate. Especially the phenomenon of widespread corruption is often 
cited; entrenched interests, injustices and inequalities are (perceived) as severe hindrances to achieve 
the transitional justice goals. Weak institutions are part of this general environment but the justice 
sector is often cited separately. Seven percent of respondents see the nature of the justice system as 
a setback to any transitional justice process aimed at achieving progress in these four domains of 
Box 15. Obstacles When Dealing With the Past: Reconciliation 
Le fait de vivre seuls, les Tutsi, ici dans le site, les Tutsi sont isolés et les Hutu sont restés sur les 
collines                          
 
L'obstacle  ce  sont  les  autorités  au  niveau  le  plus  haut  qui  ne  veulent  pas  sensibiliser  la 
population  à  la  réconciliation,  mais  aussi  il  faut  que  les  politiciens  s'entendent  entre  eux 
d'abord.                                    
 
Nous manquons de rencontres qui nous uniraient pour pouvoir nous pardonner les uns les 
autres.                            
 
Pour le petit peuple, pas d'obstacle, mais au haut sommet, tous sont égoïstes, chacun se cache 
derrière la guerre pour avoir de bonnes places   
 
Le grand problème c'est l'injustice qui caractérise notre société.                           
 
Les séquelles du passé n'ont pas encore quitté les coeurs de certaiens Burundais.                                
 
Il  y  a  encore  l'injustice  je  ne  peux  pas  me  réconcilier  avec  les  Tutsi  car  les  juges  me 
défavorisent.                       
 
Parmi  les  responsabilités  du  gouvernement  il  n'y  a  pas  mis  en  priorité  cette  question  de 
réconciliation.           
 
Il n'y a pas de problèmes de réconciliation ici, le problème se trouve au haut niveau, chez les 
intellectuels et les dirigeants.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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accountability, truth, reparation and reconciliation. But as we will indicate in the following sections, the 
nature  and/or  functioning  of  the  judicial  sector  in  Burundi  is  predominantly  an  obstacle  when 
respondents need to reflect on potential obstacles in the process of achieving accountability for wrong 
done in the past.  
 
Figure 15 What are the biggest obstacles to reach the combined transitional justice objectives 
(accountability, truth, reparation, reconciliation). (Weighted Results – Multiple Responses). 
 
 
Awareness of these contextual elements makes respondents hesitate as to whether a 
transitional  justice  process  will  be  possible  and  if  so,  productive.  Not  only  the  socio-cultural 
environment and weak institutions but, also issues related to power, politicians and the current regime 
are  considerd  to  hinder  the  reaching  of  the  transitional  justice  objectives.  Eighteen  percent  of 
respondents think there is no political will, that the guilty are still in power, that the past is politicized or 
that pardon is imposed. A significant part of them is of the opinion that the executive influences the 
judicial  sector.  The  absence  of  witnesses  or  information  or  the  unwillingness  to  participate  are  
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practical obstacles often referred to as well (16,4%), mostly when reflecting on what might impede 
establishing the truth about the past.  
 
Interesting  to  see  are  the  response  inquiring  whether  politicians  or  powerholders  are 
blocking the avenues to reach the transitional justice objectives (figure 16). To this question there are 
8% more affirmative responses of the respondents of Tutsi identity compared to the ones of Hutu 
respondents. The (perceived) nature of the current regime contributes to this difference. On the other 
hand,  there  is  a  difference  of  6%  when  comparing  Hutu  and  Tutsi  responses  with  regard  to  the 
contextual  elements  blocking  the  pathways  to  deal  with  the  past.  The  experience  of  entrenched 
injustices due to decades of privileges permeating the governance structures lies at the basis of these 
differences.  
   
Figure 16  What are the biggest obstacles to reach the combined transitional justice objectives 
(accountability, truth, reparation, reconciliation). (Weighted Results – Multiple Responses) 
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Figure 17 summarizes the findings for the perceived obstacles for each of the objectives. 
The graph not only confirms that especially political and contextual elements dominate the opinions on 
obstacles in general but also suggests that people perceive some objectives (accountability, truth, 
reparation or reconciliation) to be subject to different types of obstacles. The main obstacles to reach 
justice (accountability) for past wrongdoings are particularly the experience of a corrupt justice system 
and socio-political environment in general.  
 
Nineteen percent of the respondents see the nature of the violence as a major obstacle to 
achieve compensation for losses. As we have explained, respondents are very much aware of the fact 
that the violence experienced in the past is extremely complex: losses have been incurred over many 
decades not only in almost all segments of society but also several generations have been affected by 
the violence.  
 
The nature of the violence is, however, not considered to be an obstacle to reach the 
truth  or  reconciliation.  Difficulties  to  reach  the  truth  are  more  related  to  the  fear  of  the  possible 
consequences of speaking and establishing the truth, while the political environment is also perceived 
as not favourable to a truth-telling process. A number of the respondents are of the opinion that there 
are no major obstacles to facilitate reconciliation, although a significant part of them refer to the social 
environment  in  general  as  not  favourable  to  the  reconciliation  process.  It  means  that  people 
experience a lack in the initiatives that facilitate the co-habitation process. The social tissue at the 
local level is severely affected by the massacres and war characterizing the lives of the communities 
we visited. Distrust is pervasive. There exists a strong desire to overcome these obstacles as we will 
explain the following sections. 
 
The following tables and figures (18 to 25) consider the different objectives separately. 
The opinions are broken down along ethnic and sub-ethnic identity groups. We summarize the most 
striking findings. Especially Tutsi respondents consider politics, the government and nature of power 
as an obstacle (29%) with regard to accountability (justice). This is only the case for 17% of Hutu 
respondents. Particularly displaced persons (37%) and demobilized soldiers from the former national 
army (48%) consider the current political situation unfavourable to hold people accountable for past 
wrongdoings. Hutu perceive more obstacles in the nature of the justice system (21%) with regard to 
this objective, although Tutsi are also aware of the problematical character of the judicial institutions 
(17%).   
Figure  17    What  are  the  biggest  obstacles  to  reach  the  respective  transitional  justice  objectives  (accountability  (justice),  truth,  reparation, 





As highlighted previously, especially the fear of the consequences and the overall political 
situation are considered a potential problem when the truth about the past needs to be established. 
Also here Tutsi respondents give more often voice to the fact that they perceive the nature of the 
political environment as an obstacle (31%). Hutu are also aware of the potential influence of power 
and politics on the process that needs to establish the truth about the past (25%). In their opinion not 
only politics but also the social and institutional environment can create difficulties (19%). Almost 44% 
of the displaced persons currently still living in camps see the political situation as detrimental to a 
process of digging up the past through  some kind of truth telling exercise. The people that used to live 
in camps but have returned to their hills of origin in the meantime have also concerns referring to the 
political and power situation (31%) but they are especially afraid of the consequences of such an 
exercise (40%). This is only the case for 11% of the respondents still displaced. The fact that the 
former displaced are living again in close proximity of the people that might have played a role during 
the crisis in 1993 or the periods before or after makes them voice this opinion. A closer look at the 
interviews  with  these  people  reveals  that  they  are  aware  of  the  fact  that  they  live  in  a  fragile 
environment. Although they returned to their initial homes, the scars of the past violence have not 
healed. Although they interact with their Hutu neighbours, distrust lurks under the surface of daily life. 
They are aware of the fact that establishing the truth about what happened at the local level in the 
past-  and  thus  possibly  identifying  who  was  involved-  will  create  tensions.  They  fear  the 
consequences  of  telling  the  truth  more  than  the  ones  still  living  in  camps.  The  latter  feel  more 
protected since they  are  grouped together with others they can trust and  there is often a  military 
position near to the camps garantueeing security for them. 
 
A  similar  tendency  is  visible  with    regard  to  the  objective  of  compensation.  Tutsi 
respondents  attribute  the  potential  problems  with  or  the  lack  of  a  reparation  policy  to  the 
powerholders. Twenty-nine percent of all Tutsi respondents voice that opinion. Apart from the fact that 
they  are,  of  course,  also  aware  of  the  practical  obstacles  (19%)  and  the  complex  nature  of  the 
violence (19%). In any case there are 13% less Hutu respondents referring to politics, politicians or the 
regime as an obstacle in matters of compensation. These tendencies reveal that Tutsi respondents do 
not consider the current government to be in their favour in respect of restitution issues. But one has 
also to take into account that the political awareness of the people still living in displacement camps 
has a particular nature. While there are all kinds of reasons why they do not or cannot return to their 
hills of origin, one of them has to do with some political sensitization going on in the camps that makes 
them  afraid  to  return  since  they  perceive  the  current  political  constellation  as  unfavourable.  As  a 
consequence many (potential) decisions taken by the regime are perceived as obstacles to them. This 
can be seen when comparing the opinions of displaced and the former displaced. The latter cite the 
socio-economic environment (48%) as an obstacle to compensation. Only  14% of their responses 
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Figure 18 Biggest obstacles  you observe in order to reach accountability (at the level of a 
tribunal) for past crimes in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency) 
 
 
Figure 19 Biggest obstacles you observe in order to reach the truth on the events of the past 
and past crimes in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency) 
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Figure  20  Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  reach  compensation  for  the  losses 
experienced in the past in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency) 
 
 
Figure  21  Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  establish  reconciliation  between  the 
inhabitants in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency) 
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Figure 22 The biggest obstacles you observe in order to reach accountability (at the level of a 
tribunal) for past crimes in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency)  
 
 
 Figure 23 Biggest obstacles you observe in order to reach the truth on the events of the past 
and past crimes in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency) 
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Figure  24    Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  reach  compensation  for  the  losses 




Figure  25  Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  establish  reconciliation  between  the 
inhabitants in your community? (Coded Open Question – Weighted Frequency) 
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Table  6    Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  reach  accountability  (at  the  level  of  a 
































































































































































%  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Politics, Politicians, Regime, Government, Power  37,2%  20,6%  30,8%  20,0%  3,1%  47,7%  16,5%  23,9% 
Social, Economic, Cultural, Institutional Environment  16,8%  27,6%  26,0%  20,0%  47,7%  9,5%  27,9%  29,1% 
Justice System / Institutions  21,0%  28,4%  16,2%  26,9%  19,6%  9,5%  17,0%  19,8% 
Nature of the Violence  3,8%  7,8%  3,5%  12,3%  0,0%  9,5%  10,2%  4,1% 
Fear of the Consequences  9,9%  0,0%  2,0%  0,0%  8,1%  0,0%  8,0%  0,0% 
Practical Obstacles To Reach Transitional Justice 
Objectives 
7,5%  0,0%  6,3%  7,7%  3,1%  11,9%  6,5%  0,0% 
Other Transitional Justice Policy is Necessary  3,5%  15,6%  0,9%  0,0%  9,2%  0,0%  1,4%  0,0% 
No Obstacles  0,3%  0,0%  14,3%  13,1%  6,7%  0,0%  11,7%  15,1% 
No Idea  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  2,5%  0,0%  0,7%  4,1% 





Table 7 Biggest obstacles you observe in order to reach the truth on the events of the past and 










































































































































































%  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Politics, Politicians, Regime, Government, Power  43,8%  30,9%  25,5%  27,7%  19,8%  33,3%  25,1%  22,7% 
Social, Economic, Cultural, Institutional Environment  13,4%  0,0%  13,9%  8,5%  26,3%  9,5%  19,6%  9,9% 
Justice System / Institutions  6,7%  0,0%  8,3%  8,5%  3,1%  11,9%  3,1%  1,8% 
Nature of the Violence  0,7%  0,0%  1,2%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0% 
Fear of the Consequences  10,6%  40,1%  10,8%  11,5%  21,0%  11,9%  19,5%  16,9% 
Practical Obstacles To Reach Transitional Justice 
Objectives 
10,4%  14,5%  19,3%  20,8%  13,3%  0,0%  15,2%  19,8% 
Other Transitional Justice Policy is Necessary  14,1%  7,2%  1,2%  15,4%  9,8%  9,5%  5,4%  8,1% 
No Obstacles  0,3%  7,2%  16,8%  7,7%  6,7%  11,9%  10,8%  16,9% 
No Idea  0,0%  0,0%  3,1%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,3%  0,0% 
Other  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  1,1%  0,0% 
No Response  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  11,9%  0,0%  4,1%  
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Table  8  Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  reach  compensation  for  the  losses 































































































































































%  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Politics, Politicians, Regime, Government, Power  33,5%  14,1%  13,9%  19,2%  17,6%  35,8%  13,1%  27,3% 
Social, Economic, Cultural, Institutional Environment  10,7%  47,7%  36,0%  32,3%  48,4%  0,0%  26,0%  21,0% 
Justice System / Institutions  6,5%  7,2%  6,3%  3,8%  6,0%  9,5%  1,7%  1,8% 
Nature of the Violence  27,1%  4,6%  7,4%  7,7%  2,7%  21,4%  19,5%  8,1% 
Fear of the Consequences  3,5%  11,8%  1,7%  4,6%  2,7%  0,0%  6,2%  4,1% 
Practical Obstacles To Reach Transitional Justice 
Objectives 
7,7%  0,0%  22,0%  11,5%  17,2%  21,4%  19,2%  23,8% 
Other Transitional Justice Policy is Necessary  10,3%  14,5%  9,9%  16,9%  2,7%  0,0%  9,6%  9,9% 
No Obstacles  0,7%  0,0%  2,8%  3,8%  2,7%  0,0%  2,3%  4,1% 




Table  9  Biggest  obstacles  you  observe  in  order  to  establish  reconciliation  between  the 










































































































































































%  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Politics, Politicians, Regime, Government, Power  10,6%  18,7%  13,6%  23,1%  5,6%  11,9%  13,1%  3,5% 
Social, Economic, Cultural, Institutional Environment  39,9%  19,1%  42,5%  43,8%  37,5%  54,7%  38,0%  26,7% 
Justice System / Institutions  4,1%  4,6%  6,2%  3,8%  0,0%  9,5%  2,5%  1,8% 
Nature of the Violence  0,3%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0% 
Fear of the Consequences  13,4%  14,5%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  4,6%  0,0% 
Practical Obstacles To Reach Transitional Justice 
Objectives 
17,2%  14,1%  18,2%  21,5%  22,5%  0,0%  15,8%  24,5% 
Other Transitional Justice Policy is Necessary  6,7%  7,2%  2,9%  0,0%  6,7%  0,0%  6,0%  1,8% 
No Obstacles  7,7%  14,5%  16,5%  7,7%  27,7%  11,9%  17,4%  37,7% 
No Idea  0,0%  7,2%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0% 
No Response  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  11,9%  2,6%  4,1% 
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10.   INSTITUTIONS ENVISIONED TO DEAL WITH THE PAST: UBUSHINGANTAHE, TPR 
COMMISSION, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL 
 
In the previous section we explored the expectations in regard to the different institutions 
that might deal with the past in Burundi. Here we focus on the expectations towards each of these 
institutions separately. Figure 10 presents the weighted expectations of all respondents to the different 
mechanisms. 
 
Figure 20 What do you expect from the different institutions that might deal with the past in 
Burundi? (Multiple Responses – Weighted Results) 
 
 
Remarkable is the fact that people expect that some of the institutions will also facilitate 
other objectives than the ones dominantly associated with a particular institution. Thirty-two percent of 
respondents expect accountability from a special tribunal. But there are also 7% of respondents of the 
opinion that the activities of a tribunal should contribute to reconciliation or should facilitate what we 
have labelled ‘”communal ritual activities”. Important to take into account is that 11% expect nothing to 
come out of judicial proceedings while 13% are unaware of the nature of such an institution. 
 
A significant number of respondents has no great expectations of a Truth, Reconciliation 
and Pardon Commission (12%), some (5%) are unfamiliar with what such an institution would do. And 
while the name of such a commission refers to three objectives - truth, reconciliation and pardon – the 
answers to this question indicate that people primarily expect reconciliation (28%) and pardon (17%) 
to  be  an  outcome  of  the  initiation  of  such  a  commission.  The  “communal  ritual”  aspect  of  the 
commission  is  also  wanted  (20%).  The  latter  aspect  refers  to  the  “honouring  of  victims”,  “coming  
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together  to  talk  (about  the  past)”  and  the  “re-integration  of  people  in  society”.  Although  the  latter 
element also refers to the dialogical aspects of truth-telling activities, establishing the truth as such – 
the dominant objective of such a mechanism – is cited by 15% of respondents. 
 
The  institution  of  the  Ubushingantahe  is  perceived  as  having  to  foster  reconciliation 
(28%) and communal ritual activities (20%) in the aftermath of Burundi’s violent conflict. Everybody 
knows  the  Ubushingantahe  but  some  have  no  expectations  (12%)  of  Burundi’s  equivalent  of  the 
Gacacas in Rwanda. Pardon (17%), truth (10%) and accountability (8%) are objectives associated to a 
minor extent with the activities of the Bashingantahe, the “wise” men invested in local communities. 
 
 
10.1.   Truth, Pardon and Reconciliation Commission 
 
There  are  no  major  differences  in  the  expectations  of  Hutu  and  Tutsi  of  a  TPR 
Commission, as can be seen in figure 27. Box 16 gives more insight into how people describe in their 
own  words  how  such  a  commission  should  be  shaped  and  function.  It  becomes  clear  that  some 
respondents have no idea how such a commission would function. Others often refer to pardon and 
reconciliation as the necessary outcome of the activities of the commission. In fact, people are often in 
favour  of  such  a  commission  if  it  will  facilitate  their  co-habitation.  They  refer  to  the  fact  that 
reconciliation and living together needs to come from themselves but that a mechanism and initiative 
facilitating this process and mediating between the different social and ethnic groups is wanted and 
even needed. They even expect the commission to be decentralized to the most remote areas of rural 
Burundi  in  order  to  open  a  space  of  dialogue  between  inhabitants.  They  are  reluctant  to  see  an 
antagonistic  and  divisive  dynamic  inserted  in  their  midst.  Something  they  voice  even  more  with 
respect to the discussion on the special tribunal. 
 




Box 16. Truth Reconciliation and Pardon Commission 
 
Q. Que pensez-vous de la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation ? 4. Nous avons besoin de se 
pardonner.  3.  Nous  sommes  pour  cette  CVR,  car  on  expliquera  en  public  et  tout  le  monde 
comprendra qu’il faut dire la vérité et se pardonner ici sur la colline.2. Cette commission, c’est bon ! 
Nous  sommes  pour  le  pardon  mutuel,  car  tout  ce  que  nous  avons  vécu  est  venu  du  haut,  c’est 
pourquoi pour nous, nous sommes pour le pardon.3. Cette Commission organisera des réunions 
publiques avec tout le monde et l’auteur demandera pardon à la victime et celui qui ne demandera 
pardon sera jugé.  2. Ce n’est pas cette Commission qui va trouver une solution ici, la solution viendra 
de nous, nous pouvons nous-mêmes trouver un remède et la Commission sera un facilitateur. FGD, 
Gitega  Province,  Commune  Bugendana,  27  February  2009;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  26;  (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 33; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 69; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 
55; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 40. 
 
Q. Que pensez-vous de la CVR ? 3. Nous ne sommes pas contre cette commission, qu’elle vienne 
dans le but de réconcilier les Burundais, et même le tribunal peut venir. Que tous viennent pour tout 
mettre au clair, mais il faut que les punitions qu’on va donner ne soient pas du genre à nous faire 
retourner dans la crise. 4. Si quelqu’un avoue sa faute, cela permettra à penser que le criminel ne 
refera  plus  ce  qu’il  a  fait,  il    va  pardonner  sans  l’intervention  du  tribunal.  3.  Je  suis  pour  cette 
Commission Vérité et Réconciliation pour qu’on se dise la vérité et cela nous permettra à découvrir la 
vérité  et  les  causes  des  crises.  FGD,  Gitega  Province,  Commune  Itaba,  26  February  2009;  (1) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 44; (2) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, displaced, 50; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 39; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 
28; (6) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 37; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
 
Q. Que pensez-vous de la CVR ? 1. Nous entendons souvent parler de cette commission, son rôle 
sera de chercher la vérité. 2. Cette commission vient pour nous aider, c’est nous d’abord qui devons 
avoir en tête cet esprit de réconciliation, deux frères qui sont en conflit ne peuvent pas s’entendre 
sans médiateur. On pardonne à celui qui a péché quand il a demandé pardon. Quand on demande 
pardon, on est pardonné. 3. Personne n’est contre cette commission ! Il faut se réconcilier. 1. Il faut 
que  cette  commission  fasse  des  séminaires  avec  toutes  les  composantes  de  la  communauté 
burundaise (hutu, tutsi, twa, rapatriés, libérés, déplacés). On va s’entendre sur le rapport final et la 
solution sera trouvée par tout le monde de ce pays. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 26 
February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, 
Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 59; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
 
Q. Que pensez-vous de la CVR ? 2. Tout le monde applaudira si les gens se pardonnent. Nous ne 
voulons pas une commission pour la division, mais pour la réconciliation, nous sommes d’accord. 4. 
La CVR peut inciter les gens à venir demander pardon, car je peux pardonner à celui qui viendra me 
demander pardon. 1. Il faut pardonner pour pouvoir vivre en paix. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune 
Itaba, 12 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 85; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
former displaced, 74; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 37; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
former displaced, 60; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 37.  
 
Q. Au Burundi, on veut installer une commission de vérité. Qu’est ce que vous pensez de cela ?  
3. On entend de cela à la radio. C’est bien qu’on installe cela à la radio. Cette commission doit être 
installée  pour  faire  des  investigations  sur  ce  qui  s’est  passé  dans  le  pays  afin  de  connaître  les 
divisions qui sont à la base des problèmes. Tous : Ils doivent venir sur la Colline là où les faits ont eu 
lieu. FGD, Kirundo Province, Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 58;(2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (5) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 80; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
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  Box 16. Truth Reconciliation and Pardon Commission (2) 
 
Q. Qu’est ce que vous pensez du CVR ? 4. On ne connaît pas l’objectif de cette commission. On a 
entendu parler à la radio.  
Q. Pour établir la vérité ? 4. C’est mieux de connaître la vérité. Le mieux serait de mettre les Hutu 
et les Tutsi ensemble pour parler.  
Q. Et si on voit que ce que les Tutsi disent n’est pas le même que les Hutu ? 1. Ça sera à la 
commission de trancher. Les gens de la commission vont trouver la vérité     comme le juge tranche. 
(…….)  parce que chacun a sa version. Chacun dit qu’il est innocent.2. Il faut pardonner parce que 
celui qui accuse a peut-être aussi tué. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 30 March 
2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 56; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (4) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 46; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 74.  
 
Q. Vous avez entendu d’une CVR ? 4. Ça ne va pas servir à quelque chose. Ils vont juger qui ? 4-7 : 
Ce qui ont fait cela, ce sont les dirigeants actuels.4. Le président demande souvent pardon à la 
radio.  FGD, Kirundo Province, Commune Ntega,  28 March 2008;  (1)  peasant,  female, Tutsi, 
displaced, 36; (2) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 84; (3) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 
(4) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 36; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 31; (6) peasant, 
female, Tutsi, displaced, 66; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 47; (8) peasant, female, Tutsi, 
displaced, 24. 
 
Q. Vous avez entendu parler du CVR ? 6. On ne  connaît pas ces autorités, mais on a entendu 
parler. Il n’y a aucune autorité qui vient ici. Q. Selon vous, c’est quoi ? 6. On n’a vu personne pour 
expliquer de quoi il s’agit. On entend seulement  à la radio.  FGD, Bururi Province, Commune 
Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 86; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (3) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 60; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (6)  member hill 
councel, male, Hutu, 62; (7) peasant, female, Hutu, 54; (8) trader & Umushingantahe, male, 57; 
(9) mechanic &  hill administrator, male, Hutu, 40. 
 
Q. Avez-vous entendu parler de la CVR ? On entend cela à la radio.  
Q. C’est quoi selon vous ? 1. Je pense qu’on peut avoir une commission au niveau de la Commune 
et de la Colline. Cette commission pourra réconcilier les gens là-bas sur la Colline et  procéder à la 
restitution. * Protestation des autres. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 16 April 2008; (1) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 65; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 76; (3) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 65; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 77; (5) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, Umushingantahe, 80.   
 
2.  Les  autorités  doivent  installer  des  commissions  pour    donner  l’instruction.  On  peut  aussi 
installer des tribunaux devant lesquels les gens vont comparaître et se pardonner après la vérité. 1. 
Si possible, l’Etat doit installer ces tribunaux, car ici sur la colline, nous ne pouvons pas trancher ce 
genre de conflit. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 30 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, 
Hutu, Umushingantahe, 64; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 46; (4) 
peasant, female, Hutu, 51; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 38; (6) peasant, female, Hutu, 56.  
 
Q. On veut installer CVR au Burundi, qu’est ce que vous pensez de cela ? 3. Cette commission 
de V&R n’a pas de bonne raison d’être parce que les Hutu ont tué et les Tutsi aussi. Ceux qui ont fait 
des  erreurs  sont  ceux  qui  ont  tué  le  président,  ils  ont  aussi  tué  la  démocratie.  FGD,  Kirundo 
Province, Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (2) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 80; 
(6) peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
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10.2.   Special Tribunal 
 
There are no major difference in  the opinions of  Hutu and Tutsi with regard to their 
expectations  of  a  special  tribunal  as  can  be  seen  in  figure  28.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  Tutsi 
respondents put more emphasis on the “communal ritual” expectations of the tribunal. Especially the 
“honouring of the victims” is important to them in that regard. 
 
Figure 28 What do you expect from a Special Tribunal? 
 
 
The opinions on the potential role of a tribunal are mixed, as can be seen in the excerpts 
from discussions in box 17. Some people are not in favour of a tribunal since it will create tensions, a 
new round of war or simply because it will not be an adequate compensation for the losses. Moreover, 
respondents wonder whether such a tribunal will be able to operate independently and garantuee due 
process. As we have explained, a major obstacle voiced when reflecting on a process that needs to 
deal  with  the  past  is  the  general  experience  of  a  corrupt  and  partial  justice  system.  The  judicial 
apparatus is considered to be operating under the influence of the executive. And even in the context 
of questions inquiring about the opinions on a tribunal the notions ‘dialogue’ and ‘pardon’ prevail. 
 
People are aware of the fact that a localized judicial procedure will create tensions and 
fear in their midst. Conflicts and sentiments arising from these judicial proceedings will hamper the 
difficult process of living together again. Other respondents are aware of the fact that a process of 
establishing accountability is necessary but especially with regard to the political, administrative and 
military leaders most responsible for the violence in the past. In the popular perception the murder of 
Ndadaye was the event that was the basis of all mayhem, suffering and death that followed in their 
midst. People responsible for this assassination should be held accountable for their actions.  
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Box 17. A Special Tribunal  
 
Que  pensez-vous du Tribunal spécial pour  le Burundi ?  3.  Que  ce  tribunal vienne,  mais qu’il 
collabore avec les autres tribunaux nationaux. Qu’il travaille dans la justice, si non, il y a eu déjà des 
jugements !  1.  Que  ce  tribunal  commence  par  cette  haute  autorité,  celle  du  haut  niveau  avant 
d’arriver  au  bas  niveau.  2.  Ce  n’est  pas  nécessaire  parce  qu’il  viendra  juger  et  demandera  des 
indemnisations.  En  serons-nous  capables ?  3.  Les  procès  ont  eu  lieu,  et  les  verdicts  ont  été 
prononcés ! Seulement, on attend que ce tribunal vienne pour vérification  et collaboration avec les 
autres tribunaux. Les indemnisations viendront de la communauté internationale. 4. Pourquoi ce 
tribunal  alors  que  nous  avons  fini  de  nous  pardonner ?  Il  faut  le  pardon  mutuel  que  les  autres 
rentrent et cohabitent ensemble. 2. Tout cela e été causé par la mort du Président NDADAYE, est-ce 
que ce tribunal jugera tous les responsables ? Pour moi, la solution n’est pas là, il faut que ces gens du 
site rentrent chez eux et que ces tribunaux restent où ils sont.  4. Je vais chaque fois dans le site et on 
me donne à boire et à manger : Quand ce tribunal viendra, je n’y retournerais plus, j’aurais peur. 2. 
Pour ceux du site, on peut aussi les aider comme on a aidé ceux qui viennent de la Tanzanie, et  ainsi  
ils  viendront  et  vivront  avec  les  autres  ensemble  sur  la  colline.  La  solution  ne  viendra  pas  des 
tribunaux. Car quand il y a un procès devant les Bashingantahe, je remarque souvent qu’après le 
jugement,  les  conflits  entre  les  concernés  s’intensifient.    FGD,  Gitega  Province,  Commune 
Bugendana, 27 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 26; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 33; (3) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 69; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 55; (5)  peasant, female, 
Hutu, 40. 
 
Q.  Que  pensez-vous  du  tribunal  spécial  pour  le  Burundi ?  1.    Ce  tribunal  est  nécessaire  au 
Burundi  et  surtout  qu’on  commence  à  punir  les  responsables,  et  plus  particulièrement,  les 
promoteurs. Il faut que ce tribunal soit composé par toutes les composantes de la société burundaise 
et que son siège soit installé à l’étranger pour qu’il soit plus indépendant. 3. Devant ce tribunal, ce 
sont d’abord les autorités qui doivent répondre t. Il y a aussi les Bashingantahe qui doivent aider ce 
tribunal. 2. À propos de ce tribunal, comme les Bashingantahe ont tout vu, ils peuvent vraiment aider. 
FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 44; 
(2) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (4) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, 39; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 28; (6) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
displaced, 37; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
 
Q.  Que  pensez-vous  du  tribunal  spécial  pour  le  Burundi ?  5.  Que  ce  tribunal  vienne  et  qu’il 
commence ses investigations du début des conflits jusqu’aujourd’hui. […] 1. Ce tribunal n’est pas 
nécessaire. Ce qui est important, c’est le dialogue, lui seul sera la source de solution à nos problèmes. 
Si on demande à quelqu’un d’ici qui a tué, il répond que c’est parce qu’on avait tué le Président 
NDADAYE, mais pour lui, il ne sait pas pourquoi le Président a été tué. Que ce soit pour les Hutu et 
pour les Tutsi, le dialogue est plus important que ce tribunal. 2. Les Bashingantahe peuvent aider ! 
Quand il y a un conflit entre un Hutu et un Tutsi, un Mushingantahe sans aucune distinction, doit être 
impartial. Ils prônent pour la réconciliation. 4. Ils aident beaucoup ! Ils ne distinguent pas les ethnies 
dans les procès. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 
59; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
 
Q.   Va-t-on du tribunal spécial traiter des cas où la réconciliation n’est pas possible ? 3. Pas 
d’innocents. Tout le monde est coupable. Si le tribunal vient, tout le monde va perdre. 4. C’est Dieu 
qui va juger. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 30 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 56; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 46; 
(5) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 74.  
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10.3.   The Ubushingantahe & the Bashingantahe counsels 
 
We  have  previously  explained  the  fact  that  the  institution  of  the  Bashingantahe  was 
referred to in the Arusha peace agreement but that it remains to be seen whether the institution will 
officially be part of a transitional justice policy. In addition to the reference in the initial Arusha accords 
we pay attention to the institution because of the fact that there is globally an increasing attention for 
the potential use of localized, informal and tradition-based approaches in dealing with the past. In 
addition,  the  Ubushingantahe  as  a  set  of  values  and  the  men  embodying  these  values  –  the 
Bashingantahe  -  are  well-known  to  the  local  population  and  an  important  factor  to  be  taken  into 
account when exploring popular expectations on dealing with the past and the social dynamics already 
developing at the local level in the aftermath of violence. We first briefly sketch the almost perennial 
values referred to by the notion Ubushingantahe. We focus on the almost universal, lasting feature 
and principles guiding the functioning of the Bashingantahe counsels. Secondly, we give an overall 
overview of the different changes the Bashingantahe counsels experienced in the course of time. And 
subsequently we explore the perceptions and opinions of ordinary people on the potential role the 
Ubushingantahe and the Bashingantahe counsels might play in the transitional justice process. 
 
As  shown  we  make  a  clear  distinction  between  the  Ubushingantahe  values  and  the 
Bashingantahe  counsels.  There  is  a  general  confusion  in  the  literature  between  the  notions 
Ubusingantahe and Bashingantahe. Some authors refer to the Ubushingantahe as an institution and 
the  Bashingantahe  as  the  members  or  representatives  of  the  institutions.
25  others  refer  to  the 
“institution  of  the  Bashingantahe”  as  such.
26  Considering  the  nature  of  prefixes  used  in  Bantu 
languages and thus  also  in  Kirundi, it  becomes  clear  that  the  word Ubushingantahe refers to  the 
institution and the word Bashingantahe refers to the people that represent the (values and authority) of 
the institution. The institution as such is universal and perennial, but not necessarily unchanging, but 
the members representing the institution are temporal. This is an important distinction to keep in mind 
since -as we will argue later on- it is a crucial insight when trying to understand the problems, polemics 
and politization surrounding the institution and its members. An insight in this distinction will facilitate 
an  in-depth understanding of  popular perceptions and  opinions on the potential role this tradition-
based institution can play in the transitional justice process in Burundi. 
 
Both the notions Bashingantahe and Ubusingantahe refer to the word intahe. Intahe is 
generally translated as “the staff of justice” but it also has the connotation of “what determines where 
things belong”. In extension:  what brings together warring parties with the objective to restore the 
situation they experienced previously.
27 Ubushingantahe refers to a range of values: righteousness, 
sociableness, sagacity, compassion, self-control, responsibility, honour, discretion, hospitality, equity, 
truthfulness, justice, social cohesion, coherence and balance in speech, faithfulness, transparence, 
                                                              
25 Laely, Thomas (1992), “Le Destin du Bushingantahe. Transformations d’une Structure Locale d’Autorité au 
Burundi” Genève-Afrique, Vol. 2, pp. 75-98. Deslaurier, Christine (2003), “Le “Bushingantahe” peut-il réconcilier le 
Burundi?”, Politique Africaine, N° 92, pp. 76-96. 
26 Ntahombaye, Phillipe & Ntabona, Adrien & Gahama, Joseph & Kagabo Liboire (eds.) (1999), The 
Bashingantahe institution in Burundi. A Pluridisciplinary Study, Bujumbura. Dexter, T. & Ntahombaye, P., (2005) 
The Role of Informal Justice Systems in Fostering the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Situations. The Case of 
Burundi, Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Naniwe-Kaburahe Assumpta (2008) “The institution of 
Bashingantahe in Burundi” in: Huyse, L. & Salter, M. (eds.), (2008) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after 
Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences, Stockholm, International Idea, pp. 156. 
27 Joseph Bigirumwami, “Uses of the word Intahe andits corollaries in the Burundian language and culture” in . 
Ntahombaye, Phillipe & Ntabona, Adrien & Gahama, Joseph & Kagabo Liboire (eds.) (1999), The Bashingantahe 
institution in Burundi. A Pluridisciplinary Study, Bujumbura. p. 59-63.  
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tolerance,  etcetera.
28  Both  personal  virtues  and  social  values  are  attached  to  the  notion 
Ubushingantahe.  The  Bashingantahe  (plural)  are  the  men  (and  since  recently  also  women)  that 
embody these virtues and promote these values. A candidate who wants to be part of the group of 
Bashingantahe  should  have umutima,  what  literally  means “spirit”  or  “heart:  politeness,  education, 
compassion, self-control, social consciousness, etc;
29 in sum the set of values referred to in the word 
Ubushingantahe. The notion Ijambo, speech or discourse is attached to the popular understanding of 
the qualities of an umushingantahe (singular). A person having these qualities is an umushingantahe 
after officially being invested. The investiture is a sign of acceptance and confirmation by the local 
community.  The  Bashingantahe  were  traditionally  mandated  and  legitimized  from  the  bottom  up. 
There seem to be no consensus in the literature on the exact principles that guide the counsel of 
Bashingantahe.  The  most  cited  principles  are:  impartiality,  collegiality,  consensus,  transparency, 
credibility,  equity.  The  Bashingantahe  counsel  traditionally  had  both  a  moral,  judicial  and  political 
function. 
 
The counsel of Bashingantahe generally functions at the smallest societal unit: the hill. 
Someone  becomes  a  member  of  this  counsel  through  a  ceremonial  investiture  (kwatirwa).  The 
community is invited to participate in a ceremony where beer is shared. Before being invested the 
person needs to undergo several stages as a form of initiation. The candidate is guided and observed 
by a mentor. Once the candidate was/is accepted and invested, he becomes part of the local counsel.  
 
Due to colonial and post-colonial interventions and as a consequence of natural changes 
that characterized the functioning of the Bashingantahe counsels over time more emphasis has been 
put on the judicial features. The most common objectives of the Bashingantahe counsels on the local 
hills  in  the  Burundi  countryside  are  currently  mediation,  conciliation  and  arbitration.
30  We  give  an 
overview of the  changes the Bashingantahe counsels underwent in colonial, post-colonial and  the 
most recent period. 
 
The  Bashingantahe  occupied  fundamental  nodes  in  the  socio-political  order  of  pre-
colonial Burundi. They played an important role in the conflict resolution at the local level while they 
aimed at garantueeing peace, order and harmony. Although they also played a role as counsellers at 
the supra-local level in the courts of the king and princess.
31 they were mainly situated at the grassroot 
level of local hills. The Bashingantahe were local noble men with judicial, moral and political authority. 
Since they were part of a sacral order with no distinctions between judicial, political and social spheres 
they embodied justice, knowledge, virtue and authority at the local level. According to Laely, they were 
“more judges of peace than judges of justice (tribunal)”.
32 
 
The colonial stance towards the Burundian society was characterized by indirect rule. It 
meant  that  the  colonial  powers  –  first  Germany,  later  Belgium  –  used  the  institutions  they  found 
existing in society but nevertheless altered their functioning. The state became more powerful and 
                                                              
28 Manirakiza, Zénon (2007), “La Justice Transitionelle pour la Paix Sociale. Le Système Bashingantahe au 
Burundi”, p. 2. 
29 Laely, Thomas (1992), “Le Destin du Bushingantahe. Transformations d’une Structure Locale d’Autorité au 
Burundi” Genève-Afrique, Vol. 2, p. 81. 
30 Naniwe-Kaburahe Assumpta (2008) “The institution of Bashingantahe in Burundi” in: Huyse, L. & Salter, M. 
(eds.), (2008) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences, 
Stockholm, International Idea, pp. 156. 
31 Laely, Thomas (1992), “Le Destin du Bushingantahe. Transformations d’une Structure Locale d’Autorité au 
Burundi” Genève-Afrique, Vol. 2, p. 78 
32 Ibid, p. 78.  
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organized; the influence was felt to the most remote corners of rural life. The once sacred order in 
which  the  Bashingantahe  occupied  several  positions  and  played  several  roles  at  the  same  time 
gradually  disintegrated.  The  colonial  powers  instituted  administrative  authorities  taking  over  tasks 
normally observed by the Bashingantahe. Some dimensions of the principles structuring the actions of 
the  Bashingantahe  were  formalized.  The  political  aspects  faded.  A  modern  justice  system  was 
introduced  taking  over  some  of  the  conflict  resolution  capacities  of  the  invested  Bashingantahe 
counsels. The institution weakened and was tasked with more specific objectives. 
 
The  incorporation  by  the  state  became  stronger  after  independence.  During  the  first 
Republic (1966-76) the dominating political party Uprona politicized the Bashingantahe counsels by 
investing  individuals  without  taking  into  account  the  necessary  phases  in  the  investiture.  The 
administrative functionaries organized the appointments of the new Bashingantahe. The bottom-up 
legitimization dimension was harmed in doing so. An entirely new administrative apparatus came into 
being.  New  administrative  positions  were  imposed  top-down  and  branched  deeply  into  rural  life, 
replacing and usurpating the existing Bashingantahe at the hill level.  
 
Bagaza ruled during the Second Republic (1976-1987). His reign was characterized by 
an  increasing  authoritarian drift  and  a  far-reaching  ambition to  change  society  through  socio-legal 
engineering. Not only were ethnic identities “abolished”, religious practices were not allowed  and also 
the  Bashingantahe  investitures  became  forbidden.  Local  party  dignitaries  occupied  the  roles  the 
Bashingantahe  used  to  play  previously.  The  one  party-state  did  not  completely  annihilate  the 
Bashingantahe counsels but took over its functioning completely and allocated their members from 
within the centres of power. In doing so, it drained the counsels and the practices of its members from 
their spirit: the Ubushingantahe. The new members operated in the service of the state and the party, 
not for the good of the local communities; they were not chosen and confirmed by the population. It is 
questionable whether the initial values (the Ubushingantahe) underlying the institution could continue 
to flourish in the structures of a one party-state, dictatorial in nature and with a specific ideological and 
ethnic profile. 
 
Pierre Buyoya came to power in 1987 and was immediately faced with the question of 
national unity and political liberalization after the massacres in Ntega and Marangara in 1988. The 
“national  commission  charged  with  the  study  of  the  question  of  national  unity”  referred  to  the 
ubushingantahe as a factor of unity in the history of Burundi and recommended its revalorization. 
Research  took  place  to  identify  the  main  features  of  the  “bashingantahe  institution”.
33 
Recommendations for its rehabilitation were made. After the killing of president Ndadaye in 1993 the 
renewed attention for the institution entered a second phase. A decree “re-invented” the institution in 
1997 with as most visible consequence the installation of a consultative national counsel composed of 
40  Bashingantahe  appointed  by  president  Buyoya.  The  national  counsel  of  Bashingantahe  (CNB) 
made several recommendations in the context of the ongoing mediation between the warring parties 
at the time.  
 
Since 1997 several international donors and aid agencies contributed to the so-called 
“rehabilitation” of the institution. The UNDP financed an identification exercise to make an inventory of 
the  traditionally  invested  Bashingantahe  throughout  the  country.  They  found  34.000  “traditionally” 
                                                              
33 Ntahombaye, Phillipe & Ntabona, Adrien & Gahama, Joseph & Kagabo Liboire (eds.) (1999), The 
Bashingantahe institution in Burundi. A Pluridisciplinary Study, Bujumbura.  
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invested  Bashingantahe.  In  a  second  phase  communal  and  provincial  counsels  as  well  as  an 
additional national counsel were instigated. This rehabilitation and especially the investiture of the 
Bashingantahe at the national level was not able to counter the continued spectre of politicization of 
the institution.
34 Especially the fact that dignitaries of the old regimes were admitted to the national 
counsel gave rise to doubts on whether these persons embodied the values of the institution. The 
incorporation of people that might have played a role in the upheaval of the past did not facilitate the 
task  the  institution  is  supposed  to  play:  garantuee  unity,  promote  peace  and  harmony.  These 
problems are, however, mainly national. The situation at the local level is different as we will see. 
 
After the 2005 elections that brought to power the CNDD-FDD a new situation developed 
at the local level: a conflict between the locally elected hill counsels and the Bashingantahe counsels 
that had always existed. Both counsels have similar tasks. The members of the former have recently 
taken up their position and are dominantly associated with the CNDD-FDD political party, while the 
Bashingantahe counsels continue to have the stamp of UPRONA due to the decennia of incorporation 
in the machinerie of the one-party state. The new rulers both at the national and local level, therefore, 
questioned the legitimacy of the Bashingantahe. A conflict of authority broke out in some places at the 
local  level:  the  newly  elected  authorities  wanted  to  suppress  the  activities  of  the  existing 
Bashingantahe counsels. The 2005 law on local governance stipulates that these newly elected local 




 To come to an understanding of the functioning of the Bashingantahe councels and the 
popular  perceptions  on  the  institution  we  asked  questions  related  to  this  municipal  law  and  the 
reference made to the institution in the constitution. Figure 30 and 31 present the findings. Figure 29 
summarizes the findings on the questions whether people would prefer to contact the Bashingantahe 
counsel or the hill counsel in case of problems or conflict. Althought the law stipulates the fact that 
both counsels are supposed to work together, the preference of the respondents might indicate a 
general appreciation of the legitimacy. The figure details responses according to locality, ethnic and 
other  social  identities  of  the  respondents.  Important  to  take  into  account  is  the  fact  that  Hutu 
respondents prefer the hill counsel over the Bashingantahe counsels. Half of the Tutsi respondents 
prefer the Bashingantahe, while the other half would contact the hill counsel in case of conflict and 
problems.  In  all  but  one  locality  the  population  has  more  confidence  in  the  hills  counsels.  In  the 
province  of  Mwaro,  the  commune  Bisoro,  a  significant  part  of  the  respondents  refer  to  the 
Bashingantahe counsel as the primary institution to deal with conflicts. The hill we visited in that region 
is characterized by a large number of traditionally invested Bashingantahe, both of Hutu and Tutsi 
identity.  They  have  a  prominent  place  in  the  local  governance  structure  at  the  local  level.  Their 
authority  is  highly  respected.  They  played  an  important  role  in  the  prevention  of  the  unfolding  of 
violence during the years of “crisis”.  
 
                                                              
34 Deslaurier, Christine (2003), “Le “Bushingantahe” peut-il réconcilier le Burundi?”, Politique Africaine, N° 92, pp. 
76-96. 
35 Loi N°  1/016 du 20 avril 2005 portant organisation de l’administration communale, B.O.B N°4bis/205, 1 April 
2005, 1.  
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Figure 29. If you have a problem or conflict, do you prefer to contact the Bashingantahe or the 




Striking are the responses of demobilized rebels. This is the group that mostly challenges 
the legitimacy  of the  Bashingantahe  in  their  answers. Less than 10%  say  they  would contact  the 
Bashingantahe in case of conflict and problems, while the averages of the other social groups is to be 
situated somewhere around 40%. One has to keep in mind that the current leadership in Burundi 
mainly originates from the rebel forces. The difficult relationship between the leadership of the former 
rebel groups and the Bashingantahe at the national level is thus also reflected at the local level. But it 
does not seem to be a preoccupation of the other segments of society. In conclusion: the hill counsels 
seem to have more legitimacy than the Bashingantahe but the findings also reveal that this does not 
mean that the Bashingantahe counsels do not have any legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.  
 
And in fact, fieldwork observations made clear that both the members of the hill counsels 
and the Bashingantahe seat together in sessions to deal with local conflicts. An interesting observation 
is the fact that -although members of both groups are generally seated together on a bench facing the 
parties  in  dispute-  only  the  traditionally  invested  Bashingantahe  use  the  intahe  stick  during  the 
proceedings. Rythmically hitting the ground and pointing the “staff of justice” is the privilege of the 
invested Bashingantahe only. The stick is passed on the other members once they take the floor to 
speak. In case a member of the hill councel speaks, they do so without using the intahe stick. It is a  
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symbolic gesture that accentuates the different origins and status of the two groups but the overall 
proceedings are taking place in collaboration. 
 
As can be seen in figure 30 the Bashingantahe are indeed considered to be a source of 
peace and  social cohesion at the local level.  Both the  Arusha accords and the  constitution  make 
reference  to  the  institution  in  these  formulations.  Both  Hutu  and  Tutsi  are  of  that  opinion  with 
approximately 65% of the responses. In some localities, such as Bugendana and Bisoro again, this 
conviction is very strong. The demobilized rebels not only contest the legitimacy of the Bashingantahe, 
they also voice the opinion that they do not agree with the statement that the Bashingantahe are a 
source of peace and social cohesion. 
 
Figure 30 Are the Bashingantahe a source of peace and social cohesion? (Multiple Responses 
– Weighted Results) 
 
 
The  question  remains  what  the  ordinary  population  expects  from  the  Bashingantahe 
counsels and the set of values underlying the institution in the process of dealing with the past. We 
have  indicated  above  that  the  main  expectations  need  to  be  situated  around  the  objectives  of 
reconciliation, re-integration of people in society, honouring the victims and a dialogue taking place. 
The latter three activities were labelled “communal-ritual activities”. Pardon is often referred to as well. 
Figure 31 details these opinions according the ethnic identity of respondents. Responses do no differ 
fundamentally, although Hutu emphasize reconciliation while Tutsi voice a stronger preference for the” 
communal-ritual” dimensions of the institution.  
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We give an extensive overview of the discussions on the Basingantahe in box 18. Two 
tendencies can be distinguished in the perceptions on the Bashingantahe and the role they played 
during the “crisis”. There is an awareness that some tried and were able to prevent violence or temper 
the intensity of the violence. On the other hand people are also conscious that some of them were 
implicated in the violence. As a consequence, the potential use of the members of the institution is 
mixed as well. To a certain extent people refer to the fact that they are an ideal source of unity and 
peace  at  the  local  level,  a  factor  that  can  facilitate  social  cohesion  and  reconciliation  in  their 
communities.  On  the other  hand respondents sometimes  refer  to the fact  that  they cannot  “judge 
themselves” since they have been implicated somehow, as victims but sometimes as perpetrators as 
well.  A selection process that separates the “untainted” and the ones whose actions “have cast a slur” 
on their reputation is necessary. 
 
The true Bashingantahe are still considered to represent the values of the country. They 
might take up the role of counsellers and “sensitizers”, bringing people from different social and ethnic 
groups together. Undertaking judicial proceedings to identify guilt and responsibility in regard of the 
large-scale  crimes  is  considered  to  be  beyond  their  abilities  and  competence.  The  local 
embeddedness in face-to-face communities is an obstacle in that respect. But this local anchoring is 
considered to be an asset for the task of facilitating peace, harmony, social cohesion, reconciliation 
and even conflict prevention. Somehow the previous narratives indicate that people tend to make a 
tacit distinction between the set of values commonly referred to as Ubushingantahe and the people 
who  have  to  become  the  representatives  of  these  values  over  the  years,  the  Bashingantahe.  A  
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distinction equally observed in the research conducted by Dominik Kohlhagen.
36 We will elaborate on 
this insight in the following section where this observation receives more support with the inquiry into 
the factors important to increase reconciliation and social cohesion at the local level. 
                                                              
36 Kohlhagen, Dominik (2008), Le Tribunal Face au Terrain. Les Problèmes d’Exécution des Jugements au 
Mugamba dans une Perspective Juridique et Anthropologique, Bujumbura, RCN Justice & Démocratie, p. 136. 
Box 18. The Ubushingatahe & the Bashingantahe  
2.  Les  Bashingantahe peuvent  aider !  Quand il y  a un  conflit  entre  un  Hutu  et un  Tutsi, un 
Mushingantahe sans aucune distinction, doit être impartial. Ils prônent pour la réconciliation. 4. 
Ils aident beaucoup ! Ils ne distinguent pas les ethnies dans les procès. FGD, Gitega Province, 
Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; 
(3) peasant, female, Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 59; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
 
5. Il n’y a pas de mal avec les BASHINGANTAHE.6. C’est la 1ère institution par laquelle il faut 
commencer. 4. Nous avons confiance à eux pour résoudre les problèmes du passé. Ils peuvent 
appeler     les trois ethnies et essayer de réconcilier les ethnies. Je sais que nous sommes ici    
entrain   de dire quelque chose, les Tutsi eux aussi vont dire autre chose. Il est difficile de 
réconcilier les gens, quand il y a une réunion de la colline, il y a seulement deux ou 4 Tutsi. Les 
BASHINGANTAHE devraient inciter les Tutsi à participer aux travaux communautaires avec les 
Hutu. Ils doivent collaborer avec les élus locaux . L’administrateur doit ordonner à ces Tutsi de 
participer aux activités qui se passent sur leurs collines d’origine .Après ces activités,on peut 
faire  passer  le  message  de  réconciliation  et  de  vérité.  FGD,  Gitega  Province,  Commune 
Bugendana, 19 March 2008 ; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 67 ; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 54 ; (3) 
peasant,  male, Hutu, 54 ;  (4) peasant,  male,  Hutu, 65 ;  (5)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  49 ;  (6) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 50 ; (7) peasant, male, Hutu, 47. 
 
4.  L’institution  d’UBUSHINGANTAHE  peut  aider  grandement  si  le  gouvernement  accepte  le 
passé du Pays. Les dirigeants devraient respecter les valeurs du Pays et ne peuvent pas prendre 
en compte l’ethnie des membres de cette institution. Tous les organes devraient s’inspirer du 
fonctionnement  de  cette  institution  qui  était  vraiment  neutre.  1.  Les  ABASHINGANTAHE 
peuvent jouer un rôle dans la réconciliation, mais les rapatriés, les anciens prisonniers et même 
le  pouvoir  n’acceptent  pas  cette  institution  consultative  comme  c’était  dans  le  temps.  4.  La 
constitution devrait donner de la place à cette institution d’UBUSHINGANTAHE qui doit être un 
organe consultatif au- dessus de tous les trois pouvoirs. Cet organe a été ignoré par les pouvoirs 
qui se sont succédés depuis l’époque coloniale. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 
19 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, Umushingantahe, 58; (2) peasant, male, 
Tutsi,  displaced,  48;  (3)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  74;  (4)  teacher,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 54; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 35; (6) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 54.  
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Box 18. The Ubushingatahe & the Bashingantahe (2)  
 
Q. Que peut faire les BASHINGANTAHE de la tradition ? 2. Moi, j’ai été investi en 2002 quand j’étais 
dans le site des déplacés. 1. Moi aussi, j’ai été investi en 2002. 2.Je pense que nous pouvons convoquer 
des réunions pour inciter les Hutu et les Tutsi à vivre harmonieusement comme  dans le passé. Ces 
réunions  peuvent  être  organisées  sur  chaque  Colline.  Au  moment  de  notre  investiture,  ce  sont  les 
paysans Hutu qui ont rassemblé la bière que nous avons utilisé dans les cérémonies.Dans la Commune de 
MAKEBUKO, ce sont les BASHINGANTAHE qui ont empêché les gens de s’entretuer. 5. De telles réunions 
ont lieu ici, si elles n’ont pas eu lieu, le calme ne serait pas revenu FGD, Gitega Province, Commune 
Itaba, 12 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 85; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, former 
displaced,  74;  (3)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  former  displaced,  37;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  former 
displaced, 60; (5) peasant, male, Tutsi, former displaced, 37.  
 
Q. Les BASHINGANTAHE ont encore une tâche ? 5. Ils ont un rôle consultatif. Quand il y a un conflit, 
ces investis et les élus se consultent ensemble. Tous. On travaille ensemble. 
Q. Est-ce que les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent jouer un rôle pour résoudre les problèmes du passé ? 
6. Les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent y arriver. Pour les problèmes compliqués, on fait recours au Chef du 
site pour venir ici et donner des conseils.1. Actuellement, il faut inviter les gens à vivre ensemble, mais 
pour les criminels, il faut d’autres institutions comme les Tribunaux. Il y  a d’autres services qui sont 
chargés de cela. Mais, on ne les connaît pas. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 31 March 2008; (1) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (2) peasant, female, Hutu, 50; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 70; (4) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 43; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (6) peasant, female, Hutu, hill administrator, 60 
 
Q. Ya-t-il des anciens BASHINGANTAHE ici ?  Tous : Il n’y en a pas. 3. S’ils étaient ici, ils joueront un 
rôle dans la réconciliation. 5. Ils pourront punir ceux qui voudront faire du mal aux autres. FGD, Gitega 
Province, Commune Itaba, 26 February 2009; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 28; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 
49; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 28; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 59; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 56. 
 
Q. Alors, le mieux, c’est d’utiliser les BASHINGANTAHE ou quoi ? 1. Tout le monde connaît tout le 
monde. On les connaît mais ce sont les BASHINGANTAHE  qui peuvent grouper les gens .  
Q.  Est-ce  qu’ils  sont  respectés  ou  plutôt  le  Conseil  de  Colline ?  Tous :  C’est  plutôt  le  Conseil 
Communal.  Actuellement  les  BASHINGANTAHE  ne  jouent  aucun  rôle.  Avant,  les  BASHINGANTAHE 
étaient des sages. Actuellement, ce sont les Chefs des Collines qui règlent les conflits. 4. Avant, il y avait le 
Chef de Colline et les BASHINGANTAHE. D’abord, c’était le Chef de Colline et après, si on n’avait pas 
………….. le problème, on allait vers les BASHINGANTAHE. Maintenant, les BASHINGANTAHE ont dit que 
c’est fini avec eux. Ils l’ ont senti  eux-mêmes parce que les gens ne viennent plus chez eux. On n’a pas eu  
d’  ordre  officiel  pour  cela.  Et  les  BASHINGANTAHE  sont  peu  nombreux.  FGD,  Kirundo  Province, 
Commune  Ntega,  26 March  2008; (1) peasant,  male,  Hutu, 28; (2) peasant,  male,  Hutu, 42;  (3) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 35; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 36; (6) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 35; (7) peasant, female, Hutu, 21.  
 
Q. Est-ce que les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent jouer un rôle pour résoudre les problèmes du passé ? 
5. Les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent mieux résoudre ces problèmes. Ce sont ceux qui connaissent ce qui 
s’est passé et ils sont calmes. Ils ont une certaine expertise dans ce domaine. 2. Nous avons confiance en 
ces gens. Nous sommes contents de la manière comment ils font les procès. Ils peuvent être supporté par 
les BASHINGANTAHE.8. Le problème est que les gens ne parlent pas de ce qui s’est passé. C’est l’obstacle, 
il y a une méfiance mutuelle.5. Ce qui manque s’est le déclenchement qui vient d’en haut et qui dit, il faut 
faire ceci et cela. Mais le pouvoir ne fait rien. Il n’y a aucune route qui est construite. Il n’y a pas de 
sécurité, c’est seulement à vous qui e venez ici. FGD, Bururi Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 April 
2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 86; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (4) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (6)  member hill councel, male, Hutu, 62; (7) 
peasant,  female,  Hutu,  54;  (8)  trader  &  Umushingantahe,  male,  57;  (9)  mechanic  &    hill 
administrator, male, Hutu, 40.  
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Box 18. The Ubushingatahe & the Bashingantahe (3) 
 
Q. Est-ce que les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent jouer un rôle ? 2. Oui. Parce que si on n’a pas eu 
des BASHINGANTAHE en 1993, on pouvait avoir des     tueries. Ils ont empêché les jeunes venant 
des autres Collines. 
Q.  Ils peuvent jouer quel rôle ? 1. Ils peuvent conseiller. Pour que les gens se réconcilient, 
qu’on accorde le pardon. 
Q. Alors, c’est plutôt la sensibilisation, pas de jugements et de punitions ?  
1.  Non,  seulement  sensibilisation.6.  Ils  peuvent  seulement  conseiller  selon  ça.  Sinon,  on  doit 
envoyer vers l’échelon supérieur. FGD, Kayanza Province, Commune Kabarore, 6 May 2008; 
(1) peasant, male, Hutu, 50; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 42; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 37; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 56; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 55.  
 
Q.  Quel  serait  le  rôle des  Bashingantahe ?  3.  Avec  l’avènement  de  ce  pouvoir, on  a  voulu 
supprimer  l’institution  des  Bashingantahe,  mais  par  après,  on  l’a  acceptée,  parmi  les 
Bashingantahe,il peut y avoir  à  la fois les  juges,  les  conseillers et  les  témoins.4.  Si on  essaie 
d’observer ce qui s’est passé, il y a des gens qui ont agi par force, donc parmi les Bashingantahe, il 
y a ceux qui peuvent dire la vérité et d’autres qui ne peuvent pas. Les gens ne sont pas les mêmes. 
1. Je pense qu’avant d’être investi un Mushingantahe, il y a une phase d’observation, même dans 
ce tribunal, il faut sélectionner les meilleurs et laisser de côté les Bashingantahe qui se sont mal 
comportés  et  associer  à  ce  tribunal    ceux  qui  peuvent  dire  la  vérité.  FGD,  Gitega  Province, 
Commune  Itaba,  26  February  2009;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  44;  (2)  peasant, 
female, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 50; (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
displaced, 39; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 28; (6) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
37; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
 
Q.  Comme  le  GACACA,  les  BASHINGANTAHE  peuvent  jouer  un  rôle  pour  résoudre  les 
problèmes du passé ? Tous : Non, ils ne peuvent pas faire cela. Ils étaient là quand les choses 
sont  arrivées,  alors  ils    ne  peuvent  plus  intervenir  maintenant.  FGD,  Kirundo  Province, 
Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 58; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; 
(3) peasant, male, Hutu, 49; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 80; (6) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
 
Q. Est-ce que les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent jouer un rôle pour traiter les problèmes du 
passé ? 
3. Les BASHINGANTAHE ont aussi joué un rôle ici. Alors, « NTAWIKANDA IGISEBE »on ne peut 
pas presser sa plaie soi-même : pour dire qu’on ne peut pas se juger soi-même. La justice d’ici est 
corrompue. Si on n’a pas quelque chose à donner, on est oublié.5. Si on fait quelque chose comme 
le  GACACA  ici,  les  riches  qui  ont  les  moyens  ne  seront  pas  condamnés.Tous :  Les  anciens 
BASHINGANTAHE, les vraies sont tués dans le passé. Les autres qui sont là maintenant ont dirigé 
les massacres. 
Q. Pour  vous,  on peut seulement être  dirigeant  quand  on  a tué ?  Tous :  Oui.4.  Les vrais 
BASHINGANTAHE ont essayé d’arrêter les massacres, mais, ils étaient aussi tués . FGD, Kirundo 
Province,  Commune  Ntega,  28  March  2008;  (1)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  displaced,  36;  (2) 
peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 84; (3) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, (4) peasant, male, 
Tutsi,  displaced,  36;  (5)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  31;  (6)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 66; (7) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 47; (8) peasant, female, Tutsi, displaced, 
24. 
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  Box 18. The Ubushingatahe & the Bashingantahe (4) 
Q. Il y en a des BASHINGANTAHE ? Tous : Oui. 
Q. Ils peuvent jouer un rôle ? 2-3-4 : Non, ils ne peuvent pas. 3. Il y a la peur, il y a la guerre. Parmi les 
BASHINGANTAHE, il y a des Hutu et des Tutsi. Alors, les Hutu n’acceptent jamais qu’ils ont fait du mal 
aux Tutsi. Les Tutsi disent : »On sait ce qui s’est passé ici. C’était durant la journée ».2. Ici, il y a la peur. 
Si on dit la vérité durant  la journée, on vient te tuer durant la nuit. Même actuellement, on ne peut pas 
passer une nuit sans qu’il y ait quelqu’un qui est tué. 3. Ici, il y a encore le terrorisme. Les rapatriés 
disent qu’on va nous empoisonner. Q. Alors, mais la peur, c’est par les BASHINGANTAHE ou par 
chaque instance ? 3. Les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent faire cela,  parce que les autorités supérieures 
peuvent les supporter. Maintenant, il y  a des armes dans la forêt, des enfants, des gens d’ici qui sont 
dans la forêt.Si le CVR vient, la commission va parler avec des Tutsi et après avec des Hutu et après 
pour les mettre ensemble. Les Hutu vont dire ce qu’ils ont fait, les Tutsi vont dire qu’ils ont exagéré 
avec la vengeance. Les BASHINGANTAHE sont efficaces, mais il n’y a rien qui les protège. On peut les 
frapper  comme ça.  Alors  ils cachent  la vérité  en se  protégeant eux-mêmes  FGD, Bururi  Province, 
Commune Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, 39; (2) peasant, male, Tutsi, 72; (3) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, 52; (4) teacher, male, Tutsi, 40; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, 44; (6) peasant, 
female, Tutsi, 67; (7) peasant, female, Tutsi, 40. 
 
Q. Quel genre de justice ? 5. La justice du niveau supérieur car ici, on ne peut pas trancher de tels 
procès. Je suis un MUSHINGANTAHE, mais je pense que nous ne pouvons pas faire ce genre de procès. 
Les Burundais sont compliqués, on ne peut pas trancher ce genre de procès sur la Colline. 6. Quelqu’un 
qui perdrait sur la Colline ne va pas accepter de payer et même s’il paye, ça ne  marchera pas entre les 
deux parties. 1. La pierre va alors continuer à endommager les houes. Je pense qu’il faut pardonner 
mais  après  avoir  connu  la  vérité  car  personne  ne  peut  refuser  le  pardon.  FGD,  Mwaro  Province, 
Commune Bisoro, 1 May 2008; (1) peasant, female, Hutu, 60; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 52; (3) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 67; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 38; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 
51; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 49. 
 
2. Ici, il ya des mariages interethniques, nous sommes bien ici, même lors de la guerre de 1972, les 
BASHINGANTAHE ont essayé de calmer la situation, nous avons appelé les jeunes Tutsi au calme. 
3. La vie sur la Colline de KIGANDA est habitée par des BASHINGANTAHE. Depuis 1972, 1993, les 
BASHINGANTAHE ont essayé d’œuvrer pour le bien des gens. Même si les jeunes tentent de faire ce 
que  font  les  jeunes  des  autres  régions,  nous  arrivons  à  les  calmer.  Q.  Vous  êtes  tous  des 
BASHINGANTAHE ? Tous : Oui.  Q. Combien sur la Colline ? 3. Environ 100 sur la Colline. Q. Ceux 
sont  quelques  uns  qui  viennent  pour  les  procès ?  3.  Oui,  parce  que  les  gens  ont  d’autres 
occupations. Q. Quel rôle des BASHINGANTAHE pour traiter les problèmes du passé ? 1. Nous 
sommes surpris, nous devons nous concerter pour répondre à cette question.     Il faut une réunion 
pour identifier ceux qui ont perdu les gens et les biens.4. Ensemble avec les autres, nous pouvons voir 
ce que nous pouvons faire. 3. Ici nous sommes au nombre de 5, nous ne pouvons pas décider pour 100 
personnes.1. Parmi les BASHINGANTAHE, il y en a qui ont commis les crimes, ou qui ont perdu leurs 
biens,  ils  ne  peuvent  pas  se  juger  eux-mêmes.  Il  faut  une  commission  communale  pour  faire  des 
investigations. Q. Pourquoi faut-il cette commission ? 3. On ne peut pas se juger, on est jugé par les 
autres.  FGD,  Mwaro  Province,  Commune  Bisoro,  16  April  2008;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
Umushingantahe,  65;  (2)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  Umushingantahe,  76;  (3)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
Umushingantahe,  65;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  Umushingantahe,  77;  (5)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
Umushingantahe, 80.   
 
Q. Est-ce que les BASHINGANTAHE peuvent jouer un rôle pour traiter le passé ? 3. Non, nous ne 
pouvons pas. 6. Nous sommes ici pour calmer les gens. 3. Les gens qui font cela sont forts, ils ont des 
enfants bien placés, on ne peut pas les toucher. 1. Même si on nous donne une aide qui va passer par les 
enfants de ces gens, ça ne va pas arriver jusqu'à nous. FGD, Mwaro Province, Commune Bisoro, 15 
April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 51; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 
Umushingantahe, 73; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 67; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 63; 
(6) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 43.  
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11.   LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN:  OPENING SPACES OF “TOGETHERNESS” 
 
This concluding section takes into account the findings we presented earlier. An attempt 
is  made  to  identify  to  contours  of  the  transitional  space  emerging  from  the  narratives,  popular 
understandings  and  existing  practices  of  the  ordinary  peasants  living  in  the  hills.  A  concluding 
question  of  the  survey  instrument  probed  what  institution,  activity,  event  or  person  is  the  most 
important to increase the peaceful cohabitation and social cohesion in the the communities of the 
respondents. Figure 32 presents the findings. 
 
Figure 32 According to you, what institution / activity / event / person is the most important to 
increase  peaceful  cohabitation  and  social  cohesion  in  your  community?  (Coded  Open 
Question – Multiple Responses -Weighted Results) 
 
 
Thirty-two percent of all respondents answer with statements that  can be  categorized 
under the label (good) governance. Socio-economic development is equally an element often referred 
to (26%). What is generally considered as transitional justice in the narrow sense of the word (truth, 
accountability, reparation, reconciliation) only follows third with 16% of the responses. Some people 
phrase their answer as the need to undertake an action but do not specify the type of action (12%).  
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Security  (8%)  and  religion  (5%)  follow.  Tutsi  respondents  put  more  emphasis  on  socio-economic 
development as can be seen in figure 33. 
 
Figure 23 According to you, what institution / activity / event / person is the most important to 
increase  peaceful  cohabitation  and  social  cohesion  in  your  community?  (Coded  Open 
Question – Multiple Responses -Weighted Results) 
 
 
It  is  important  to  take  into  account  that  ordinary  Burundians  seem  to  stress  other 
objectives than the typical transitional justice objectives when they are asked to reflect on the need to 
prevent a recurrence of the violence of the past and the increase of social cohesion. It can be argued 
that  transitional  justice  also  operates  in  the  domains  of  governance  reform  and  socio-economic 
development. There are without any doubt linkages but this tendency to link transitional justice with 
many  other  issues  risks  to  inflate  transitional  justice  in  such  a  way  that  everything  becomes 
transitional justice and hence nothing is transitional justice. We have, therefore, limited ourselves to 
clearly demarcated objectives and specific mechanisms that can reach these objectives. We have 
stipulated these objectives and mechanisms in the introductory section. Also in the case of Burundi 
there are clearly identifiable mechanisms envisioned to deal with the past in general and to reach a 
specific range of objectives. 
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The findings presented in the figure above place the transitional justice process as we 
just qualified it in a broader perspective. It is in fact governance and development that should be an 
issue and only then transitional justice (as qualified above). Good governance and socio-economic 
development are, of course, container terms referring to many things. It is difficult to clearly identify 
what is being referred to here. One need to keep in mind that the findings presented in figure 33 are 
derived from answers to open-ended questions that were only coded afterwards. We constructed a 
code book with  initially  67 possibilities for this open-ended question (see  annex). We consistently 
aggregated the categories with eight final categories. Table 10 and 11 give an overview of what is 




Egalité / Division (Gouvernance - Aide - Development) 
(National) 
Egalité / Division (Gouvernance - Aide - Development)  
(Local) 
Egalité / Division (Discours) (National) 
Egalité / Division (Discours) (Local) 
Egalité  / Division (Ethnique) (General) 
Retour des Habitants (Deplaces) 
Retour des Habitants (Rapatriés) 
Retour des Habitants (Deplacés & Rapatriés) 
Partage Du Pouvoir chez les autorités superieurs 
Cooperation / Entente Entre les Politiciens 
Visit des Politiciens dans la Population 
Arret de la corruption 
Impartialité dans la Justice / Respect de la loi 
Stabilité Politique 
Pas de Multipartisme 
Elections des Nouveaux Dirigeants (National) 
Elections des Nouveaux Dirigeants (Local) 




Table 11  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation 
(Cohésion / Paix)  (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation 
(Cohésion / Paix)  (Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation 
(Cohésion / Paix) (ONG) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / 
Parler (Cohésion / Paix)  (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / 
Parler (Cohésion / Paix)  (Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / 
Parler (Cohésion / Paix) (ONG) 
Fête / Ceremonies Traditionelles (partage de la bière) 
Activités / Réunions de Sport 
Creation d'une comité des Sages 
Creation des Associations (Général) 
Creation des Associations (H et T) 
Creation des Associations Pour Dialoguer (H et T) 
Creation des Projets de Development (General) 
Creation des Projets de Development (H et T) 
Aide aux plus pauvres 
Creation des Ecoles / Education 
Construction des Maisons (Déplacés) 
Construction des Maisons (Rapatriés) 
Construction des Maisons (Rapatriés & Déplacés) 
Villagisation ensemble (sans distinction ethnique) 
Redistribution de la terre 
 
Figure 34 gives a visual overview of the responses when aggregated into 19 options, a 
medium range aggregation in between the eight general categories and the initial 67 categories. What 
is  clear  is  the  relative  importance  attached  to  the  organization  of  local  level  encounters,  general 
meetings without specific focus on transitional justice issues, although the latter issue is also referred 
to in the context of encounters. The return of displaced and refugees to the community is also often 
cited. In sum, the strengthening of the social tissue, the aspect of being together, placing everything in 
its place as it used to be before everything fell apart, a revitalization of daily life and interactions are 
tacitly stressed. Box 19 gives an overview of a selection of responses where peasants phrase these 
issues  in  their  own  words.  Dialogue,  speech,  reconciliation,  festivities,  ceremonies,  reunions, 
regroupings are notions that often return. A following text box (20) summarizes quotes related to the 
notion of (good) governance equally often cited: peace, security, justice and equity, no favoritism and 
divisionism are recurring themes.  
 
  
Figure 34 According to you, what institution / activity / event / person is the most important to increase peaceful cohabitation and social cohesion 
in your community? (Coded Open Question – Multiple Responses –Weighted Results)  
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Box 19. Coming Together = Being Together 
 
Organiser des  fêtes au  niveau  de  la colline et  les  Hutu  et  les  Tutsi peuvent  dialoguer et 
renforcer la cohésion sociale.                    
 
Multiplication des réunions de sensibilisation de la population à la cohésion sociale                                           
 
Il faudrait organiser beaucoup de rencontres réunissant les Burundais des collines                                  
 
Les  autorités  au  niveau  provincial  et  communal  doivent  faire  des  réunions  pour  nous 
réconcilier.                                  
 
Il  faut  se  mettre  ensemble  pour  parler  de  ce  qui  s'est  passé  en  vue  d'améliorer  la 
cohabitation.                                   
 
Organisation des associations communautaires pour réduire la pauvreté, ce serait un cadre 
de dialogue.                               
 
Il faut que l'administrateur rassemble les gens pour les sensibiliser à la cohésion sociale.                               
 
Organisation des activités de développement rassemblant toutes les ethnies.                                    
 
Créations des associations où toutes les tenances se rassemblent et dialoguent.                                  
 
Les dirigeants doivent intensifier des réunions pour réconcilier les gens.                                
 
Organisation des fêtes qui rassemblent Hutu et Tutsi autour de la bière.                                 
 
Organisation des fêtes où les Hutu et les Tutsi puissent se rassembler et se dire la vérité.  
 
L'administrateur devrait nous ramener sur nos collines natales et essayer de nous présenter 
publiquement  devant  nos  anciens  voisins  et  leur  recommander  de  nous  accueillir 
chaleureusement.                        
 
Le gouvernement devrait organiser des rencontres avec nos anciens voisins.  
 
Les Hutu et les Tutsi doivent se regrouper dans les associations.                                  
 
Le retour des déplacés et des réfugiés : il faut que le gouvernement s'investissent .  
 
Participation dans les fêtes chez les Hutu par les Tutsi et vice-versa.                                
 
Organisation des activités génératrices de revenus dans lesquelles tous peuvent participer.                            
 
Il faut reconstruire pour les Tutsi pour qu'ils rentrent et vivent parmi les Hutu.                                    
 
Il faut faire rentrer tout le monde, quand on est séparé on est divisé.           
 
Il faut des réunions pour sensibiliser les gens. Et les citoyens, dans ces réunions, peuvent 
émettre leurs idées.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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Box 20. Good Governance 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Il faudrait que les politiciens des différents partis s'asseyent ensemble pour trouver des 
solutions durables aux problèmes burundais.                                
 
Il faut faire comprendre aux gens que la démocratie ne veut pas dire exclure les autres         
 
Les représentants (les élus) du peuple doivent mettre en avant la paix et la sécurité pour 
servir de modèles.  
 
Les autorités doivent réunir les gens de façon quotidienne pour la paix.                                     
 
Le chef de colline qui doit chercher la paix pour ses gens.                                   
 
Les autorités doivent renforcer les mesures de sécurité pour que tout le monde se sente à 
l'aise.  
 
Il faut que la société civile enseigne à la population comment vivre ensemble dans la paix.  
 
Les autorités supérieures qui doivent sensibiliser les déplacés et les Hutu à vivre ensemble.  
 
Il faut des projets de lutte contre la pauvreté et c'est le gouvernement qui peut nous aider.  
 
Les autorités doivent éviter la politique divisionniste.  
 
La concertation entre la population et les autorités collinaires.                             
 
L'enregistrement sur les listes des bénéficiaires des aides de façon juste et équitable .  
 
La responsabilité d'unir tous les Burundais incombe aux autorités actuelles.                             
 
Les autorités doivent éviter le favoritisme dans la distribution des aides aux habitants.                                
 
Il faudrait que tous les Burundais puissent comprendre qu'ils sont tous égaux.                                
 
Il faut que les autorités et surtout les gens instruits cessent de semer les divisions.                                 
 
Les hautes autorités sont la source de la cohabitation pacifique et il faut qu'elles s'entendent 
et il y aura une cohabitation pacifique.                     
 
Le gouvernement doit faire de l'unité sont mot d'ordre.  
 
La stabilité politique dans le pays et l'entente au niveau politique.                                  
 
L'entente au niveau des politiciens (partage du pouvoir).                            
 
C'est le président qui est capable d'augmenter la cohabitation pacifique.                            
 
Il faut que nos dirigeants servent de modèles et réunissent les gens pour discuter de la paix.                                                                                           
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We have explained in the previous sections that our ordinary peasant interlocutors are tempted not to 
venture  into  a  process  dealing  with  the  past,  transitional  justice  as  it  is  commonly  defined  and 
understood. They prefer not to dig up what once was and is rotting. They chose not to bring the stone 
that was buried to the surface again. This opinion is partly based on a sincere conviction, partly on the 
consequence of a widespread awareness that many obstacles are currently blocking a fruitful initiation 
of a process that deals with the past. As we have shown there is also a desire that the ones most 
responsible  for  the  past  crimes  are  held  accountable.  But  there  is  a  strong  urge  to  facilitate 
reconciliation, communal-ritual activities of re-integration, honouring and dialogue as well as a strong 
conviction to pardon. These should especially take place at the local level between ordinary people. 
 
The  findings  presented  in  this  section  came  further  to  qualify  these  expectations  of 
ordinary Burundians. In the first place the transitional justice process has been situated in a broader 
perspective. Issues of good governance and socio-economic development are considered to be more 
important  than  a  transitional  justice  approach  as  understood  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  word. 
Secondly, there is on the vertical axis – the connection with the state and power – a desire to continue 
a transformation of the structures of power that underly the domains of the economy, security and 
justice. In sum social justice is as important as transitional justice narrowly defined. Horizontally there 
is  the need  to facilitate between ordinary  people not  only their cohabitation  but  also  their  coming 
together again. While cohabitation has a minimalistic connotation (it is no more than not killing each 
other), actually bringing together what has fallen apart or is torn asunder is a process that goes much 
deeper. There is an awareness that this is a very difficult process. It is a process that needs to be 
facilitated in the opinion of our peasant interlocuters. But they have a very specific understanding of 
how this can be done based on their view of the world, their customary practices and the “social 
imaginary” that dominates rural life. 
 
The sharing of food and drinks, ceremonies of conviviality and the exchange of gifts are 
important signs of positive social relations. Mutual help in general and in case of distress or general 
collaboration between people, as well as greeting each other on pathways or neighbourly visits are 
considered to be signs of good social cohesion as well. These signs might seem evident or banal from 
the perspective of an outsider but what one labels as “reconciliation” is rooted in the ambiguities of 
local life. Dealing with the violence of the past and preventing a recurrence in the future is interwoven 
in the web of tightly knit face-to-face communities, difficult to understand from the perspective of an 
outsider used to different preconceived categories of what is taken for granted. 
 
The cohabitation that started after the period of violence and war at the local level was 
initially marked by fear. Out of necessity life returned to a form of normality and cohabitation. Daily life 
in the hills of Burundi is highly pragmatic. During discussion groups the participants often refered to 
the ‘heart’ when talking about the events of the past and expressing the nature and level of trust and 
confidence they have in their neighbours, fellow villagers or members of the other ethnic group (see 
box  21).    The  heart  is  the  force  unifying  the  human  being.  Emotions,  thoughts  and  will  are 
interconnected and unified in the heart. Due to the violence experienced in their midst ‘the hearts have 
changed’. The heart has changed because of the crimes committed, the violence experienced or the 
dehumanising acts observed.  
 
We have previously referred to the fact that the notion Ubushingantahe has a connection 
with the word umutima, heart or spirit. In a more general sense the change of heart thus also refers to  
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the  fact  that  the  values  that  once  invigorated  society  have  changed.  Living  conditions,  the  social 
universe and daily interactions have developed into a form of normality again after decades of crisis 
and upheaval but the outward appearance of normality reveals little about someone’s heart.  
 
Daily actions and interactions have become a way of dealing with the past either in a 
positive or negative sense: the crossing on the pathway to the fields, the offer and sharing of banana 
beer, a fair deal in the conflict with a neighbour, the invitation to a wedding or the helping hand when 
transporting a sick person to the hospital may be catalysts in restructuring relationships. Meanwhile 
accusations of witchcraft, threats or suspicions of poisoning, exclusion from participation in a decision-
making  procedure,  the  (interpretation  of  the)  blink  of  an  eye,  the  failure  to  invite  someone  to  a 
ceremony,  favouritism in  the  resolution  of a  quarrel  are enough to  increase  distrust  and reinforce 
existing prejudices. Exploring these practices is a means of inspecting the humanity of oneself and the 
other crystallized in the heart. It engages with perennial values torn apart by the crisis, the violence. 
 
Dealing with the past from the perspective of an ordinary Burundian peasant, the large 
majority of the population, seems to mean the facilitation of “a change of the heart” when considering 
the interpersonal perspective. At the societal level it means a revitalization of the values of Burundian 
culture and at the macro-political level it means an inclusion and integration of all segments of society 
with powerholders operating in the service of the many instead of the few. Taking an inside (emic) 
perspective,  it  somehow  means  the  revitalization  of  the  set  of  values  referred  to  by  the  notion 
Ubushingantahe., understood here in the sense of the perennial, almost universal values embedded in 
Burundian society. It does not necessarily refer to the Bashingantahe counsels. The latter are only 
temporary in nature and, as we have shown, therefore to a certain extent perverted by the influence of 
the  power  structures  and  social  conditions  that  marked  the  subsequent  time  periods  they  lived 
through. As we have explained, most of the literature refers to the Ubushingantahe as an institution of 
social  values.  Manarikazi  refers  to  the  fact  that  these  values  might  be  the  equivalent  of  the 
contemporary and western notion of “good governance”37. Laely refers to the notion of the “heart” 
(umutima)  when discussing  the personal  virtues  needed  as  a  prerequisite to  become  an  invested 
Umushingantahe.  The  existing  Bashingantahe  as  well  as  any  ordinary  Burundian  will  have  to 
reintegrate  these  values  in  their  daily  practices.38  This  can  not  be  decreed  through  legal  texts, 
rehabilitation operations focusing on detached nation level counsels or policies imposing changes top-
down through social engineering. It can only be facilitated by adopting a carefully designed approach. 
 
It is evident that more general socio-economic and typical development related initiatives 
can  facilitate  these  expectations.  With  a  more  strict  focus  on  the  transitional  justice  options  for 
Burundi, the findings suggests the absolute need to take these popular expectations and objectives 
into account in the design and practice of the mechanisms envisioned to deal with the past in Burundi. 
The stipulation of the transitional justice objectives and the design of the mechanisms not only need to 
be informed by the expectations of ordinary Burundians, they also need to be impregnated by the 
wisdom of the peasantry in order to produce the desired outcomes. This is no plea for impunity or 
amnesty.  A  specifically  designed  commission  –  genre  truth  and  reconciliation  commission  – 
complemented by an institution establishing some sort of accountability at some point in time – genre 
                                                              
37 Manirakiza, Zénon (2007), “La Justice Transitionelle pour la Paix Sociale. Le Système Bashingantahe au 
Burundi”  
38 Kohlhagen makes a similar point. Kohlhagen, Dominik (2008), Le Tribunal Face au Terrain. Les Problèmes 
d’Exécution des Jugements au Mugamba dans une Perspective Juridique et Anthropologique, Bujumbura, RCN 
Justice & Démocratie, p.  P139  
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special tribunal - might be part of such a process, if taking place in conjunction with sufficient attention 
for non-judicial and grassroots initiatives. It also means important attention should be paid to timing 
and  sequencing  and  issues  of  complementarity  between  approaches.  We  provided  some 
recommendations in that regard in the introduction of this report.  
 
And it means that mechanisms adopted and initiatives undertaken should not introduce 
logics that diametrally oppose the existing social dynamics and the popular expectations. The globally 
dominating  transitional  justice  approaches  but  also  the  way  they  are    envisioned  for  Burundi  are 
overtly legalistic. The impact of the modernization of the Gacaca court system in Rwanda has in the 
meantime  revealed  the  effect  emerging  when  a  logic  is  introduced  that  runs  counter  to  existing 
practices and popular expectations.39 Before the state-sanctioned installation of the Gacaca courts, 
popular  practices  and  narratives  show  that  the  past  was  primarily  tacitly  explored  without  much 
discursive content. The Gacaca courts substantially altered this non-discursive process of cohabitation 
due to the introduction of a logic of prosecution in the midst of a peasant society. The forensic ‘truth’ 
had to be spoken in a process where (ethnic) groups approached each other in an antagonistic way: 
“us vs. them”.  As a consequence, prosecution and forensic ‘truth’-telling (who, where, when, with 
whom) replaced non-discursive activities to deal with the past and became an important pre-requisite 
to re-establish social relationships and to evolve towards interpersonal reconciliation. Local dynamics - 
the power of the gun, the number, money or authority - came to pervert the procedures and thus also 
the outcomes.  
 
What the Gacaca process in Rwanda facilitated for some disturbed or destroyed it for 
many. The arrival of Gacaca created an overall “crisis”,  a tension worsening social cohesion and 
attitudes (prejudices) towards the ‘other group’ – a crisis due to a clash between an imposed Western 
model  with  forensic  ‘truth’-telling  as  cornerstone  on  the  one  hand  and  different  communication 
principles and popular practices informed by socio-cultural sensibilities on the other. It is, therefore, 
even more important in the case of Burundi to take the existing practices, popular expectations and 
socio-cultural sensibilities into account challenging the Western approaches taken for granted. As a 
Hutu peasant formulates it: “the truth will appear in the gestures, in the act of sharing”.  
 
                                                              
39 Waldorf, L. (2006), “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice”, Temple 
Law Review, Vol. 79, N° 1. Brouneus, K. 2008, ‘Truth-telling as talking cure? Insecurity and retraumatization in the 
Rwandan Gacaca courts’, Security Dialogue, 39, 1: 55-76. Buckley-Zistel, S. 2005. ‘‘The truth heals?’ Gacaca 
jurisdictions and the consolidation of peace in Rwanda’, Die Friedens-Warte, 80, 1-2: 1-17. Buckley-Zistel, S. 
2006. ‘Remembering to forget. Chosen amnesia as a strategy for local coexistence in post-genocide Rwanda’, 
Africa, 76, 2: 131-150. Burnet, J.E. 2008. ‘The injustice of local justice: truth, reconciliation and revenge in 
Rwanda,’ Genocide Studies and Prevention, 3, 2: 173-193.  Rettig, M. 2008. ‘Gacaca: Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?” African Studies Review, 51, 3: 25-50. Ingelaere, B. (2008). ‘The gacaca 
courts in Rwanda’, in L. Huyse & M. Salter, eds. Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms After Violent 
Conflict: learning from African experiences. Stockholm: International Idea, 25-60.  Ingelaere, B. (2009), “Does the 
Truth Pass across the Fire without Burning? Locating the Short Circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts”, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 47, N°  4.  
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Box 21. A Change of Heart 
 
Q. Vous parlez entre vous de ce qui s’est passé en 1988 ? 1. On parle de ça mais on commence à 
rigoler parce qu’on se demande comment tuait un autre. 1. C’est venu du cœur des gens.3. C’est le 
Satan qui est allé dans les cœurs des gens. C’est comme dans la Bible. FGD, Kirundo Province, 
Commune Ntega, 26 March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 45; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (3) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 40; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 62; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 42. 
 
5. Qu’est ce qu’on peut faire. Les gens qui reviennent de l’exil disent qu’ils ont été en exil à cause 
des Tutsi. Comment cette haine  peut –elle disparaître  dans les cœurs des gens? FGD, Bururi 
Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, 39; (2) peasant, male, 
Tutsi, 72; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, 52; (4) teacher, male, Tutsi, 40; (5) peasant, female, Tutsi, 
44; (6) peasant, female, Tutsi, 67; (7) peasant, female, Tutsi, 40. 
 
 Q. Où organiser ce genre de rencontre ? 1. Ce problème est délicat, le criminel ne va pas aller 
devant la victime pour lui demander pardon. « IMITIMA Y’ABARUNDI NTIYOROSHE = les cœurs 
des Burundaisne sont pas tendres », il faut installer des commissions qui vont visiter les gens qui 
ont perdu les leurs pendant les différentes crises, les victimes vont dénoncer les criminels et la 
commission va mettre en confrontation les victimes et leurs bourreaux. Ici, la crise de 1972 a été 
« AGAHOMERAMUNWA = inqualifiable », mais les crimes étaient commis en pleine journée, ce 
n’était pas pendant la nuit, on connaît ceux qui ont commis des crimes. Si une telle commission est 
installée,  on  peut  pardonner  après  l’aveu.  FGD,  Mwaro  Province,  Commune  Bisoro,  30  April 
2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, Umushingantahe, 64; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 46; (4) peasant, female, Hutu, 51; (5) peasant, female, Hutu, 38; (6) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 56.  
 
1. Les gens ne vivent plus en entente, il y a eu une mésentente et l’économie en partie. 2. Les cœurs 
des gens ont changé, nous avons vu beaucoup d’événements.5. Par exemple, pour nous qui étions 
jeunes, nous avons été traumatisés parce que nous avons vu. 2. Il y a des Tutsi qui sont traumatisés 
à cause de ce qu’ils ont vécu. FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 12 April 2008; (1) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 70; (2) peasant, male, Hutu, 40; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 48; (4) peasant, male, 
Hutu, 67; (5) peasant, male, Hutu, 30.  
 
Q. Qui/comment organiser ce dialogue ? 8. Les problèmes se trouvent au niveau des autorités 
qui ne viennent pas pour sensibiliser. Autrement, les gens pouvaient vivre ensemble. Ici, c’est 
comme  s’il n’y a pas de pouvoir, les parlementaires, le gouverneur, l’administrateur ne viennent 
pas.7.  Le  pardon  vient  du  cœur.  Même  celui  pour  qui  on  n’a  pas  tué  les  gens,  il  peut  être 
mécontent. Le cœur des gens est ….Les rapatriés pensent que les Tutsi sont mauvais et les Tutsi 
pensent  que  les  rapatriés  sont  mauvais.  Il  faut  les  sensibiliser.  8.  Il  y  a  un  proverbe 
burundais « UMWERA UVUYE I  BUKURU  BUCA    WAKWIRIYE  HOSE »=LA CHARITE  QUI  VIENT 
D’EN HAUT SE REPAND PARTOUT. » 5. Si les autorités venaient, les gens vont faire ce qu’ils disent. 
Ils vont se parler etc. 
Q. C'est-à-dire qu’actuellement, il y a encore la méfiance ? 7. Oui, ce n’est pas visible, mais on le 
remarque durant les paroles. Le problème des Burundais, c’est qu’on n’extériorise pas l’émotion. 
FGD, Bururi Province, Commune Rumonge, 23 April 2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 86; (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (4) peasant, male, Hutu, 70; (5) peasant, 
male, Hutu, 52; (6)  member hill councel, male, Hutu, 62; (7) peasant, female, Hutu, 54; (8) 
trader & Umushingantahe, male, 57; (9) mechanic &  hill administrator, male, Hutu, 40. 
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ANNEX 1: COMMUNITY HISTORIES 
 




Q. Alors qu’est ce qui s’était passé en 1972 ?  
 
2. En 1972, on voulait tuer les Tutsi. J’avais un 
voisin qui a été tué par balle, ces    enfants 
même ont été tués par des copains. 
 
Q.  Ça  a  commencé  comment ?  C’était  quoi 
l’origine ? 
 
3.  Il  y  avait  une  réunion  de  la  population  à 
RUMONGE dirigé par le Ministre de … . 5. Ils 
ont  tous  torturé,  on  a  coupé  lem  édecin  en 
disant : « Tu peux te soigner ». l’intérieur. A la 
fin de la réunion, tous ces gens là-bas étaient 
armés,  la  guerre  a  commencé  là-bas  à 
RUMONGE. Ils ont commencé à massacrer les 
Tutsi.  Quand  les  autorités  qui  rentraient  à 
BURURI  arrivaient  à MUTAMBARO,  ils  ont 
trouvé  une  barrière  sur  la  route, 
l’Administrateur,  les  Juges  et  le Médecin 
étaient cachés par un arabe. Les paysans ont 
attaqué  cette  maison.  Ils  ont  demandé  de 
donner ces gens autrement il était tué. Il l’ a 
fait et ils ont été tous tués, c’étaient des Tutsi. 
 
Q. Cette réunion, c’était pour quel objectif ? 
 
5. C’était une réunion de sécurité. Il y avait des 
rumeurs de guerre. Le Ministre   disait : « Tu as 
des machettes, mais nous avons des fusils. » 
 
Q. Ces rumeurs venaient d’où ? 
 
3. Je pense qu’il y avait quelques personnes 
qui connaissaient le secret de cette guerre. Les 
paysans  ne  savaient  rien.  Il  y  avait  un 
Administrateur  de  NYANZA-LAC  du  nom  de 
Thomas.  Au  début  de  la  crise,  il  a  fui.  Mais 
après, le gouvernement l’a cherché en exil. Le  
gouvernement  a  dit  de  libérer  les  biens  de 
Thomas  parce  que  Thomas  avait  révélé  le 
HUTU 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé ici en 1972 ? 
 
4. On a appelé les gens pour aller dans une 
réunion  à  RUMONGE.  Et  la  guerre  a 
commencé là-bas. Ils sont revenus en courant. 
On  a  tout  abandonné.  Ils  sont  allés  en 
TANZANIE.  Ils  ont  passé  30  ans.  Mais  ces 
terres sont occupées. 
 
Q. Quand est-ce qu’on avait cette réunion ? 
 
Tous :  Le  29  avril.  C’était  avec  des  ministres 
venus  de  BUJUMBURA.  C’était  une            
réunion de sécurité. 
 
Q. Avant, il n’y avait rien de spécial ici ? 
 
7.  Au  cours  de  1965,  on  a  eu  aussi  des  
troubles. On avait recensé les gens qui avaient 
fait  des  études  ou  qui  avaient  de  l’argent. 
Aussi sur la Colline ici. En 1968-1969, on est 
venu  ici  encore  pour  arrêter  les  gens.  On 
arrêtait  les  étudiants  et  on  les  tuait  dans  la 
prison. Après ce désordre, il y avait un mauvais 
climat entre les ethnies. Alors en 1972, comme 
il  y  avait  des  gens  qui  étaient  en  exil  et 
d’autres restés ici, alors le 29 avril, il y avait la 
guerre  ici  et  à  BUJUMBURA.  Avant  c’était 
calme ici. 
 
Q. En 1965, ça a été fait par qui ? 
 
6.  Il  y  avait  une  jeep  et  le  Commissaire 
militaire qui avait une liste est venue. 3. On 
avait aussi des habitants Tutsi, mais ils étaient 
peu nombreux. 5. Entre les gens ordinaires, il n 
’y  avait  pas  de  problèmes.6.  Les  simples 
paysans n’étaient pas un obstacle pour la paix. 
C’étaient des problèmes  entre les dirigeants. 
 
Q.  Et  1972  est  venu  comme  ça  dans  la  
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secret  de  la  guerre.  C’était  un  Hutu,  il  a  dit 
qu’il y avait quelque chose en train de se  
préparer. 
 
Q. Alors qui était entrain de se préparer ? 
 
3. On était entrain de préparer les massacres. 
Les  Hutu  se  préparaient  à  tuer  les  Tutsi.  La 
crise a commencé le 29 avril. On avait organisé 
des soirées partout pour que les gens puissent 
être surpris. 2. Ici, la réunion se faisait  chez un 
certain  BIYORE.  C’étaient  des  réunions  pour      
préparer les massacres des Tutsi. 
 
Q.  Mais  la  réunion  du  Ministre  était  pour 
calmer ou inciter la population ? 
 
4. Pour calmer suite aux rumeurs. 3. Même le 
Ministre n’a pas pu rentrer, aussi la voiture de 
la  radio  a  été  brûlée.  4.  Les  gens  étaient 
préparés,  même  si  le  Ministre  n’était  pas 
venu.  3.  C’était  préparé,  même  là  où  le 
Ministre  n’a  pas  passé,  à  NYANZA-LAC,  à    
VYAMBE, on a commencé alors. 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé ici ? 
 
2.  Quand  les  gens  sont  revenus,  ils  ont 
commercé à creuser des fosses pour enterrer      
les Tutsi. 3. Ils ont érigé la barrière. 
 
Q.  C’étaient  des  gens  d’ici,  ou  d’autres 
régions et pays ? 
 
5.  Les  gens  d’ici.  3.  D’ici.  2.  Ils  ont  pris  un 
camion et ils ont mis des gens avec des flèches 
etc. Pour aller à  Bujumbura. Ce camion a été 
arrêté par des militaires et brûlés. 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé après ? 
 
3. Les militaires sont venus en intervention et 
les gens ont pris la fuite. Ils ont dit aux gens de 
rester calme, mais les gens n’ont pas suivi les 
ordres. Ils ont même attaqué des véhicules  
militaires. 
 
Q. Après le calme est revenu ? 
3. Ils avaient commencé à attaquer le 29. Vers 
réunion. 
 
6. Il y avait des rumeurs. Il y avait un plan au 
niveau des hauts dirigeants pour   diminuer le 
nombre des Hutu. 5. Avant cette crise, le petit 
paysan ne savait pas ce qui se passait. Mais les     
commerçants et les éduqués savaient de quoi 
il  s’agissait.  5.  Dans  cette  réunion,  on  disait 
qu’on avait entendu qu’on voulait s’entretuer 
et  on  disait  qu’on  devait  laisser  ces  tueries. 
Quand  on  disait  ça,  c’est  qu’ils  avaient  déjà 
planifié  parce  que  les  massacres  ont 
commencé  le  soir  même.De  retour  de 
RUMONGE,  on  a  trouvé  des  barrières  sur  la 
route pour monter ici. 1-3 : Sur cette barrière, 
il y avait des gens d’ici mais aussi des autres 
venus d’autres          régions. On ne pouvait pas 
les remarquer, ils étaient couverts de bananes. 
5. Comme il y avait ce mauvais climat depuis 
1965, ça vient de là. 6. C’était une  sorte de 
récolte populaire. 
7. En réalité, c’étaient des Hutu qui voulaient 
attaquer les Tutsi. Le 29 Avril, ce sont  les Hutu 
qui ont attaqué. Le 30, les Tutsi ont organisé 
une  contre-attaque.  Le  1  mai,  il  y  a  eu  une 
attaque  des  militaires  du  gouvernement 
appuyé  par  les  troupes  congolaises  de 
MUBUTU  qui  voulaient  éviter  que  les  Hutu 
attaquent son pays. Les Congolais avaient des 
avions.  Les  gens  qui  ont  attaqué  le  29 
n’étaient  pas  des  Burundais.  Ils  ne  parlaient 
pas le Kirundi, c’étaient des mercenaires. 
 
Q. Mais il n’avait rien à faire avec 1965 ? 
 
7. En 1965, il y avait des gens qui avaient fui le 
pays.  Et  en  1968-1969  aussi,  ils  sont    venus 
avec ces mercenaires. 1-2-3 : Oui, c’est vrai. 
 
Q. Alors le 3 mai, il y avait cette attaque des 
Congolais, qu’est ce qui s’est passé ? 
 
 
6.  Pas  de  distinction  ethnique.  Avec  ces  a 
vions, on tuait tout le monde, Hutu et Tutsi. 
Pas  de  distinction.  Heureusement,  ils  ont 
seulement passé une journée ici. 
 
Q.  Tous  ces  problèmes,  est  ce  que  c’était  
Living Together Again   IOB Working Paper / 2009.06 - 125 
The Expectation of Transitional Justice in Burundi 
   
le 10 mai, il y a eu une loi présidentielle que 
tout individu qui n’était pas revenu avant le 29 
mai  1972  n’aura  plus  droit  à  sa  maison  et 
terre.Il y a quelques paysans qui sont revenus 
dans le pays. Des gens en TANZANIE, tout près 
de  NYANZA-LAC  ont  continué  à  attaquer  le 
pays. Les prêtres ont essayé de les convaincre 
d’arrêter, mais ils ont été tués. 
 
Q.  Est-ce  qu’il  y  avait  des  Congolais 
impliqués ? 
3. Il y avait des Congolais de l’ethnie BABEMBE 
qui  vivaient  ici  qui  ont  aidé  ces  Hutu  à 
massacrer les Tutsi. 
 
Q. Vous connaissez les Mulelistes ? 
3. Non, pas de Mulele ici. Mais ces gens d’ici 
quand  ils  attaquent,  les  autres  disaient :      
« Mai-Mulele ».  2.  Parce  que  les  Mulele 
étaient entrain de se battre au Congo et les 
gens d’ici   s’entendaient bien avec les Mulele. 
 
Q. Mais à la fin, ce sont des gens d’ici qui ont 
commencé ? 
2-4 :  Oui,  ce  sont  les  gens  d’ici.  4.  C’était 
même ici que la guerre était féroce. Les grands 
combattants étaient     originaires d’ici. 
3. Ici, il y avait beaucoup de richesse. C’était 
une guerre nationale et les gens d’ici étaient 
les  premiers  à  répondre.  Ils  disaient : «Nous 
sommes  capables  de  répondre,  nous  avons 
beaucoup d’argent ». 3. Il y avait beaucoup de 
protestants ici. Eux étaient  très efficaces. Les 
gens  des  autres  églises  n’étaient  pas  au 
c.ourant.  Ils  ne  boivent  pas  d’alcool.  Ils 
peuvent garder un secret. On avait peur que 
ceux qui boivent de l’alcool peuvent livrer le 
secret. 
 
FGD,  Bururi  Province,  Commune  Rumonge,  23 
April  2008;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  39;  (2) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, 72; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, 
52;  (4)  teacher,  male,  Tutsi,  40;  (5)  peasant, 
female, Tutsi, 44; (6) peasant, female, Tutsi, 67; 
(7) peasant, female, Tutsi, 40. 
aussi à cause de la richesse d’ici ? 
 
6.  Il  y  a  une  relation.  Il  y  a  une  raison 
economique derrière. Ici, on tuait les Hutu et 
les  Tutsi.  Ici,  c’était  une  région  très  riche, 
même à BUJUMBURA, on nous respectait. 
 
Q. Avant 1972, on faisait quoi comme …. ? 
 
5. Il y avait toutes les plantes, café, bananiers, 
palmiers,  tous  les  fruits.  On  vendait  la     
production pour gagner de l’argent. 
 
Q.  Alors  après  l’attaque  des  Congolais,  les 
gens ont pris la fuite vers la TANZANIE ? 
 
6. Comme il y avait ce plan d’exterminer les 
gens, les militaires ont continué à     massacrer 
les gens. Il y avait des positions militaires et les 
gens  ont  pris  la  fuite.  Tous :  La  guerre  a 
commencé  un  samedi  et  beaucoup  de  gens 
ont pris la fuite la semaine suivante.3-7 : Avec 
le régime de BAGAZA, beaucoup de gens sont 
revenus ici, les gens revenus durant BAGAZA 
ont  pu  regagner  leur  terre.  3.  Mais  après  la 
mort de NDADAYE, ils ont encore perdu leur 
terre.  Dans  la  courte  période  que  NDADAYE 
était au pouvoir, il avait ordonné de redonner 
la terre aux propriétaires. Mais ils ont repris 
après. 5. Je ne suis pas mécontente de ces  
gens parce que c’est l’Etat qui a donné. L’Etat 









FGD,  Bururi  Province,  Commune  Rumonge,  23 
April  2008;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  86;  (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 57; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 
60;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  70;  (5)  peasant, 
male, Hutu, 52; (6)  member hill councel, male, 
Hutu,  62;  (7)  peasant,  female,  Hutu,  54;  (8) 
trader  &  Umushingantahe,  male,  57;  (9) 
mechanic &  hill administrator, male, Hutu, 40. 
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Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé ici ? 
 
5. En 1988, on a eu des troubles ici. Les Hutu 
ont commencé à tuer les Tutsi. Depuis cette 
période, beaucoup de gens ne sont pas rentrés 
chez eux. En 1993, ceux qui étaient rentrés ont 
été chassés de nouveau. 
 
Q.  Tu as  dit  que les Hutu  ont commencé  à 
tuer  les  Tutsi.  Qu’est  ce  qui  s’est  passé     
exactement ? 
 
4.  Le  15  Août  1988,  la  guerre  a  commencé. 
Mais depuis le 13 Août, il y avait un militaire 
de MWENDO, il était venu en vacances. Quand 
il rentrait chez lui, il a été attaqué et tué à la 
machette dans la vallée, mais il n’est pas mort. 
Il  s’est  caché  dans  la  brousse  et  était 
gravement  blessé.  C’était  le  13.  Le  14,  le 
lendemain, à MONGI, on a tué une femme et 
sa fille qui étaient à la maison parce que les 
garçons  avaient  fui.  Le  15,  un  lundi,  ils  ont 
attaqué  le  propriétaire  de  cette  maison, 
comme il était riche, ils voulaient aussi piller. 
Ce  jour,  dans  les  deux  Communes,  on  a 
commencé  à  brûler  toutes  les  maisons  des 
Tutsi. 
 
Q. Pourquoi est- ce qu’on avait attaqué cette 
dame ? 
 
4. On ne sait pas pourquoi. Mais les garçons 
avaient pris fuite. Il y avait un certain temps 
que  ces  gens  parlaient  de  ce  qui  allait  se 
passer.  Un  certain  RUCANA,  commerçant 
dirigeait des réunions pour inciter les Hutu. 7. 
Pour  inciter  les  Hutu  à  tuer.  Il  y  avait  aussi 
d’autres groupes avec des agronomes et des    
enseignants. 
 




Q. Comment était la vie ici durant les années 
1980 ? 
 
4.  Dans  les  années  80,  la  situation  était 
mauvaise. Depuis les années 1970, les HUTU 
étaient  persécutés,  pas  de  droit  pour  parler 
pour  les  Hutu,  les  autorités  se  succédaient 
mais aucun Hutu parmi les hautes autorités. 
Dans ces années on a eu beaucoup de mort 
surtout  des  Hutus  parce  que  le  Tutsi 
dirigeaient. 5. Actuellement il y a la justice et 
tout le monde peut s’exprimer librement. En 
1988, les Tutsi ont été très malins ils ont dit 
aux Hutu d’aller se mettre quelque part pour 
assurer la sécurité et on prenait quelques uns 
pour les tuer. 
 
Q. Ça a commencé quand? 
 
1. Le 15 août 1988. C’était bien préparé. 3. Il y 
avait de la bière et viande pour fêter réparer 
par  Reverien  HARUSHINGORO  surnommé  «  
BUGABOBWIGABA=  pour  dire  qu’il  faisait  ce 
qu’il  voulait  dans  toute  la  commune ».  1.  Il 
était  commerçant  au  centre  de  NTEGA, 
originaire de MANIZA. Il se comportait  comme 
«  NKAYICA = une vache enragée ». Il ne parlait 
à personne et personne ne pouvait lui parler. 
2. Très tôt le matin du 15 août, Reverien a tué 
quelqu’un  avec  un  fusil.  Alors  toute  la 
commune est allée voir le monsieur qui tuait. 
Ce sont les Hutu évidemment, quand les gens 
sont arrivés là-bas, les gens ont commencé à 
tirer  à  travers  la  fenêtre.  Les  gens  ont 
commencé  à  lancer  des  pierres  jusqu’  à  17 
heures.  Après la maison a été brûlée et il est 
mort  à  l’intérieur.  3.  Avant  cette  date,  il 
montait  des  signes  qu’il  allait  préparer 
quelque chose. Il y avait un autre  commerçant 
Hutu  en  concurrence  avec  lui  du  nom 
BUCANA. Ce Reverien avait envie de récupérer  
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commerçants ? 
 
4.  Sur  la  Colline  de  MWENDO,  il  y  avait 
beaucoup de Tutsi. Ensemble avec les Hutu de 
MARANGARA,  on  venait  piller  chez  les 
commerçants.  7.  Et  l’agronome  a  distribué 
l’essence pour brûler les maisons. 6. Ils sont 
venus ici. On a essayé de ….la porte, on a mis 
l’essence  sur  les  tôles.  Reverien  a  quitté  la 
maison  et  on  a  transporté  vers  une  autre 
maison  avec  les  enfants  pour  être  tué.  Ici, 
c’était le magasin. Il a été brûlé dans la maison 
d’habitation.  1.  Comme  il  avait  une  maison 
solide, beaucoup de Tutsi a pris la fuite vers là-
bas pour prendre refuge. Et ils ont tué les gens 
là-bas aussi. 6. Après, la guerre a affecté toute 
la  Colline.  Les  gens  mourraient  sur  leurs 
collines.  1.  Les  ménages  des  Tutsi  étaient 
dispersés.  On  attaquait  dans  de  différents 
endroits.6.  ils  avaient  des  chiens  pour 
attaquer.  7.  L’intervention  est  venue  tard 
parce  que  la  police  était  tuée.  On  avait  pris 
fuite  et  les  ponts  étaient  coupés.  7.  J’étais 
militaire. Je suis venu ici et je voyais que ça 
n’allait pas ici. Alors, je voulais transféré ma 
famille à KIRUNDO mais mon père a dit qu’il y 
avait  pas  de  problème.  Alors  après,  j’ai  pris 
fuite. Quand j’étais en vacances, j’étais dans le 
6ème bataillon commando. 
 
Q. Ça a duré combien de jours ? 
 
4.  Les  militaires  sont  venus  mardi.  Mais  les 
ponts  étaient  détruits  et  les  arbres  étaient 
coupés     sur la route. Ça prenait du temps 
pour réparer. 6. A NTEGA, ils sont venus une 
semaine après. Mais dans les autres Collines, 
ça a duré une semaine. 1. On a dû utiliser des 
hélicoptères pour chasser les gens. 3. Quand 
on voyait les militaires, les gens cachés sont 
sortis et les Hutu les ont tué en prenant fuite 
vers le RWANDA. 3. Quand les militaires sont 
venus,  les  Hutu  pensaient  que  c’étaient  les 
leurs. Le Colonel a dit qu’il faut arrêter de tuer 
et ils ont commencé à tirer sur eux avec des 
flèches.  Les  paysans  Hutu  pensaient  que  les 
militaires  rwandais  pourraient  venir  au 
secours.    7.  Alors  quand  ils  attendaient  les 
coups de fusils, ils pensaient qu’ils sont venus 
les  biens.  C’est  à  partir  de  ces  deux  que  la 
division  entre  les  groupes  ethniques  est 
venue. Avant le 15, personne ne passait la nuit 
à l’intérieur de la maison parce qu’il avait des 
groupuscules  qui  s’organisaient  pour 
exterminer  les  Hutus.  1.  On  ne  voulait  pas 
rester à la maison parce que on savait ce qui 
c’était passé avec les Hutus en 1972. Tous : On 
était  ici  en  1972.  4.  En  1972,  tout  Hutu  qui 
avait  une  belle  aison  était  arrêté  en  disant 
qu’on collaborait avec l’ennemi. En 1988, les 
Hutu disaient qu’ils avaient assez et la guerre 
avait explosé comme ça. 
 
Q. Qui a organisé en 1972 ? 
  
1. Tous les militaires ici en 1972 étaient des 
Tutsis.  3.  Depuis  longtemps  le  pouvoir  était 
dans les mains des Tutsis. Le conseiller et les 
adjoints étaient  des Tutsis. Ils écrivaient des 
rapports et on identifiait les gens on les tuait. 
Les enseignants étaient tués devant les élèves 
et  on  disait  que  c’était  des  malfaiteurs  qui 
avaient pillé les biens de l’Etat. 1. On tuait les 
gens à VUMBI. On les mettait dans la voiture 
pour être tués la-bà. 
 
Q. Qu’est-ce qui c’est passé après, en 1988 ? 
 
4. En 1988, le plan de 1972 continuait  ncore. 
Quand  les  Hutu  se  développaient  en     
construisant  une  belle  maison  ils  étaient 
accusés d’avoir pillé l’Etat.     Alors en 1988 les 
Hutu  étaient  devenus  intelligent  « BARI 
BAMAZE GUCA AKENGE » 1. « IGITI KIGUKOZE 
MUJISHO KABIRI KIBA GISHAKA KURIMENA = 
Si une     branche d’arbre te touche dans l’œil 
deux fois, elle cherche à le briser ».3. À partir 
de là, la guerre ethnique a éclaté ici. Dès le 
moment  qu’il a tué  la première personne  le 
matin, on a commencé à attaquer les gens sur 
les collines et on est allé chez lui. BUCANA a 
fuit le 15 mais les Tutsi l’ont poursuivi en moto 
jusqu’à Bujumbura. 
 
Q. Comment était la situation sur la colline le 
15 août ? 
 
3. « NTAWUTERA ICUMU MWICUMI = on ne  
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pour  …..  Ce  sont  les  gens  de  1972  qui  sont 
venus  faire  la  sensibilisation  ici  venant  du 
RWANDA. Alors comme ça ils pensaient que le 
RWANDA  allait  …….4.  Depuis  1987,  on 
entendait qu’il y avait des burundais venu du 
RWANDA  pour  sensibiliser.3.  Il  y  avait  [4 
noms]  qui  faisaient  des  réunions  chez  […]. 
BUCANA avait une voiture, c’est lui qui circuler 
pour faire venir les gens. Ce sont eux qui ont 
circulé  le  15  pour  dire  aux  Hutu  de 
commencer.  C’étaient  des  burundais  qui 
vivaient  ici.  Les  gens  venus  du  RWANDA 
allaient chez eux pour sensibiliser.  4. Après la 
mort  des  Tutsi,  on  a  écrit  sur  les  maisons 
PALIPEHUTU UBU = (Inconnu    maintenant).4-




Q.  Vous  pensez  que  les  Hutu  ont  perdu 
aussi ? 
 
Tous :  Eh?  4.  Beaucoup  ont  fui  vers  le 
RWANDA. Ceux qui sont restés ici ont pillé les 
biens d’autres. 7. Non, pas de Hutu morts. 
4. Oui, il y en a. En 1988, on a eu des morts. 
1. En 1994, on a eu des morts. 4. En 1994, les 
Tutsi  étaient  à  BUSONI  ou  à  KIRUNDO.  Le 
gouverneur originaire d’ici nous a mis dans des 
véhicules pour revenir ici. On nous a installé 
dans des sites ici. On a commencé à avoir des 
aides. On a un groupe de jeunes qui ont tué un 
comptable de la Commune qui était Tutsi. Les 
Tutsi d’ici se sont vengés pour tuer les Hutu 
aussi.  1.  Le  cabaret  où  était  le  comptable 
appartenait  au  IPJ,  un  ……..  On  a  lancé  la 
grenade qui a     tué le comptable et blessé 
l’agronome. 4. En 1993 et 1988, on n’a pas eu 
des Hutu morts. 
(Silence) 4. Quand les militaires sont venus en 
1988,  les  militaires  ont  tué  les  paysans  qui 
avaient  des  lancés  et  des  flèches.  5.  Quand 
l’avion venait, on tirait avec des flèches en feu. 
4-7 : Même, on essayait d’attaquer des blessés 
avec des flèches et des petites houes. 
 
Q. Alors, les militaires se sont défendus ? 
 
7.  Les  militaires  ont  tiré  dans  la  foule  pour 
jette  pas  une  lance  dans  une  dizaine ».  On 
attaquait  les  Tutsi  aussi,  mais on  ne pouvait 
pas tous les tuer. 
 
Q. Ils sont morts ? 
 
Tous : Oui il y en a beaucoup qui ont été tué. 
 
Q. Par qui ? 
 
3. Par des Hutu. Si un Tutsi tombait dans un 
groupe de Hutu, il était tué. 6. Par après, des 
hélicoptères  sont  venus  de  Bujumbura  et  ils 
tuaient, aussi des militaires sont venus et ils 
demandaient s’il y avait un Tutsi parmi eux. On 
disait  d’aller  à  la  commune  pour  eux,  on 
mettait les Hutu dans une salle et on lançait 
une grenade. 
 
Q.  Quand  est-ce  que  les  militaires  et 
hélicoptère sont venus ? 
 
1. Le deuxième jour, le 17 vers 14h.    
1.  Nous,  on  était  caché  partout  dans  la 
brousse, on est allé se réfugier au Rwanda. 
6.  Il  y  avait  un  journaliste  à  la  radio,  un 
MUTAMA  Athanase  qui  disait  d’aller  et  fuir 
partout    surtout  dans  les  brousses  et  les 
bananiers, de ne pas laisser personne derrière 
car  « UWUSHAKA  KWICA  INDA  AHERA 
KUMUGI  =  celui  qui  veut  tuer  un  pou 
commence  par  son  œuf »,  tout  le  monde  a 
compris qu’on était menacé et on est allé au 
Rwanda.Maintenant, on ne peut plus fuir vers 
le Rwanda, on va fuir vers brigade l’armée est  
maintenant mélangé. Les Tutsi peuvent aller à 
la brigade, comme nous aussi. Nous avons des 




1. A 1988, les Tutsi voulaient exterminer les 
Hutu.  Quand  les  Hutu  ont  vu  qu’ils  allaient 
être attaqués, on a attaqué le premier. Mais 
quand ils ont vu qu’on ne pouvait pas tenir ils 
ont  pris fuite. C’est un Tutsi, Reverien qui a 
tiré sur les gens. Il avait l’habitude de tirer sur 
les gens et de piller les magasins. 
 Tous :  Au  mois  d’Août  vers  22h,  il  a  
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protéger  les  maisons  où  étaient  cachés  les 
femmes.4-7 : Non, on n’a pas eu beaucoup de 
morts  3.  Pour  pouvoir  sauver  un  garçon,  on 
devait  le  présenter  comme  une  fille.  C’est 
comme ça que je faisais. Les Hutu avaient dit 
qu’il fallait seulement les femmes et filles. Une 
femme enceinte était coupée pour voir s’il y 
avait  un  homme.  7.  Les  Hutu  qui  avaient 
épousé des femmes Tutsi devaient tuer leurs 
femmes et enfants. 
 
 
FGD,  Kirundo  Province,  Commune  Ntega,  28 
March  2008;  (1)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi, 
displaced,  36;  (2)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi, 
displaced,  84;  (3)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi, 
displaced, (4) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 36; 
(5)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  31;  (6) 
peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  displaced,  66;  (7) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 47; (8) peasant, 
female, Tutsi, displaced, 24. 
 
commencé à tirer sur les gens.2. Les Hutu ont 
dit :  Depuis  1972  ils  ont  l’habitude  de  nous 
tuer,  maintenant  c’est  fini.  Les  Hutu  ont 
commencé  en  tuant  les  gens  avec  des 
machettes. Mais l’armée est venue et on a pris 
fuite.  (2  –  5) :  Apres  les  coups  de  fusils,  les 








FGD,  Kirundo  Province,  Commune  Ntega,  26 
March  2008;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  58;  (2) 
peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (3) peasant, male, Hutu, 
49;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  57;  (5)  peasant, 
male, Hutu, 80; (6) peasant, male, Hutu, 40. 
 
 
Box 24. 1993: BUGENDANA 
TUTSI 
 
Q.  Qu’est-ce  qui  s’est  passé  en  1993, 




1.  Après  la  mort  de  NDADAYE,  les  Hutu  ont 
commencé à massacrer les Tutsi. 
4.  Même  les  Hutu  qui  n’étaient  pas  pour 
étaient  tués.  1.  Le  jour  de  la  mort  de 
NDADAYE, les Hutu ont commencé à tuer les 
Tutsi.  3.  Il  y  a  eu  plus  d’une  semaine  de 
massacre,  même  ceux  qui  fuyaient,  on  les 
poursuivait. 1. Dans certaines Communes cela 
a duré plus de deux semaines. Les massacres 
se sont arrêtés  après l’arrivée des militaires. 
Les militaires n’étaient pas nombreux, ils ont 
commencé par protéger ceux qui étaient dans 
les  sites,  mais  ceux  qui  étaient  dans  les 
endroits reculés ont été secourus après trois 
semaines. Les Hutu ont essayé de combattre 
les  militaires  en  leur  lançant  des  pierres,  ils 
HUTU 
 
Q . Est-ce que vous étiez tous sur la colline en 
93 ? 
 
3 ˝Oui, nous étions tous ici, mais à la fin, nous 
avons d^^u nous réfugier 
 
Q. Est-ce que vous vous souvenez le moment 
ou le président élu a été tué ? 
 
4 c’était en 1993, le 21/10/. 
 
Q. Comment avez-vous appris la nouvelle ? 
 
4    Ce  jour-  là,  de    nombreux  étaient  à  la 
maison, nous nous croyions en sécurité. Nous 
avons  entendu  que  le  président  a  été  tué. 
Baku  bise  umwungeri  ubushyo  burasanzara  
Nous  nous sommes dit  que  nous aussi  nous 
allions être tués. 3 Urugi ruvuye ku muryango, 
imbeho ica yinjira  
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attaquaient  même  les  blindés.  Les  Tutsi  eux 
ont  fui  vers  GITEGA,  MASHITSI  et  ISA.  C’est 
l’Administrateur,  les  Chefs  de  Colline  et  les 
moniteurs  agricoles  qui  faisaient  la 
sensibilisation.5.  L’administrateur  donnait 
l’ordre aux Chefs de Colline car ce sont eux qui  
savaient où habitaient les Tutsi.  
 
1.  Après  la  victoire  de  NDADAYE,  tout  le 
pouvoir a été pris par les Hutu du RODEBU. 
4. Si l’Administrateur n’avait pas incité les gens  
 
à  tuer  les  autres,  les  paysans  n’allaient  pas 
s’entretuer car c’est sur la colline qu’on a tué 
même les femmes et les enfants, alors que sur 
d’autres Collines, on ne tuait que des hommes 
et des garçons âgés. 6. Ça a été un ordre car 
les Hutu n’étaient pas tous mauvais, ils ont tué 
à cause de l’ordre. 4. On a même tué les Hutu 
qui  essayaient  de  protéger  les  Tutsi.  On  a 
continuer à tuer les Tutsi  qui quittaient le site.  
 
1. Les juges et les enseignants ont joué un rôle 
important  dans  les  massacres.  Il  y  avait  un 
comité  sur  chaque  Colline qui  organisait  des 
massacres.  A  la  victoire  de  NDADAYE,  nous 
avons  constaté  qu’il  allait  y  avoir  des 
massacres car on a installé ces comités qui ont 
organisé  des  massacres,  c’était  en  fait  le 
comité  du  FRODEBU.  Nous  sommes  revenus 
dans  ce  site  en  1995.  Avant,  on  nous  a  dit 
d’aller  à  MUSHIHA  où  étaient  les  refugiés 
rwandais,  nous  avons  refusé  en  disant  que 
nous devions rentrer dans nos Communes. A 
ce  moment  là,  c’était  un  peu  calme,  on 
pouvait quitter MASHITSI pour venir ici.6. Par 
après, ça a changé. Les Hutu nous rendaient 







FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 19 
March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
Umushingantahe,  58;  (2)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 48; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
74;  (4)  teacher,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  54;  (5) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 35; (6) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, 54.  
Q. Qu’est- ce que les gens ont fait après avoir 
entendu cette nouvelle. 
2 Nous avons fui, car les militaires sont venus 
avec des blindés. 4. Le blindé est venu le jour 
suivant. Les paysans ont barré les routes pour 
empêcher les véhicules des militaires  à entrer 
pour  pouvoir  fuir.  Le  jour  de  la  mort  du 
président nous avons barré la route. 
 
Q. Qu’est-ce  les Tutsi ont fait après la mort 
du président Hutu ? 
4.  Sans  mentir  (Tudahendanye),    après  avoir 
entendu  la  nouvelle,  les  Tutsi  avaient  dans 
leurs  têtes  qu’ils  allaient  tuer  les  Hutu.  Eux 
aussi.  Ce  qui  nous  a  révvélé  leur  plan,  c’est 
que le lendemain le 22-23/10/93, les militaires 
sont venus pour faire fuir les Tutsi vers GITEGA 
(MASHITSI). 
 
Q. Qu’est - ce qui s’est passé  avec les Tutsi ? 
Qu’est - ce que vous avez fait aux Tutsi ? 
4. Nous avons été pris par le chagrin, et nous 
avons  commencé  à  nous  entretuer.  5.  Celui 
qui avait plus de force que l’autre le tuait. 4. 
Les Hutu ont tué les Tutsi pendant trois jours, 
mais les Tutsi ont continué à tuer les Hutu. 
 
Q. Qu’est -ce qui s’est passe après le départ 
des Tutsi dans les collines ? 
4.  Nous  étions  comme  des  orphelins  après 
avoir  enlever  les  barrières,  la  récompense  a 
été de nous tuer. Celui qui enlevait les arbres 
était tué. 2. on ne peut pas savoir exactement 
le nombre de jours que cela a duré 
 
Q. Quand est-ce que le calme est revenu ? 
4.  Il n’y  avait  jamais de calme, les Tutsi  ont 
continué,  à  nous  tuer,  93,  94,  94,97,  ils  ont     
continué, ceux qui avaient la force ont fuit vers 




FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 19 
March  2008 ;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  67 ;  (2) 
peasant,  male,  Hutu,  54 ;  (3)  peasant,  male, 
Hutu,  54 ;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  65 ;  (5) 
peasant,  male,  Hutu,  49 ;  (6)  peasant,  male, 
Hutu, 50 ; (7) peasant, male, Hutu, 47.  
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Box 25. 1993: ITABA 
TUTSI 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé sur la Colline de 
KAGOMA ? 
 
1.  Chez  nous,  nous  avons  connu  la  crise  de 
1993.  Nous  avons  fui  à  GITEGA,  nous  y     
avons passé deux années. Moi, j’ai vécu deux 
ans  à  GITEGA.  7.  A  KAGOMA,  on  a  eu  des 
massacres.  Les  gens  ont  commencé  à 
s’entretuer. Les gens ont pris la fuite. Les biens 
des gens tués, ont été pillés, mais on ne sait 
pas par qui. Une ethnie a pris fuite à cause  
d’une autre ethnie.6. C’était en Octobre, ……… 
le  25,  le  21  Octobre.1.  C’est  le  début  de  la 
guerre. 5. Au début, nous ne savons rien. Mais 
par  après,  nous  avons  entendu  que  le 
Président     de la République était entre les 
mains des gens chargés de la sécurité. A cette 
date, il y avait des rumeurs que quand on osait 
tuer le Président qu’il y aura quelque chose. Le 
jour après, c’était vendredi. On a commencé à 
brûler les maisons des Tutsi. 
 
Q. Qui a fait cela ? 
 
1. Les Hutu et ils tuaient aussi. 
 
Q. Les habitants de la Colline ? 
 
Tous :  Oui,  oui.  5.  C’étaient  nos  voisins, 
quelques jours après, les militaires sont venus 
ici. Mais les militaires sont venus après que la 
plupart a été tuée. 
 
Q. Ils sont venus quand ? 
 
4-5. Après environ deux semaines 
 
Q. Les tueries et brûler les maisons, ça a duré 
combien de jours ?  
 
1. Environ deux semaines. 5. On a commencé 
a avoir le calme quand les militaires étaient là.  
HUTU 
 




5.  En 1972,  ,  il  n’y avait pas  grand-chose  ici 
parce qu’on cherchait des gens qui avaient fait 
des  études.  Les  gens  qui  avaient  fait  des 
études à Bujumbura. Ici, il n’y avait personne 
qui a été tuée. Tous : Rien ne s’est passé ici. 
5. En 1993, les Hutu et les Tutsi ont commencé 
à s’entretuer. 6. C’était au mois d’octobre, le 
20.  1.  Le  jour  après  avoir  entendu  que  le 
président était tué, on a commencé à tuer. 3. 
Le  jour  qu’on  avait  entendu  la  mort  du 
Président, les Hutu ont commencé à brûler les 
maisons  des Tutsi.  5. C’étaient  des  Hutu  qui 
habitaient sur la Colline ici. 
 
Q. Il y avait combien de ménages de Tutsi ? 
 
(Discussion sur le nombre)Tous : Environ 50. 
 
Q.  C’était  spontané  ou  est-ce  qu’il  y  avait 
quelqu’un qui a pris le devant ? 
 
5.  Personne  n’a  donné  l’ordre.  On  a  vu  les 
maisons brulées sur les autres Collines. On     a 
dit :  « Nous  sommes  les  derniers,  on  va 
commencer aussi » ? 
 
Q. Où étaient les Tutsi ? 
 
5. Les uns ont été tués par des hommes, des 
civils, d’autres ont pris la fuite. 
 
Q. Ça a duré combien de temps 
 
5. Ça a duré une journée. 
 
Q. Après, c’était le calme ? 
 
5. C’était fini après une journée. 2. Au mois de  
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Les gens de là-bas ont même poursuivi les  
 
habitants de la Colline. 5. On avait tous fui vers 
des endroits différents. 
 
Q. Il y avait combien de familles Tutsi ? 
 
5. Plus de 100 ménages. Il y  a des familles qui 
ont totalement disparu. 
 
Q. On a eu combien de mort ? 
 
6. J’ai perdu 18 personnes moi-même. 4. Si on 
a eu du temps, on peut faire le calcul, on ne 
peut même pas estimer. Il y  a des nouveaux  
 
nés tués aussi. 
 
Q. Quand est-ce que vous êtes revenus ? 
5-6. Le site n’existait pas ici, mais il y avait des 
gens à la paroisse. 4-6. La plupart est venue 
1994-1995. 
 
Q. Comment était la situation ? 
Bon,  après  quand  la  population  est  rentrée 
avec  les  armes,  les  militaires  ont  attaqué  la 
Colline pour récupérer les armes. 
 
Q.  C’est  seulement  à  ce  moment  qu’on  a 
attaqué la Colline ? 
Tous : Non. 5. Les militaires n’ont pas attaqué 
la Colline à ce moment. Mais, l’Evêque a dit :  
«D’ici deux  semaines  vous  allez  rentrer  chez 
vous ».  (Explications très incompréhensible).7. 
Au cours de cette période, il y avait un peu de 
calme. 
 
Q. Quand vous êtes venus ici, comment était 
la situation ici ? 
1. Quand nous sommes arrivés ici, la sécurité 
était assurée par des militaires. 
 
Q. Vous alliez aussi sur la Colline ? 
5. Pendant cette période, il n’y avait personne 
qui allait sur la Colline. 3. Nous avons passé 
une année ici sans pouvoir aller sur la Colline.    
Tous :  Vers  fin  1995,  on  pouvait  aller  sur  la 
Colline. 4. Les gens de là-bas vivaient chez eux,  
 
 novembre, les militaires sont venus et ils ont  
 
commencé à se venger     sur les Hutu. 
1. Une semaine après, les militaires sont venus 
avec 9 blindés et trois hélicoptères. 
2-3. Ils ont commencé à tirer sur les gens 
3-5. Il n’y avait plus de chasse aux Tutsi à ce 
moment. 
 
Q. Combien de Tutsi ont été tué ? 
 
Les Tutsi ne sont pas morts sur la Colline, on 
les a amenés vers la Colline et ils sont morts 
en cours de route. 
 
Q. Qui était Administrateur ? 
 
5. Il était tout nouveau. Il venait d’être élu. 
Tous : On ne sait pas de quel parti. 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qu’il a fait durant ces jours ? 
 
6.  Un  certain  Jean.  Il  était  Conseiller  depuis 
longtemps Avant les élections, mais il     a été 
remplacé  par  un  certain  Edouard  durant  les 
élections.Jean a été élu mais il a pris la fuite et 
il était remplacé par Edouard. Il a pris la fuite     
parce que  les  soldats avaient tiré sur lui. . 
 
Q.  Qu’est  ce  que  Jean  faisait  durant la 
période qu’on chassait les Tutsi ? 
 
Tous : Rien. Il voulait empêcher mais il n’avait 
plus  de  pouvoir.  3.  C’était  grave.  Quand  on 
essaie  de  cacher  un  Tutsi,  on  était  menacé. 
Moi,  j’ai  caché  deux  enfants.  Un  est  à 
l’Université  maintenant.  Je  n’avais  pas  de 
relations mais c’étaient des voisins. 5-6. Il n’y 
avait  pas  de  problèmes  entre  les  ethnies.5. 
Tout  est  venu  à  cause  de  la  mort  de 
NDADAYE.5-6. Les gens qui ont tué ne sont pas 
spéciaux. 5. Surtout des jeunes mariés 
 
Q. Pourquoi les jeunes mariés ? 
 
5.  Moi  aussi, j’ai  été  surpris. On  ne sait  pas 
d’où c’est venu. J’ai vu un groupe de jeunes  
gens, je les ai appelés pour demander  
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d’autres vivaient en TANZANIE. 
 
Q. Est-ce qu’il y en a qui sont morts ? 
 
5.  Quelques  uns  sont  morts  quand  ils  sont 





FGD,  Gitega  Province,  Commune  Itaba,  26 
February  2009;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced,  44;  (2)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
50;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  39;  (5) 
peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  displaced,  28;  (6) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 37; (7) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
pourquoi ils avaient des journaux ? Ils ont dit 
que je ne savais pas ce qui s’est passé, et j’ai 
dit :  « Non,  je  ne  le  sais  pas ».  Ils  ont 
commencé à brûler les maisons vers 19heures. 
6.  Ils  ont  passé  toute  la  nuit,  brûlant  les 
maisons. Le lendemain, c’était fini. On voyait    
les maisons brûlées et la fumée partout. 
 
 
FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 31 March 
2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (2) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 50; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 70; 
(4) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (5) peasant, male, 
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Box 26. 1996: BUGENDANA MASSACRE 
 
TUTSI 
Q.  Qu’est-  ce  qui  s’est  passé  au  camp.En 
1996, ils sont venus nous exterminer ici dans 
le  site.  1.  Moi,  j’étais  rentré  chez  moi,  j’ai 
même  passé  six  mois  dans  mon  ancienne 
parcelle.  Tout  a    changé  avec  l’arrivée  des 
rebelles.  4.  Les  rebelles  étaient  les  plus 
forts(lors  des  événements  de  1993,  ils  ont 
alors  voulu  parachever  ce  qu’ils  avaient 
commencé  en  1996.  1.  Il  y  avait 
TIBANTUNGANYA  comme  président  à  ce 
moment-  là,  la  rébellion  était  forte.  Ils  sont 
venus  de  la  Commune  GIHOGAZI,  ils  ont 
sensibilisé les Hutu d’ici pour nous  attaquer, 
on ne pouvait pas fuir. 6. Lors des massacres 
de  1996,  les  paysans  étaient  les  plus 
farouches,  avec  des  gardiens,  des  couteaux, 
des machettes,……c’était le 21 Juillet 1996. Le 
massacre a duré environ 4h, de 5h00 à 9h30. 
 
1. Ici il y avait seulement sept militaires, ils ont 
été attaqués, nous avons été sauvés par des 
renforts venus de GITEGA. A leur arrivée, les 
rebelles et les paysans Hutu se sont sauvés, ils 
ont pris la fuite. Après cette attaque, il y a eu 
un autre meurtre en 1997 quand les rebelles 
ont surpris treize personnes qui étaient dans 
leurs  champs.  La  guerre  était  entre  les 
militaires  et  les  rebelles,  mais  les  rebelles 
tuaient les Tutsi. Les militaires eux ne tuaient 
pas les paysans Hutu car les Hutu collaboraient 




FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 19 
March 2008; (1) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
Umushingantahe,  58;  (2)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 48; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
74;  (4)  teacher,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  54;  (5) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 35; (6) peasant, 




Q. Qu’est- ce qui s’est passé au camp. 
4.  Nous,  nous  ne  pouvons  pas  répondre  à 
cette  question.  Nous    étions  cachés  dans  la     
brousse. Nous avons seulement entendu des 
coups de feu.7. Au plus fort de la guerre, tous 
les gens d’ici ont fui. Nous, nous avons cessé 
de tuer.     Mais les Tutsi continuaient à tuer, 
alors pour se venger, il y a des gens qui ont 
pris  la          décision  de  se  venger.  Ce  qui  a 
soulevé cette vengeance, ce sont environ 40 
cadavres     qu’on a trouvés aux environs de 
GITEGA.  Les  rebelles  se  sont  dit  alors,  il  est 
temps de    leur montrer que nous aussi nous 
pouvons tuer les Tutsi. 4. Nous ne rappelons 
plus  l’année, car quand on est démuni, on ne 
compte plus les   années, mais c’était  environ 
2  ans  après  que  les  Tutsi  soient  revenus  de 
MASHITSI.  
 
Q.  Comment  les  rebelles  s’organisaient-ils ? 
Avaient – ils des contacts avec la population ? 
 
 4.  Non,  on  ne  pouvait  pas  les  voir.  Ils  se 
cachaient  des  militaires  et  des  civils.  Les      
militaires  nous  ont  dit  de  leur  signaler  la 










FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Bugendana, 19 
March  2008 ;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  67 ;  (2) 
peasant,  male,  Hutu,  54 ;  (3)  peasant,  male, 
Hutu,  54 ;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Hutu,  65 ;  (5) 
peasant,  male,  Hutu,  49 ;  (6)  peasant,  male, 
Hutu, 50 ; (7) peasant, male, Hutu, 47. 
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Box 27. 2002: ITABA MASSACRE 
TUTSI 
 
Q. Vous avez connu la guerre ici ? 
 
Tous : oh, oh, oui, oui. 2. Ici, c’est la région la 
plus touchée. 5. C’est la période quand 
l’armée et les rebelles se battaient ici. 6. C’est 
depuis 1998 que c’est devenu grave. 
 
Q. Les rebelles étaient ici ? 
 
7. On ne sait pas d’où ils venaient. Mais, ils 
étaient là. Ce sont de gens originaires d’ici. 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qu’ils faisaient ? 
 
On demandait de l’argent, on pillait des vaches 
et parfois ils tuaient. 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé après ? 
 
5. A un moment donné, les rebelles et les 
militaires se sont affrontés sur la Colline de     
KAGOMA et KAYONGA  et on a connu 
beaucoup de morts. C’était en 2002. 1. 2002 
entre septembre et octobre. 
 
Q. Qu’est ce qui s’est passé à ce moment ? 
 
3. On ne peut pas savoir. On était ici comme 
d’habitude, on a entendu des coups de feu     
et on a dit que les gens de KAYONGA et 
KAGOMA étaient morts. 
 
Q. Comment ? 
 
3. Comme était le champ de bataille, les 
militaires et les rebelles se sont battus là-bas. 
 
Q. Les rebelles étaient là-bas ? 
 
7. Les rebelles et les civils étaient mélangés sur 






6.  Il  y  a  eu  la  guerre  ici.  Aussi  une  année 
durant  trois  mois,  on  n’  a    pas  pu  sortir  à     
cause  des  batailles.  Depuis  qu’on  a  tué  le 
prêtre en 2000, la guerre était grave ici. Mais 
en 2002, c’était   catastrophique. 
 
Q. C’était comment ? 
 
1. C’est au cours de cette année qu’on a eu 
beaucoup  de  morts  ici.  On  ne  sait  pas     
comment  les  militaires  ont  pu  encercler  la 
Colline.  6.  Très  tôt  le  matin.  Les  militaires 
originaires  de  cette  Colline  avaient  pris 
position sur  la montagne et commençaient à 
tirer  pour  donner  des  ….  Aux  gens  qui 
habitaient  sur  le  site.1.  Ils  ont  encerclé  les 
deux Collines de façon qu’on ne pouvait pas 
fuir  vers  d’autres    Collines.  On  faisait  deux 
colonnes  venant  des  deux  côtés.6.  Ils  ont 
commencé à tirer par groupe les gens. Quand 
les gens étaient rassemblés ils     les tuaient 
ensemble. Tous : les gens étaient encerclés et 
groupés dans les maisons et on les tuait sur 
place. 6. On ne les a pas enterrés. On demolait 
la maison et c’était fini. 5. Ce sont les paysans 
qui  détruisaient  les  maisons  à  cause  de  la 
mauvaise odeur. 
 
Q. Les maisons sont encore là ? 
 
6.  On  peut  les  voir,  mais  par  après,  on  a 
enterré les corps . C’est en      2002 qu’on a fait 
cela.1.  C’étaient  des  maisons  en  briques  …. 
Maintenant  ce  sont  les  champs.6.  Ceux  qui 
sont tombés dans la vallée, on peut remarquer 
leurs tombes. 
 
Q. Ça a duré combien de temps ? 
 
6. C’était le 22 Septembre 2002. C’était   
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s’est passé. 4. On entendait des coups de feu 
de la guerre. 
 
 
Q. Il y avait beaucoup de morts ? 
 
1. Oui, sur les deux Collines. 
 
Q. Mais les gens du site étaient ici ? 
 
Tous : Oui, tout le monde était ici. On ne 
pouvait pas aller là-bas. 
 
Q. Quand est-ce que le calme est revenu ? 
 
5. C’est après les élections de 2005 quand 
Monsieur NKURUNZIZA a gagné les    élections. 















FGD,  Gitega  Province,  Commune  Itaba,  26 
February  2009;  (1)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi, 
displaced,  44;  (2)  peasant,  female,  Tutsi, 
displaced, 50; (3) peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 
50;  (4)  peasant,  male,  Tutsi,  displaced,  39;  (5) 
peasant,  female,  Tutsi,  displaced,  28;  (6) 
peasant, male, Tutsi, displaced, 37; (7) peasant, 
male, Tutsi, displaced, 40. 
 
 
ensemble  avec  les  jeunes  gens  qui  habitent      
sur le site. 1. Il y avait un groupe de tueurs et 
un  groupe  de  pillards.  Ceux  qui  pillaient 
étaient des gens du site. Ils  pillaient les choses 
dans les maisons et le bétail. 6. Rien ne restait. 
Après avoir pillé tout, on brûlait la maison. 
 
Q. On connaît les gens du site ? 
 
Tous : Non. Ils avaient pris la fuite. 1. Avant de 
venir ici, les militaires sont passés au site. En 
rentrant, ils étaient  accompagnés des civils. 
 
Q. Vous étiez où ? 
 
2.  Caché  partout.  A  un  certain  moment,  on 
commençait  à  brûler  la  brousse  aussi.  On  a     
traversé  la  rivière  pour  aller  dans  l’autre 
Colline. 
 
Q.  Pourquoi  a-t-  on    fait  cela  sur  les  deux 
Collines ici ? 
 
Tous :  Nous  avons  été  trahi.  Ce  sont  les 
politiciens  qui  le  savent.  On  disait  qu’on            
faisait la chose aux rebelles, mais il n’y en avait 
pas. 5. Pendant les événements, on était dans 
une  maison  comme  ici  et  si  on  n’était  pas 
alerté, on était tous tué  
 
 
FGD, Gitega Province, Commune Itaba, 31 March 
2008; (1) peasant, male, Hutu, 60; (2) peasant, 
female, Hutu, 50; (3) peasant, female, Hutu, 70; 
(4) peasant, male, Hutu, 43; (5) peasant, male, 
Hutu,  70;  (6)  peasant,  female,  Hutu,  hill 
administrator, 60  
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ANNEX 2 : CODE BOOK 
  
OBJECTIVES JUSTICE, TRUTH, COMPENSATION, RECONCILIATION 
 
1)  POLITICS, POLITICIANS, REGIME, GOVERNMENT, POWER 
Guilty have/are still in Power (General) 
Guilty have/are still in Power - Cannot Judge Themselves 
Guilty have/are still in Power - Victims are afraid 
Guilty have/are still in Power - Fear to Speak Out 
Guilty have/are still in Power - No incentive Initiate Clarification of Past  
Government / State / Politicians Uncapable // No Good Governance 
No Willingness (General) 
No Political Will (General) 
No Political Will (Local Authorities) 
No Political Will To Clarify the Past / Address Past Crimes 
No Initiation By High-Level Authorities (Political Will) 
No Sensitization By High-Level Authorities 
No Example By High-Level Authorities 
No Dialogue / Cooperation Between Politicians / High-Level  Authorities 
Necessity to Initiate Political Reconciliation First 
Pardon is Imposed by Administration / Regime / Politicians 
Policization of Past (Crimes) 
No Agreement on TJ-Policy (General) 
No Agreement on TJ-Policy (Hutu vs. Tutsi) 
No Agreement on TJ-Policy (Political Level) 
Too Sensitive (Political Issue) 
Not the Right Moment Yet (Political Constellation) 
Discrimination in State Actions / Divisions Enhanced by Politicians 
No Judicial Independance (Influence of Executive) 
 
2)  SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Corruption  
Trauma / Wounds of War - Violence 
Ethnic Hatred 
Rancor / Hatred (Hearts) (General) 
Local Conflicts 
Local Land Conflicts 
Loss of Property 
Discrimination in Society (General) (Rich vs. Poor - Elite vs. Peasants) 
Discrimination (Ethnic) 
Discrimination (Regional) 
Divisions in Population / 'Spirit' of Divisionism 
People are not Living Together (Physically) 
Lacking Social Cohesion / Values / 'Love' / 'Entente' / Trust 
Lacking Unity 
Negative Solidarity / Ethnic  
Negative Solidarity / Protectionisme (Family - Friends) 
Continuing Insecurity / No Peace (War / Banditry / Violence) 
Rumours / Tracts / Dividing 'Speech' 
Unwilling by Others to Live Together Again 
Absence of Common Dialogue 
No Culture of Truth (Witnesses / Population) 
Poverty 
No Humanitarian Assistance 
Institutional Instability 
 
3)  JUSTICE SYSTEM / INSTITUTIONS 
Justice System is Partial (General) 
Justice System is Partial (Clientelism) 
Justice System is Partial (Ethnic) 
Justice System is Partial (Tutsi Dominance) 
Justice System is Partial (Hutu Dominance) 
Past Impunity (Jurisprudence of Impunity) 
General Absence of Rule of Law 
Poor Education of Judges 
Judges have played a role 
Weak Justice System (No Enforcement of Decisions / Delay in Decisions) 
Misuse / Manipulation / Disrespect of Bashingantahe 
 
4)  NATURE OF THE VIOLENCE 
Everyone is Guilty / Too Many Perpatrators 
History of Violence is Too Long 
Too Many Crimes 
Crimes Are Too Complex 
Losses Are Too Big 
 
5)  FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES 
Fear of Consequences (General) 
Fear of Consequences (War) 
Fear of Consequences (Local Level Social Cohesion) 
Fear of Consequences (Hatred / Vengeance) 
Fear of Consequences (Negative Impact on Process of Pardon & Reconciliation) 
Fear of Consequences (Settling Accounts) 
Fear of Consequences (Targeting by Accused)  
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Fear of Consequence (Targeting by Politicians) 
Fear of Consequences (Never Ending Accusations) 
Fear for Punishment / Obligation for Restitution / Sanctions 
Fear to Testify /  Denounce Others (General) 
Fear to Testity / Speak Truth to Power (Politicians) / Administration 
Fear of (Liberated) 'Political Prisoners' 
Fear to Live Together Again 
 
6)  PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO REACH TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OBJECTIVES 
No Willingness to Live Together Again (Physically) 
No Willingness to Participate In this Action (General Population) 
Guilty Don't want to Participate in this Action (General Population 
Absence of Witnesses  
Absence of Knowledge about Crimes & Losses / Absence of Truth / False Testimonies 
Absence of Alledged Perpetrators (Refugees - Soldiers) / People Disappeared 
Perpetrators Unknown 
 
7)  OTHER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ACTION/OBJECTIVE IS NECESSARY 
This Action Has  No Capacity to Foster Reconciliation 
This Action Leads to Nothing 
Punishment / Establishing Accountability Has No Capacity to Foster Reconciliation 
Need To Leave the Past Behind / Forgetting 
Need to Pardon 
Need to Establish Accountability 
Need of a Special Judicial Enviroment (Laws / Tribunal) 
Need of a Special Social Environment (Spaces of Dialogue / Framework / 
Commission) 
Need of Indemnisation For Victims 
Need To Clarify Big Historical Events (Murder Ndadaye, ...) 
Real Causes are Unknown 
Need of International Assistance in This Matter 
 
8)  NO PROBLEM 
No Obstacle 
No Problem Between Ordinary People 
Confidence / Cohesion Returned - No TJ-Action Necessary 
 
9)  NO IDEA 
No Idea 
 
10)  OTHER 
Other 
Good Example of Rwanda 
Bad Example of Rwanda 
 
11)  NO RESPONSE 
No Response 
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Importance Living Together Peacefully / Co-Habitation 1 
 
1.  UNSPECIFIED / GENERAL ACTION 
Amour / Harmonie / Vivre ensemble / Paix (trés général) 
Action des Habitants Locales Mêmes (Voisinage / Entreaide) 
Action International Community 
Action Présidentielle 
Action Gouvernement / Administration (General) National 
Action Gouvernement / Administration (General) Local 
Action Undertaken by Abashingantahe 
 
2.  GOD / RELIGION / CHURCHES 
 
3.  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (NARROW: Dealing with the Past) 
Punition des Coupables 
Pardon 
Pardon et Amnestie 
Vérité Sur le Passé 
Vérité et Pardon 
Oublie / Amnestie 
Indemnisation 
Solution pour Occupation des Maisons / Restitution de la terre & Biens 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Resoudre le Passé (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Resoudre le Passé (Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Resoudre le Passé (ONG) 
 
4.  (GOOD) GOVERNANCE 
Egalité / Division (Gouvernance - Aide - Development) (National) 
Egalité / Division (Gouvernance - Aide - Development) (Local) 
Egalité / Division (Discours) (National) 
Egalité / Division (Discours) (Local) 
Egalité  / Division (Ethnique) (General) 
Impartialité dans la Justice / Respect de la loi 
Retour des Habitants (Deplaces) 
Retour des Habitants (Rapatriés) 
Retour des Habitants (Deplacés & Rapatriés) 
Partage Du Pouvoir chez les autorités superieurs 
Cooperation / Entente Entre les Politiciens 
Visit des Politiciens dans la Population 
Arret de la corruption 
 
Stabilité Politique 
Pas de Multipartisme 
Elections des Nouveaux Dirigeants (National) 
Elections des Nouveaux Dirigeants (Local) 
Sensibilisation General (La Paix / La Cohabitation) (Gouvernement) 
 
5.  SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation (Cohésion / Paix)  (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation (Cohésion / Paix)  
(Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation (Cohésion / Paix) (ONG) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / Parler (Cohésion / Paix)  (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / Parler (Cohésion / Paix)  
(Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / Parler (Cohésion / Paix) (ONG) 
Fête / Ceremonies Traditionelles (partage de la bière) 
Activités / Réunions de Sport 
Creation d'une comité des Sages 
Creation des Associations (Général) 
Creation des Associations (H et T) 
Creation des Associations Pour Dialoguer (H et T) 
Creation des Projets de Development (General) 
Creation des Projets de Development (H et T) 
Aide aux plus pauvres 
Creation des Ecoles / Education 
Construction des Maisons (Déplacés) 
Construction des Maisons (Rapatriés) 
Construction des Maisons (Rapatriés & Déplacés) 
Villagisation ensemble (sans distinction ethnique) 
Redistribution de la terre 
 
6.  SECURITY 
Resoudre Conflit Locaux 
Combattre les Rumeurs 
Renforcer la Sécurité 
Désarmement des Civils 
Fin de la Guerre 
Negociation / Pact avec les rebelles 
 
7.  NO PROBLEMS 
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Importance Living Together Peacefully / Co-Habitation 1 
1.  Love / Harmony / Living Together / Peace (General) 
Amour / Harmonie / Vivre ensemble / Paix (trés général) 
 
2.  GOD / RELIGION / CHURCHES 
Dieu / Religion / Eglises 
 
3.  Equality / No Division (Governance / Development / Discours)  
Egalité / Division (Gouvernance - Aide - Development) (National) 
Egalité / Division (Gouvernance - Aide - Development) (Local) 
Egalité / Division (Discours) (National) 
Egalité / Division (Discours) (Local) 
Egalité  / Division (Ethnique) (General) 
Impartialité dans la Justice / Respect de la loi 
 
4.  Punishment of Guilty 
Punition des Coupables 
 
5.  Pardon 
Pardon 
Pardon et Amnestie 
 
6.  Truth  
Vérité Sur le Passé 
Vérité et Pardon 
 
7.  Amnestie / Oblivion 
Oublie / Amnestie 
 
8.  Indemnisation / Restitution 
Indemnisation 
Solution pour Occupation des Maisons / Restitution de la terre & Biens 
 
9.  Unspecified (General) Action 
Action des Habitants Locales Mêmes (Voisinage / Entreaide) 
Action International Community 
Action Présidentielle 
Action Gouvernement / Administration (General) National 
Action Gouvernement / Administration (General) Local 
Action Undertaken by Abashingantahe 
 
10. Sensibilisation (Cohesion & Peace) - General (Government) 
Sensibilisation General (La Paix / La Cohabitation) (Gouvernement) 
 
 
11. Organization of Local Level Encounters /  
Meetings (Dealing with the past) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Resoudre le Passé (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Resoudre le Passé (Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Resoudre le Passé (ONG) 
 
12. Organization of Local Level Encounters / Meetings (General) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation (Cohésion / Paix)  (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation (Cohésion / Paix)  (Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Sensibilisation / Formation (Cohésion / Paix) (ONG) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / Parler (Cohésion / Paix)  (Général) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / Parler (Cohésion / Paix)  (Gouvernement) 
Reunions / Assemblées de Rencontre / Dialogue / Parler (Cohésion / Paix) (ONG) 
Fête / Ceremonies Traditionelles (partage de la bière) 
Activités / Réunions de Sport 
Villagisation ensemble (sans distinction ethnique) 
 
13. RETURN OF REFUGEES / DISPLACED 
Retour des Habitants (Deplaces) 
Retour des Habitants (Rapatriés) 
Retour des Habitants (Deplacés & Rapatriés) 
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14. CREATION OF ASSOCIATIONS 
Creation d'une comité des Sages 
Creation des Associations (Général) 
Creation des Associations (H et T) 
Creation des Associations Pour Dialoguer (H et T) 
 
15. STIMULATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Creation des Projets de Development (General) 
Creation des Projets de Development (H et T) 
Aide aux plus pauvres 
Creation des Ecoles / Education 
Construction des Maisons (Déplacés) 
Construction des Maisons (Rapatriés) 
Construction des Maisons (Rapatriés & Déplacés) 
Redistribution de la terre 
 
16. SECURITY 
Resoudre Conflit Locaux 
Combattre les Rumeurs 
Renforcer la Sécurité 
Désarmement des Civils 
Fin de la Guerre 
Negociation / Pact avec les rebelles 
 
17. POLITICAL CHANGE 
Partage Du Pouvoir chez les autorités superieurs 
Cooperation / Entente Entre les Politiciens 
Visit des Politiciens dans la Population 
Arret de la corruption 
Stabilité Politique 
Pas de Multipartisme 
Elections des Nouveaux Dirigeants (National) 
Elections des Nouveaux Dirigeants (Local) 
 






    
 
 